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Abstract 
With the post-WWII acceleration of globalisation and the proliferation of transnational 
concerns (such as nuclear armament, financial instability, climate change, the spread of 
diseases etc.), there has been a concomitant increase in international laws and institutions 
designed to regulate this activity and facilitate international cooperation. This widening and 
deepening of international law brings to the fore normative concerns about how and from 
where international law derives its legitimacy. Indeed, international legal institutions have 
been suffering a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in recent years: from the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’ to Brexit. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the philosophical literature on the political legitimacy of 
international law. In particular, it seeks to morally evaluate the traditional theory of 
international legal legitimation: ‘state consent’.  
After conducting an in-depth conceptual analysis of three key concepts (international 
law, political legitimacy, and state consent), the thesis will consider six arguments against the 
proposition that state consent is either sufficient or necessary for the legitimacy of 
international law. I conclude that state consent is not ‘sufficient’ as – to properly legitimate 
international law – state consent would need to fulfil the additional necessary requirement 
of being ‘authorised’ by the individuals within the state; arguably through a process of 
deliberative democratic decision-making. I also conclude, however, that state consent may 
be ‘necessary’ for the legitimacy of a certain category of international law; namely, the 
international law of ‘cooperation’ (as opposed to ‘coexistence’). The thesis ends by tentatively 
suggesting proposals for how international law may increase its claim to legitimacy under the 
existing state-consent model: first, by incentivising a process of internal democratisation, and 
second, by establishing an international ‘harm principle’ that better protects third-parties 
from indirect harm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The subject of this thesis is the legitimacy of international law. International laws are those 
that govern the interrelationships of sovereign states.1 Legitimacy (in a political context) is a 
type of moral justification that applies specifically to formal institutions and is thus concerned 
with institutional design. To have legitimacy – as I understand it – means to have the right to 
be obeyed for ‘content-independent’ reasons (i.e., for reasons relating to the design of the 
institution promulgating the rules rather than the content of the rules themselves).2 The 
question of the legitimacy of international law, then, is a question of whether or not those 
subject to international law have a content-independent obligation to obey it. 
 To be legitimate, international law – as with any law – will need to satisfy certain 
conditions. Of what these conditions consist, and how they can be satisfied in practice, is a 
matter of great dispute. One traditional answer, however, is that – to achieve legitimacy – 
international laws require the consent of states (specifically, the consent of those states over 
whom those international laws claim jurisdiction).3 It is on this proposed requirement of ‘state 
consent’ that this thesis will focus. In this regard, I will consider two related and overarching 
questions: 
1. Is state consent sufficient for the legitimacy of international law? 
2. Is state consent necessary for the legitimacy of international law? 
 
If state consent is sufficient, then it provides for the legitimacy of international law on its own. 
This would not preclude, however, the possibility that there exist other sufficient means by 
which to legitimate international law. On the other hand, if state consent is ‘necessary’, then 
international law cannot be legitimate without it. In this scenario, it may also be the case that 
there exist other necessary requirements that need to be satisfied alongside state consent.  
                                                          
1 International law can also – more rarely – govern the activities of individuals and other actors. See chapter 
one and section 5.1 for relevant discussions. 
2 See chapter two for a full explanation and justification. 
3 See chapter three for a full discussion. 
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The arguments made throughout this thesis all culminate in my conclusion that state 
consent is not sufficient, but is arguably necessary, for the legitimacy of (some types of) 
international law. I also conclude, however, that state consent may be sufficient when given 
by (sufficiently) democratic states. Filled, as it is, with caveats, this conclusion does not 
provide the ‘neatness’ that we as philosophers are often at pains to provide. What I believe 
this conclusion can claim to its advantage, however, is to be compatible with our intuitions 
about the natural right to self-determination; albeit self-determination of a particular kind. 
Whereas traditional international law focuses on the self-determination of ‘states’, my 
conclusion reflects an emphasis on the self-determination of peoples. In other words, the 
legitimacy of international law is contingent on its not diminishing the autonomy of 
individuals (organised as collectives) rather than of states per se. As such, state consent is 
sufficient as a method of legitimating international law only to the extent that it can, or helps 
to, achieve this.  
Idealistically, my conclusions are cautious. In other words, I take as my starting 
position the international legal system as it is currently structured, and work from there. I do 
not, as others have done, formulate abstract theories from a ‘blank slate’. Having said that, 
my conclusion is still committed to the idea that international law does indeed need to satisfy 
moral demands; mere dominance in power relations or realpolitik is not satisfactory. As a 
result – toward the end of the thesis – I offer practical suggestions of how international law 
might evolve, from its current state, toward a position of increased legitimacy. This consists, 
first, of incentivising a process of internal democratisation within states and, second, by 
establishing an international ‘harm principle’ that better protects third-parties from indirect 
harm. 
 As will become apparent, this thesis is an exercise in moral and political philosophy. It 
is not an empirical study, nor is it a contribution to social or political science. To the extent 
that it ‘is’ descriptive, it is only to inform normative discussions. Put simply, it presents an 
argument for what ought to be case. It does not offer a description or explanation for why 
the world is the way it is, or why agents behave as they do. As a consequence, this thesis is 
the product only of secondary research and philosophising. No primary data has been 
collected. 
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It is also important to note that, although this is essentially an exercise in moral 
philosophy – it does not presuppose any particular moral framework; be that 
consequentialism, deontology, or virtue ethics. Instead, I shall follow theorists such as 
Michael Huemer in adopting an approach of ‘moral intuitionalism’. In other words, I will base 
my discussion on morally intuitive and uncontroversial premises (i.e., those that theorists of 
all moral and political persuasions would want to accept). From these premises, I will attempt 
to reason my way to conclusions about the points of contention. My reason for taking this 
approach is the same as that given by Huemer: ‘political philosophy’, argues Huemer, ‘is a 
difficult and disputed field. One who hopes to make progress cannot begin from a contentious 
moral theory, still less from a contentious political ideology. One’s premises should be things 
that, for example, both liberals and conservatives would typically find obvious at first glance’.4 
Although not often stated as explicitly, I’ve found that this is the approach adopted by most 
theorists who have written on this and similar topics. 
 The rest of this introduction will attempt to provide some context for my research 
question, and provide a justification for why such a question is worth asking. I will explain 
both the historical context of my research question, and also how this thesis fits within the 
wider academic discussion. I will end the introduction with a brief overview of how the thesis 
will be structured and its primary contents.  
 
Historical Context 
The question of political legitimacy is not new. Indeed, as Barker declares: ‘the identification 
of the conditions which justify government and require obedience has always been at the 
centre of political enquiry: What is meant by legitimacy or legitimate authority? That is the 
master question of politics’.5 Having said that, it has also not been around forever – or at least 
not in the sense in which we shall be discussing it. The question of political legitimacy is only 
ostensibly compelled to life during the ‘Age of Enlightenment’. This is because the concept 
only really becomes intelligible alongside certain basic assumptions about the individual and 
                                                          
4 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.15 
5 Barker, R. (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State: p.4; see also: Crick, B. (1959) The American Science of 
Politics: p.150 
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political society; assumptions that first found widespread currency in Enlightenment thinking. 
To explain: 
Prior to the Enlightenment era – which arguably began in seventeenth-century Europe 
– government was not seen to require any special justification, but was instead invariably 
justified with reference to the ‘divine right of kings’.6 The doctrine of St. Paul was nearly 
universally accepted, by political theorist and layman alike: ‘Let every person be subject to 
the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist 
have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has 
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment’.7 As Simmons explains, ‘the political 
authority of Kings was believed to be granted by God, and the duties of citizens toward their 
king were imposed by God. Neither the conduct of kings nor the behavior of individual citizens 
played any part in the generating of political bonds or authority’.8  
Fundamental to Enlightenment thinking, however, was the idea that the individual is 
‘born free’ and is subject to no natural political obligations; whether that be to a divinity or 
any other temporal agent.9 From this starting point, and in the face of political hierarchies 
and obligations, one is compelled to ask, by what ‘special’ right does one individual rule over 
another? Any attempt to rule over another is prima facie impermissible and thus stands in 
need of further justification.10 This is the question of political legitimacy, which was expressed 
beautifully in the opening lines of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract when he 
observes: ‘Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains… how did this change come about? 
I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer’.11 
Theories of political legitimacy were originally developed to justify the existence and 
actions of nation-states. One of the earliest attempts to justify state power came from those 
theorists within the ‘social contact’ tradition.12 This ‘voluntarist’ account began to develop, 
arguably, in the mid-seventeenth-century with the writings of Thomas Hobbes13, and soon 
                                                          
6 See, for example: Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’  
7 Romans 13:1 & 2; See also: Simmons, J.A. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations: p.58 
8 Simmons, J.A. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations: pp.58-9 
9 Lister, M. (2011) ‘The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law’: p.671 
10 See: Valentini, L. (2011) ‘Coercion and (Global) Justice’. 
11 Rousseau, J.J. (2004) [1762] The Social Contract. 
12 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.20 
13 Hobbes, T. (2013) [1642] De Cive; and Hobbes, T. (1968) [1651] Leviathan. 
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after continued by John Locke14 and the aforementioned Jean-Jacques Rousseau.15 For the 
majority of history since Hobbes, the concept of the state has been the central object of 
political analysis.16 In addition to these voluntarist accounts, there have been bids made to 
assess the legitimacy of the state on teleological17 as well as deontological18 grounds.19 
 The reason the state has been the centre of such extensive normative analysis, of 
course, is that states typically make a number of morally significant claims over those whom 
they govern. For example, states claim the exclusive right to issue commands, within a given 
territory, and to enforce those commands with, if necessary, ‘physical violence’.20 This ability 
to affect human well-being in such a fundamental way renders the state an object of 
considerable moral significance. 
Since at least the end of the Second World War, however, there has been an 
interesting and profound development in the distribution of political power. The ability of the 
state to affect human well-being, although still dominant, seems to be in relative decline. 
Instead, a whole host of global and international actors appear to be playing a larger and more 
prominent role in how human lives are governed.21 This ‘shift’22 in the exercise of power from 
the state to the ‘global’ has been driven – primarily – by the forces of ‘globalisation’. 
Globalisation refers to the ‘widening, intensifying, speeding up and growing impact of 
worldwide interconnectedness’23 and has, in large part, been brought about by a ‘revolution 
in technology and communications.’24 This revolution, of course, has made it is easier for 
                                                          
14 Locke, J. (1924) [1690] Two Treatise of Government. 
15 Rousseau, J.J. (2004) [1762] The Social Contract. 
16 Held, D. (1983) ‘Introduction’ States & Societies: p.2 
17 See, for example: Bentham, J. (1988) [1776] A Fragment on Government; Hume, D. (1965) ‘Of the Original 
Contract’; and Hare, R.M. (1976) ‘Political Obligation’. 
18 See, for example: Kant, I. (1981) Kant’s Principles of Politics; Kant, I. (1999) Practical Philosophy; Rawls, J. 
(1964) ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’; Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice; and Pitkin, H. (1972) The 
Concept of Representation. 
19 For a general overview of the different philosophical traditions of state justification, see: Horton, J. (1990) 
Political Obligation. 
20 Weber, M. (1994) [1919] ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’; and Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy 
of International Law’: p.82 
21 Hale, T. & Held, D. (2011) ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance’: p.1 
22 Dicken, P. (2013) Global Shift. 
23 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics, and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.2; see also: 
Held, D. et al. (1999) Global Transformations. 
24 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: p.25 
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political, social, and economic actors to operate transnationally.25 More specifically, as Held 
& Maffettone delineate, globalisation embraces at least four distinct types of change:  
‘First, it involves a stretching of political, social and economic activities across 
frontiers, regions and continents. Second, globalization is marked by the growing 
magnitude of networks and flows of trade, investment, finance, culture and so on. 
Third, globalization can be linked to a speeding up of global interactions and 
processes, as the development of worldwide systems of transportation and 
communication increases the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, 
capital and people. And, fourth, it involves the deepening impact of global interactions 
and processes such that local events can come to have enormous global 
consequences. In this particular sense, the boundaries between domestic matters and 
global affairs become fuzzy.’26 
 
Although globalisation brings with it many potential benefits and opportunities for the 
improvement of human well-being, it also presents us with a number of new challenges; 
challenges that are not confined to the borders of any particular nation-state. These include, 
but are not limited to: financial instability and systemic crisis, climate change, nuclear 
proliferation, extremist terrorist networks, the global spread of diseases, cyber-crime, and so 
on.27 In such an interdependent and globalised world, ‘no individual state, no matter how 
competent, can address [such] transnational issues’ on its own.28 As Hale & Held put it, 
attempting to resolve these issues using solely state institutions is ‘essentially using 17th-
century institutional technology to confront 21st-century challenges.’ 29 Thus, globalisation 
has created a demand for, and led to the proliferation of, a multitude of new governance 
institutions and international laws that operate at the transnational level; beyond the state.30   
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics, and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.2 
27 Hale, T. & Held, D. (2011) ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance’: p.3; and Sell, 
S.K. (2014) ‘Who Governs the Globe?’: p.73 
28 Hale, T. & Held, D. (2011) ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance’: p.3 
29 Ibid. 
30 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: pp.28-9. It should be stressed at this point 
that contemporary international law has its origins far further back – arguably in the seventeenth century. This 
was the time of the Treaty of Westphalia and the birth of the modern sovereign state (see chapters one and 
three). Concomitantly, international laws began to develop to regulate the interactions between these new 
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It is important to note that the shift from ‘state’ to ‘global’ governance has been partial 
and by no means complete. Indeed, the state arguably remains the primary governance actor 
and the ‘pivotal entity of interest aggregation, legitimation and control.’31 However, in the 
words of Joost Pauwelyn, it is clear that states are increasingly ‘supplemented, assisted, 
corrected and continuously challenged by a variety of other actors.’32 The proliferation of 
international institutions and laws in terms of sheer numbers goes some way to 
demonstrating this shift. For example, from the beginning to the end of the twentieth-
century, ‘the number of intergovernmental organisations had grown from a handful to more 
than 2,000.’33 Likewise, the number of ‘multilateral and bilateral treaties have also increased, 
now standing at around 3,000 and 27,000, respectively.’34 However, not only have ‘the 
number and range of activities that are shaped or regulated by international and 
transnational institutions skyrocketed in the last five decades’, but ‘their role and the 
pervasiveness of their influence in the internal politics of most nation-states’ is also widely 
acknowledged.35 As Henriksen observes, ‘international regulation is actually everywhere 
around us. It is present in the cars we drive, the phone calls we make, the food we eat, the 
wine we drink, the clothes we wear, the movies we watch, the medicine we use and so on 
and so forth.’36 Indeed, to get some sense of the ubiquity of international law, it is worth 
browsing the American Society of International Law’s ‘100 Ways Project’ which describes one 
hundred practical ways in which international law shapes our everyday lives.37 
 
The Current Crisis of Legitimacy  
On the positive side, international laws and institutions have the potential to manage many 
of the problems thrown up by globalisation. They can, for example: help alleviate poverty; 
                                                          
states. The post-WWII era of globalization, however, marked a significant turning point in the acceleration and 
proliferation of international laws and institutions. 
31 Pauwelyn, J. (2012) ‘An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking’: p.20 
32 Pauwelyn, J. (2012) ‘An Introduction to Informal International Lawmaking’: p.20 
33 Hale, T. & Held, D. (2011) “Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance”: p.5; see 
also: Held, D. et al.(1999) Global Transformations. 
34 Hale, T. & Held, D. (2011) ‘Editors’ Introduction: Mapping Changes in Transnational Governance’: p.5; and 
Simmons, B. (2010) ‘Treaty Compliance and Violation’. 
35 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.12 
36 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.2 
37 ‘International Law: 100 Ways it Shapes Our Lives’ (2018) American Society of International Law. [Online]. 
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combat climate change38; engender economic stability and growth39; facilitate peaceful 
resolutions to conflict40; institutionalise human rights41; promote corporate good practices42; 
and prevent the global spread of diseases.43 However, the existence of these international 
laws and institutions brings forth the same fundamental problem of legitimacy that the 
Enlightenment philosophers raised in relation to the nation-state. As Thomas notes, 
international laws and institutions now wield ‘powers with deeply intrusive implications for 
the autonomy of states and individuals.’44 Thus, as international law becomes a more 
prominent part of our everyday lives – and in some cases takes over the traditional functions 
of domestic law – it is equally reasonable to ask what legitimates international law.45 As 
Steffek rightly notes:  
‘The globalization debate of the last decade has drawn public attention to the fact that 
states are ceding more and more competences to international organizations, and in 
turn have become dependent upon their rules and decisions. As a consequence, a 
quite extensive debate about the legitimacy of such governance ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ 
the nation-state has emerged.’ 46 
 
The need to assess the legitimacy of international laws is evident in practice from the growing 
criticisms levelled against a number of international actors in the last two decades in 
particular.47 ‘Since the “battle in Seattle” in 1999’, writes Steffek, ‘many international 
                                                          
38 For example, the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement.  
39 For example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
40 For example, the UN Security Council and UN Charter more broadly. 
41 For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
42 For example, the Basel III banking regulations. 
43 For example, the World Health Organisation.  
44 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: pp.729-30. In justifying this 
statement, Thomas explains that: ‘states may now be pressured under WTO rules to change their health or 
environmental policies; they may be required to align their economies with the policies remotely dictated by 
the World Bank in exchange for funds; the UN Security Council may impose sanctions that target individuals 
directly’.   
45 The debate over the extent to which the state has diminished in power relative to international authorities is 
hotly contested, and has resulted in many essays and volumes of work. (See, as just two examples: Ohmae, K. 
(2009) ‘The End of the Nation State’; and Strange, S. (2009) ‘The Declining Authority of States’). I do not intend 
to take any strong position within this debate; I only claim that international laws and institutions have 
developed some governance capabilities (previously undertaken by states), and, to that extent, expose 
themselves to challenges of legitimacy. 
46 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.252 
47 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: p.25 
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organizations… have become subject to critical public review.’48 Machida adds to this that 
‘protesters have condemned policies of major intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such 
as the… IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, claiming that they lack democratic 
accountability’49 and that they act in the interests of hegemonic states and big business, and 
not in the interests of the global community at large.50 Indeed, in addition to protest by civil 
society actors, the legitimacy of international legal institutions has been questioned by 
academics, practitioners51, governments52, and even other international institutions.53 It is 
not an uncommon view, therefore, that – as expressed by Lefkowitz – ‘at present 
international law enjoys less, and perhaps far less, legitimacy than it claims (or that some 
claim on its behalf).’54 
Indeed, since I began work on this thesis, one seismic event in particular has brought 
the question of the legitimacy of international laws and institutions to the fore once again. 
This was, of course, the decision of the United Kingdom to cease its membership of the 
European Union (EU) in June 2016. As I interpreted it, the electorate’s decision to leave the 
EU, was – in large part – a reaction to the EU’s perceived illegitimacy.55 My reading of the 
situation was that most of those who voted to leave the EU were not doing so based (solely 
or necessarily) on a dislike of particular policies or laws; as might be the case when voting to 
replace a domestic government with that of another. Instead, they voted as such based on a 
rejection of the institution itself.  
                                                          
48 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.249; see also: Kaldor, M. (2000) ‘’Civilising’ 
Globalisation?’. 
49 Machida, S. (2009) ‘Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations’: p.371; see also: 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Civilization and its Discontents; Bruner, L. (2003) ‘Global Governance and the Critical Public’; 
and Howse, R. & Nicoloaidis, K. (2003) ‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy’. 
50 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: p.25 
51 Perhaps the most famous example of a practitioner criticizing GGIs (specifically the World Bank and the IMF) 
is Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz is a Nobel Prize Laureate and former Chief Economist of the World Bank. (For an example 
of his criticisms see Stiglitz, 2002). Another notable example would be Dore Gold’s criticism of the United Nations 
in his book Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos (see: Gold, 2005). Gold is a former 
Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. 
52 See, for example, Argentinian President Cristina Fernandez’s criticism of the IMF (Todays Zaman, 2012). More 
generally, as noted by Woods (2002), ‘many developing countries are increasingly concerned that [the] growing 
intervention [of GGIs] in the realms of politics, human rights and security is a strictly one-way affair which carries 
overtones of a new imperialism’. 
53 A recent example was IMF criticism of the austerity measures imposed on Greece by the European Union 
(specifically the European Commission and European Central Bank). See, for example: BBC News (2015) ‘Greece 
debt crisis: IMF attacks EU over bailout terms’. 
54 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.114 
55 I do not intend to take a position in this thesis as to whether the EU is, or is not, legitimate, or whether the 
vote to leave was justified on these terms. 
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It is important here to recognise the difference between the concept of legitimacy and 
other normative evaluations such as ‘good/bad’, ‘right/wrong’, ‘advantageous/ 
disadvantageous’ and so on. The difference can be illustrated as follows: in the domestic 
sphere, for example, it is perfectly rational and consistent for an individual to, on the one 
hand, be extremely condemnatory of a particular government and their policies but, on the 
other, recognise their right to govern and create laws. In other words, they can still recognise 
that government’s ‘legitimacy’. This, I submit, was not the case with the EU. The primary 
grievance was one of institutional design. It was not fundamentally about what laws were 
being imposed, but how and by whom those laws were made. 
 This reading of ‘Brexit’ as one primarily to do with legitimacy is borne out by analysing 
the rhetoric of those who argued most prominently and vociferously in favour of leaving. 
Daniel Hannan – often described as the ‘architect behind Brexit’56 – complained that: ‘The EU 
is run, extraordinarily, by a body that combines legislative and executive power. The European 
Commission is not only the EU’s ‘government’; it is also, in most fields of policy, the only body 
that can propose legislation. Such a concentration of power is itself objectionable enough; 
but what is truly extraordinary is that the twenty-eight commissioners are unelected’.57 In a 
similar vein – and with similar reference to the institutional design of the EU – notorious 
Brexiteer Nigel Farage argued on the eve of the referendum vote that:  
‘Leaving would mean that we would be taking back control. That those we elect as 
MPs would be the ones who make and decide our laws, rather than a bunch of 
unelected old men in Brussels who most people cannot name and who we cannot vote 
for or remove. Leaving the European Union would revitalise our democracy and mean 
that the big decisions were made by us instead of for us. I believe we're big enough 
and good enough to govern our own country.’58 
 
                                                          
56 For example, see: Bosotti, A. (2018) ‘Architect of Brexit shares brilliant solution to Government’s negotiation 
woes’. 
57 Hannan, D. (2016) Why Vote Leave: p.39 
58 Farage, N. (2016) ‘Nigel Farage: Why you should vote for Brexit this Thursday’. 
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Many other prominent leave campaigners expressed similar sentiments.59 This line of thinking 
is further supported by the fact that the single biggest reason that Leave voters (49%) gave 
for their decision was ‘sovereignty’.60 Even the other substantive reasons given for leaving – 
such as ‘immigration’ and the ‘economy & trade’ – were framed in terms of ‘taking back 
control’. Indeed, this official slogan (‘take back control’) of the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign 
suggests, again, that the grievance was one of legitimacy; one based on how and where laws 
were made, and not of what they consisted. 
The reason the perception of the illegitimacy of the EU was greater in Britain than in 
other member states was – so the argument has been made – because the constitutional 
procedures that are recognised as legitimating the imposition of laws in the British domestic 
sphere are very different to those of the EU. This cannot be said of the constitutional make-
up of most other continental member states – whose constitutional arrangements and 
processes of legitimation are invariably reflected at the EU level. For example, the EU, as with 
most other member states, but unlike the UK: has proportional representation at legislative 
elections; has a Parliament whose primary role is to amend rather than propose legislation; 
has a system whereby a written constitution is supreme, rather than parliamentary 
supremacy; and has executive minsters who are appointed rather than elected.61 
 
Academic Context 
Brexit, however, was just a reaction to the increasing imposition of international laws and 
institutions that – as mentioned – started at pace after the Second World War. However, for 
a long time, the question of the legitimacy of international law remained neglected and is, 
even now, arguably ‘under explored and under scrutinised’.62 In his essay ‘The Uses and 
Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’, Chris Thomas offers a number of reasons for this 
                                                          
59 Boris Johnson, for example, argued that through Brexit, ‘[w]e would be able to take back control of our 
democracy’ and that ‘[w]e’d be able to set our own laws’ (Johnson, B. (2016) ‘Boris Johnson’s 8 Reasons Why 
Britain Should Leave the EU’). Michael Gove argued that Brexit would be a ‘vote for democracy’, as UK 
membership of the EU ‘prevents us from being able to change huge swathes of law’ (Gove, M. (2016) ‘EU 
Referendum: Michael Gove Explains Why Britain Should Leave the EU’). See also: Airas, I. (2017) ‘A Neo-
Gramscian Analysis of Brexit’.  
60 Ashcroft, L. (2016) ‘How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday… and Why’. 
61 Hannan, D. (2016) Why Vote Leave: pp.103-115 
62 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.730 
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historic neglect.63 Just one of the plausible explanations he offers is that ‘it is only 
comparatively recently that philosophers and social scientists have recognized the relevance 
of legitimacy to justifying forms of public power not explicitly based on violence. International 
law’s traditional lack of coercive sanctions [therefore] effectively excluded it from earlier 
investigations.’64   
It was only (arguably) after the publication of Thomas Franck’s seminal work The 
Power of Legitimacy among Nations in 1990,65 that the academic literature experienced what 
Ian Clark called ‘a veritable renaissance of international legitimacy talk’.66 However, the exact 
focus of this literature tends to vary. Thomas Christiano, for example, has written multiple 
essays on the legitimacy of ‘international institutions’.67 Alternatively, Buchanan & Keohane, 
and Held & Maffettone have focused on the legitimacy of ‘global governance’ or ‘global 
governance institutions’.68 Elsewhere, Buchanan, as well as others such as David Lefkowitz, 
have produced essays on the legitimacy of ‘international law’.69 As will be obvious from the 
title of this thesis, I will be opting for the latter approach in focusing on the legitimacy of 
‘international law’. My reasons for this choice are as follows:  
 First, a focus on ‘international institutions’ would not get to the heart of our normative 
concerns. This is because – for the most part – international institutions derive their powers 
from (and are simply a manifestation of) the international legal treaties that led to their 
creation.70 As such, the object of most normative significance is actually the ‘constituent 
treaty’ that creates the institution, and not the international institution itself. This does not 
mean that this thesis will not refer to the ‘legitimacy of international institutions’ – indeed it 
                                                          
63 Ibid.: pp.730-1 
64 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.730; see also: Wellman, C. 
(1996) ‘Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy’: p.211 
65 Franck, T.M. (1990) The Power of Legitimacy among Nations; see also: Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and 
Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.731 
66 Clark, I. (2005) Legitimacy in International Society: p.12 
67 See, for example: Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’; Christiano, T. 
(2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’; and Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Institutions’. 
68 See, for example: Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’; 
and Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’. 
69 Buchanan, A. (2008) ‘Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Legal Order’; Buchanan, A. 
(2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’; and Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’. 
70 For example: the UN is a manifestation of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations; the IMF is a manifestation 
of the of the 1945 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; and the EU is a manifestation of 
the Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Function of the European Union. 
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will. However, it should be recognised that such a reference will invariably be an assessment 
of the international legal document (i.e. treaty) on which that institution is constituted. 
Additionally, a focus on international institutions would be unduly narrow. This is because 
many other international laws exist that do not establish international institutions but are 
nevertheless of at least equal moral significance. This includes most bilateral treaties, 
customary international law, and general principles of international law (see chapter one).  
Conversely, a focus on ‘global governance’ – in general – is unnecessarily wide. As a 
consequence (and as I will argue in chapter two) it does not lend itself to assessments of 
legitimacy. This is for two reasons: first (as has been mentioned) legitimacy is primarily a 
question of institutional design. The problem, then, is that much global governance doesn’t 
come in an ‘institutional package’. Indeed, as James Rosenau correctly points out, the broad 
concept of global governance ‘refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations 
through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained’.71 Instead, global 
governance should be conceived ‘to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – 
from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the 
exercise of control has transnational repercussions.’72 Second  (and again as I will argue 
further in chapter two) legitimacy is specifically about justifying the imposition of obligations. 
Many global governance actors and institutions, however, do not attempt to impose 
obligations on ‘subjects’, whereas all international laws (by definition) do.73 
Notwithstanding the literature to which I have just referred, I agree with Held & 
Maffettone when they say that the issue of legitimacy – particularly in relation to 
international law – ‘has not received the attention that it deserves within mainstream 
debates. The global political theory literature’ they go on to say, ‘has poured considerable 
amounts of ink on the scope of egalitarian distributive principles, yet, with the exception of 
debates addressing the desirability of global democracy,74 it has paid comparatively less 
                                                          
71 Rosenau, J.N. (2005) [1995] ‘Governance in the Twenty-First Century’: p.45 
72 Ibid. 
73 A good example of such an institution would be the ‘Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’ (BCBS). 
Although the BCBS posit ‘rules’ relating to global standards for the prudential regulation of banks, they 
demand no obligation of obedience; the rules are merely voluntary. As it says in the Basel Committee Charter: 
‘The BCBS does not possess any formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. Rather, 
the BCBS relies on its members' commitments’. 
74 See, for example: Held,D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order; and Marchetti, R. (2008) Global 
Democracy: For and Against.  
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attention to the more specific questions pertaining to legitimacy and institutional design’.75 
This thesis, then, in its own modest way, aims to reduce the deficit of attention that has been 
paid to the legitimacy of international law. However, I will not attempt to formulate any new 
standard of legitimacy against which international law should be assessed. Nor will I attempt 
to review every proposed standard of legitimacy that has hitherto been put forward. Instead, 
I shall confine myself to a consideration of just one potential standard for the legitimacy of 
international law: that of ‘state consent’. At its simplest, this is the theory that says 
international law is legitimate when states consent to that law (although see chapter three 
for a more in-depth exposition). My reasons for focusing solely on state consent as a potential 
standard for the legitimacy of international law are four-fold:  
The first is simply a matter of ‘space’. As Christiano sets out in his essay ‘The Legitimacy 
of Institutions’, there are – in contemporary thought – at least three main categories of 
theories of what makes international law (or institutions) legitimate.76 These are: state 
consent; democratic decision-making; and ‘instrumental’ theories in which legitimacy is 
based on the quality of outcomes.77 I have judged that focusing on two or all of these main 
theories would – given the limited space I have available to me – diminish the quality and 
depth with which I could analyse any one theory in particular.  
My second reason is that the theory of state consent is the one most frequently 
assumed to be correct in actual international legal practice (see more below). Thus, although 
this thesis undertakes a normative analysis of specifically state consent, to the extent that 
international law is the product of state consent in practice, it is also a normative analysis of 
the current international legal system. Third, there is a serious lack of normative 
consideration of the state consent theory of international legal legitimacy in the literature – 
both in terms of quantity and depth. Of the theorists who have addressed this topic, most 
afford it no more than a few pages and, as far as I am aware, there exists no book-length 
analysis devoted specifically and entirely to this question. Andrew Guzman also seems to 
notice this problem when he writes that ‘the normative implications of our consent-centric 
                                                          
75 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.12 
76 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.382 
77 Ibid. 
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approach to international law have not been adequately addressed and, in my view, are not 
well understood.’78   
My fourth reason is perhaps the most intellectually and academically interesting. This 
is to do with the fact that there is an obvious – and seemingly irreconcilable – oppositional 
difference in the way that the theory of state consent is viewed by, on the one hand, political 
philosophers, and on the other, international lawyers. Held & Maffettone, in reviewing the 
existing philosophical literature on the legitimacy of international law observe that all hitherto 
theorists  ‘share something in common, namely, the refusal to accept a background picture 
in which states are sovereign in the traditional Westphalian sense of the term, and 
consequently, see their international obligations as only justifiable through voluntariness or 
consent.’79 They go on to paraphrase Rawls (1999) in saying that ‘we now live in a (normative) 
world where states are no longer considered the originators of all their powers. The upshot 
is that it is untenable to evaluate international institutions and regimes through the lenses of 
state consent alone.’80 Held & Maffettone also very much subscribe to this view. 
 By contrast, most international lawyers (especially legal ‘positivists’) will want to 
portray all – or nearly all – international legal obligations as derived from the consent of 
states. Louis Henkin expresses this view, for example, when he says that a ‘state is not subject 
to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority’.81 For people 
like Henkin, the international legal order is premised on the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty in which states can only be legitimately bound through their own consent. As any 
basic or introductory text on the international law will tell you, international law is 
fundamentally a consent-based system.82 Indeed, the International Court of Justice (formerly 
the PCIJ) has expressed this principle in a famous paragraph: 
‘International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
                                                          
78 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.5 
79 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.12 
80 Ibid. 
81 Henkin, L. (1989) ‘International law: politics, values and functions’: p.27 
82 See, for example: Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.21; and Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: 
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established to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims [emphasis added]. 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’83 
 
In addition, and although international lawyers tend to be hesitant about straying from 
interpretive to normative analysis, private conversations that I’ve had with international 
lawyers (both academic and practicing) have suggested that the state consent model of 
legitimacy is not only an accurate description of the reality of international legal practice, but 
is morally preferable to any other model.84 
 
Summary 
I began this introduction by setting the parameters of this thesis and making clear that its 
contents will build towards the conclusion that mere state consent is insufficient, but arguably 
necessary, for the legitimacy of international law. This conclusion is largely compatible with 
our intuitions about the moral importance of the self-determination of peoples. This is 
because state consent is – in the current international legal system – a necessary means to 
achieve such self-determination; but not a sufficient one.  
It was also emphasised that this thesis is an exercise in moral and political philosophy; 
and not a contribution to social or political science. I noted further that, in writing this thesis, 
I do not presuppose any particular moral framework – be that consequentialism, deontology, 
or virtue ethics. Instead, I shall adopt an approach of ‘moral intuitionalism’ in that I will base 
my discussion on morally intuitive premises and then attempt to reason from these premises 
to conclusions about the contested questions that are of interest. The primary purpose of this 
introduction, however, has been to provide some context – both historical and academic – 
for the question my thesis seeks to answer. It has also tried to demonstrate why a thesis-
length analysis of this question is valuable – both in terms of contributing to the academic 
literature, and also in helping to understand and address contemporary global events.  
                                                          
83 SS Lotus, The (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10. 
84 One such conversation in which this view was expressed was with an English Judge at the International Court 
of Justice – Sir Christopher Greenwood.  
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I began by explaining how the question of political legitimacy began to take root during 
the ‘Age of Enlightenment’. This was because the Enlightenment brought with it the notion 
that individuals are ‘born free’ and thus not subject to any natural political obligations. Thus, 
any authority that sought to impose political obligations stood in need of special justification 
– or rather ‘legitimacy’. The question of legitimacy was initially confined – predominantly – to 
the nation-state and the justification of domestic law. However, as new forms of authority 
began to emerge above and beyond the nation-state, the question of legitimacy also naturally 
extended to these new international laws and institutions. This shift from the domestic to the 
global was nowhere more apparent than in the post-WWII era of globalisation.  
 I then showed how the increasing pervasiveness and relevance of international laws 
and regulations in our everyday lives has provoked discussion as to their political legitimacy, 
and led many to the conclusion that many such laws are illegitimate (and thus constitute 
unjustified impositions). This began, most overtly, with criticism of the preeminent 
international financial institutions (such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank) in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and culminated, most recently, in ‘Brexit’. These events have led to a noticeable 
increase in academic interest on the legitimacy of international law. As I noted, however, this 
literature is still relatively scant compared to the vast literature on both political and 
distributive justice. This thesis, then, aims to help reduce the deficit of attention that has been 
paid to the legitimacy of international law.  
I have also tried, in this introduction, to highlight the limitations of what this thesis 
hopes to achieve. Specifically, it does not attempt to propose any grand theory of the 
legitimacy of international law. Instead, it focuses attention on just one (increasingly 
controversial) theory – the theory of state consent. My reasons for this are various – but my 
main motivation is derived from noticing the vastly different positions adopted by 
philosophers on the one hand, and international lawyers on the other. 
By affording this one theory in-depth and nuanced consideration, I hope to dissect 
those elements of the theory that are morally attractive from those that need amending or 
discarding altogether. In this way, I hope this thesis will convince other theorists that the 
choice facing them is not whether to accept or reject the state consent theory of legitimacy. 
Instead, it is to understand when and under what circumstances this theory may be 
applicable. 
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Structure of Thesis 
In navigating this thesis, it will be useful for the reader to see it as falling into two halves. The 
first half will be the ‘conceptual analysis’ in which I consider the three main concepts relevant 
to this thesis: ‘international law’, ‘political legitimacy’, and ‘state consent’. Explanations as to 
these terms are provided in chapters one, two and three respectively. The second half of the 
thesis (chapters four, five and six) will consist of the discussion in which I will attempt to 
answer the research question – in other words: the extent to which state consent provides 
for the legitimacy of international law. This, in turn, will be broken down into the question of 
whether state consent is ‘sufficient’ for the legitimacy of international law (chapters four and 
five), and whether it is ‘necessary’ (chapter six). 
Chapter one of this thesis will give an overview of the structures and function of 
international law. In other words, it will give a descriptive account of the current international 
legal order. It will explain the way in which international law is fundamentally different to 
domestic law in terms of the structure of authority. The chapter will also give an overview of 
the way in which different types of international laws are created. Providing this basic 
understanding of the disparate structure of international law will be essential for any nuanced 
discussion of whether state consent is necessary or sufficient for the legitimacy of 
international law. This is because, as will be shown, state consent does not relate to all types 
of international law in the same way. Simply asking the question ‘does state consent 
legitimate international law’ begs the question as there is no ‘one’ type of international law.  
Chapter two will analyse the concept of political legitimacy. This is a notoriously 
elusive concept to pin down, and it has been attributed various different meanings in the 
literature. I will make clear in this chapter that I am using the term legitimacy in its normative 
– as opposed to descriptive – sense. The primary tasks of this chapter will be to propose a 
particular ‘moral function’ of legitimacy (i.e., the difference in normative standing between a 
legitimate and illegitimate institution), and also to identify the ‘basis of legitimacy’ (i.e., those 
features of a political institution that one ought to assess when determining legitimacy). 
Finally, I will make clear the difference between the concept of legitimacy, and that of 
‘justice’. 
Chapter three will analyse the notion of ‘state consent’ and consent in general. It looks 
at: consent’s normative function; the way in which it legitimates law; and the criteria for 
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‘valid’ consent. It will also be looking at how the doctrine of state consent has evolved in 
international law, and the necessary assumptions that one must hold about the international 
system before accepting a state consent theory of legitimacy. Finally, this chapter will briefly 
consider the extent to which state consent claims to be able to legitimate international law 
in practice. 
As mentioned, chapters four to six (the second half of the thesis) will comprise our 
normative evaluation of state consent as a method of legitimating international law. I will be 
dividing this analysis into, first, whether state consent is ‘sufficient’ to legitimate international 
law (chapters four and five), and second, whether state consent is ‘necessary’ (chapter six). 
My approach will be to consider those arguments I believe to be the most convincing against 
the proposition that state consent is necessary and/or sufficient for the legitimacy of 
international law. 
 Chapter four considers the problems of ‘non-voluntary state consent’ (section 4.1) 
and ‘uninformed state consent’ (section 4.2). These two arguments focus on instances where 
purported state consent may be ‘invalid’ (and thus insufficient to legitimate international 
law). This is simply because – according to consent theory – consent must be both ‘free’ & 
‘informed’. The two sections in this chapter argue that ‘ostensible’ state consent is insufficient 
to legitimate international law, and that other criteria must be fulfilled to ensure that any 
instance of state consent is both free and informed.  
Chapter five will consider the problem of ‘authorisation’ (section 5.1) and also the 
problem of ‘immoral state consent’ (section 5.2). The problem of authorisation argues that 
state consent is insufficient for the legitimacy of international law because – to give 
normatively significant consent – states must be authorised to do so by their citizens (which, 
it is argued, they seldom are). In this way, the problem of authorisation essentially criticizes 
the theory of state consent for assuming that our unit of primary moral concern is the state 
rather than the individuals within that state. This section will go on to argue that only 
sufficiently democratic states can properly be authorised to consent to international legal 
obligations. The problem of immoral state consent, on the other hand, is essentially an 
argument against the idea that a purely procedural view of the legitimacy of international law 
– such as state consent – can be sufficient. To be sufficient, goes the argument, the content 
or ‘substance’ of international law must also meet morally acceptable standards. 
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Of all the four arguments considered against the sufficiency of state consent in 
chapters four and five, I will find the ‘problem of authorisation’ (section 5.1) to be the most 
convincing; and the one which ultimately renders state consent insufficient for the legitimacy 
of international law. 
Chapter six will look at two problems for the proposition that state consent is 
necessary for the legitimacy of international law. Section 6.1 covers the problem of ‘immoral 
state non-consent’, and section 6.2 the ‘problem of non-consensual international law’. The 
‘problem of immoral non-consent’ says that the non-consent of states to some cooperative 
activity can – in some instances – create negative externalities severe enough to constitute 
an injustice. Accordingly, any proposed international law that attempts to rectify these 
injustices is legitimate; with or without the consent of states. The problem of non-consensual 
international law, on the other hand, is an argumentum ad consequentiam (argument to the 
consequences). This is an argument that concludes a hypothesis to be either true or false 
based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences. The reason 
this is a problem for the necessity of state consent is that there already exist many 
international laws that – although we perceive them to be legitimate – do not derive from 
state consent. Thus, holding to the position that state consent is necessary for the legitimacy 
of international law will lead to the undesirable consequence that many of the laws we 
assumed to be legitimate, are not.  
 As mentioned, however, we turn now to chapter one, which aims to unpack and 
explain the concept of ‘international law’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
This chapter seeks to set-out a broad picture of how the international legal system operates. 
It is not intended to be a novel contribution or provide any special insights that do not already 
exist in other basic texts. Instead, it will help set the context for later discussions for those 
without a background in international law. This chapter, unlike much of the ones to follow, 
will be largely descriptive. In other words, I will merely attempt to describe the structure of 
the current international legal system as best I understand it, without (for now) passing 
judgement on the merits or otherwise of that system. This descriptive overview, although 
elementary, will prove to be vital in informing and shaping the scope and parameters of our 
discussion on the state consent theory of international legal legitimacy. 
This chapter will attempt to provide answers to the following questions: what is the 
structure of the international legal system; how does international law differ from domestic 
law; why does international law exist; and how is international law created? It will not, 
however, focus specifically on state consent, nor on the historical development of 
international law as these topics will be discussed further in chapter three.  
 
1.1 The Structure of the International Legal System 
A preliminary distinction ought to be made between ‘public’ and ‘private’ international law. 
Private international law is the law that ‘regulates individual conduct with a transboundary 
element’ (e.g. international contracts, international marriages or international traffic 
accidents etc.).1 Public international law, however, is ‘the system of law that regulates the 
interrelationship of sovereign states’.2 This thesis is concerned only with public international 
law (from herein just ‘international law’). A more comprehensive definition of international 
law is offered by Professor Shearer:  
                                                          
1 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.3; see also: Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.1 
2 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.1 
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‘International law may be defined as that body of law which is composed for its greater 
part of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound to 
observe, and therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with one another, and 
which includes also: 
(a) The rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions or 
organisations, their relations with each other, and their relations with states and 
individuals; and 
(b) Certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-states so far as the rights or 
duties of such individuals and non-state entities are the concern of the 
international community.’3  
 
A good starting point for understanding the organisational structure of the international legal 
system is to compare it to something with which people are more familiar: domestic (or 
‘municipal’) law. In (most) domestic legal systems, there exists a legislative body (in the UK 
this would be Parliament) that creates laws. These laws are then applied to, and enforced on, 
legal subjects (such as individuals) by an executive body (in the UK this would be Her Majesty’s 
Government). Finally, judicial bodies (such as Courts and tribunals) will interpret the 
application of the law in particular cases. These three branches (the legislature, executive, 
and judiciary) may often overlap or take different forms in different states, but they are 
usually conceptually discernible.  
 The most striking difference with domestic legal systems, then, is that the 
international legal system has no legislative or executive body.4 Similarly, as Henriksen 
explains, ‘although a number of international courts have been created over the years, there 
is no mandatory and well-established procedure for the settlement of legal disputes.’5 The 
reason for this fundamental organisational difference is that the international system has no 
single overarching authority.6 Consequently, unlike domestic systems, there exists no vertical 
or ‘top-down’ application of the law. Instead, international law is a horizontal or decentralised 
                                                          
3 Shearer, I.A. (1994) Starke’s International Law: p.3; see also: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public 
International Law: p.6 
4 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: pp.2-3 
5 Ibid.: p.3 
6 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.9 
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system ‘in which it is primarily up to the legal subjects themselves to create, interpret and 
enforce the law.’ 7 The primary international legal subjects – states – are not recipients of the 
law in the same way that individuals might be within the nation-state; they are (in theory) the 
creators of the law that they then apply directly to themselves. 
This decentralised structure is a corollary of the notion that each individual state is 
sovereign. Law can only exist in a society of sovereign states if it is created by those states 
themselves. If law were created by authorities other than states, then states, by definition, 
would cease to be sovereign. As Klabbers explains: ‘since states are considered to be 
sovereign, it follows that there is no authority above them; and if there is no authority above 
them, it follows that law can only be made with their consent – otherwise the system would 
be authoritarian. Hence, international law is often said to be a consent-based (or consensual) 
system.’8 The ICJ (then the PCIJ) expressed this principle when it stated that: 
‘International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims [emphasis added]. 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.’ 9 
 
This peculiar nature of the international legal system has led some to deny that international 
law is really ‘law’ at all. 10 If one chooses to define law – in part – as that which emanates from 
a single sovereign (as did, for example, nineteenth-century legal-scholar John Austin) then 
international law starts to look something more akin to a ‘positive morality’. 11 Although ‘more 
recent theorists do not hesitate to refer to international law as “law” proper’, Austin’s 
position is certainly intuitively appealing.12 As Klabbers notes, it is perfectly reasonable to ask: 
‘how, indeed, does international law function if it has no sovereign authority? How are its 
                                                          
7 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.3 
8 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.21 
9 SS Lotus, The (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10. 
10 See: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.3 
11 Austin, J. (1995) [1832] The Province of Jurisprudence Determined: p.124; see also: Klabbers, J. (2013) 
International Law: p.10 
12 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.10 
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rules made, in the absence of a legislator, and, perhaps even more puzzlingly, how can the 
system work in the absence, by and large, of a police force, a Department of Justice, a set of 
prosecutors and all the other characteristics we usually associate with legal systems?’13 The 
debate over whether international law is properly ‘law’, however, is one discussed in the field 
of analytic jurisprudence, and not one that is necessary for this thesis to confront.14 Indeed, 
for our purposes, what one chooses to call ‘it’ is far less important than understanding what 
it does, and how it is made.  
Another useful way to view international law is to see it as a ‘supplement’ or a 
‘complement’ to national law.15 In other words, international law does (or rather, has the 
potential to do) what national law is unable to do. As Henriksen explains, ‘national law is 
perfectly adequate to regulate the vast majority of legal disputes that merely involve the 
relationship between citizens of a sovereign state or between citizens and the state. But 
mutual respect for sovereignty dictates that national law is ill-suited to a situation where the 
interests of more than one sovereign state collide.’16 Any attempt to unilaterally apply 
national law internationally would be to impose upon the jurisdiction of another state 
(thereby undermining their sovereignty). To maintain the sovereign independence of each 
state, any interaction or dispute between two or more states needs to be regulated or 
resolved by a mutually recognised set of rules: i.e., ‘international law’. In this way, the scope 
of international law is arguably determined by the inadequacy of national law.17 
As mentioned, the role of international law is to regulate the interaction between 
sovereign states. However, states interact with one another in two broad ways. Consequently 
(and correspondingly) there exist two broad substantive structures of international law; one 
to govern each type of interaction. These two broad structures of international law are: the 
international law of ‘coexistence’, and the international law of ‘cooperation’.18  
                                                          
13 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.10; see also: Henkin, L. (1979) How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign 
Policy. 
14 For a discussion on the status of international law, see, for example: D’Amato, A. (1985) ‘Is International Law 
Really ‘Law’?’: p.1295 
15 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
16 The relationship between national and international law will be discussed further below.  
17 Spiermann, O. (2005) International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: pp.46-
48; see also: Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
18 It should be noted that Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland posits a third substantive structure: the ‘international law 
of conflict’ (Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.4 & 17). I, however, would argue that 
this third category could be subsumed within the broader category of ‘the international law of coexistence’.  
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 The international law of coexistence are the rules that enable states to coexist 
peacefully with one another.19 As Henriksen explains, ‘the mere fact that international society 
is composed of a multitude of sovereign states with different interests’ necessitates a 
minimum set of rules that allow that system to exist at all.20 Laws relating to coexistence are 
often referred to as ‘general international law’. These laws will contain ‘the answers required 
to separate the powers of the sovereign states and thereby uphold peaceful coexistence.’21 
International laws relating to coexistence include: ‘issues related to the delimitation of – and 
title to – territory, the criteria for statehood and the recognition of new states and 
governments, jurisdiction and immunity, the use of force, the conduct of armed hostilities 
and neutrality in times of armed conflict. Also included are the international principles of 
treaty law and the secondary legal principles on state responsibility.’ 22 
 The international law of cooperation, on the other hand, are the rules that govern 
cooperative activity between states that goes beyond mere coexistence.23 States are naturally 
interdependent in many ways, and international law can help facilitate the cooperation that 
this interdependence sometimes demands.24 Cooperation exists when two or more states 
agree to turn an issue – that would otherwise have been dealt with by national law – into one 
of an international character.25 Examples and areas in which states cooperate include: 
international human rights law, the majority of international environmental law and 
international economic law, the creation and maintenance of an international postal system, 
eradicating disease by means of common rules as to vaccination, and in combating 
international terrorism.26 EU law is a particularly good example of a legal regime solidly 
situated in the international law of cooperation.27 Under EU Treaties, ‘member States have 
transferred important powers to EU institutions. In some areas, e.g. the Common Commercial 
                                                          
19 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.17 
20 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. For views on the scope of the international law of coexistence, see also: Spiermann, O. (2005) 
International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: pp.83-87; and Bull, H. (1977) The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics: pp.66-67 
23 The international law of cooperation has also been referred to as the ‘international law of governance’. See, 
for example: Kumm, M. (2004) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.915 
24 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.17 
25 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
26 See both: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.17; and Henriksen, A. (2017) 
International Law: pp.10-11 
27 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.11 
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Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU has exclusive powers, i.e. the EU alone is 
entitled to act at both internal and international level with regard to these areas.’28 
Henriksen explains that the international law of cooperation is much ‘younger’ than 
that of coexistence: 
‘In the period immediately after the end of the Second World War states began to 
create organizations that were given competence to deal with issues that had until 
that time been considered to be of an entirely national interest. The result was the 
emergence of a new structure of international law involved in the promotion of a 
variety of ‘societal’ goals. International law thereby began to be concerned with the 
manner in which sovereign authority was exercised within individual states.’29 
 
Perhaps the clearest way to differentiate the international law of coexistence from that of 
cooperation is that the former is primarily concerned ‘with the manner in which sovereign 
states interact with… each other’, whereas the latter is more ‘preoccupied with how sovereign 
authority is constituted or exercised in relation to the citizens within the state.’30 
 As Henriksen points out, ‘it is also important to note that, the international law of 
coexistence is… not concerned with binding states closer together… it merely seeks to ensure 
that states can pursue their different and separate interests… in a way that respects the 
sovereignty of other states.’31 This is in contrast with the law of international cooperation 
which often involves states giving-up a degree of independence so as to achieve some further 
goal in partnership with other states. Finally, ‘it is important to understand that states are 
only inherently bound by the international law of coexistence and that they must agree to all 
other international legal obligations. The international law of cooperation is therefore 
‘optional’ in the sense that states decide for themselves if they want to turn a matter 
previously dealt with by national law into a matter of international law.’32  
                                                          
28 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.17 
29 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.11; see also: Friedmann, W. (1964) The Changing Structure of 
International Law: pp.61-71; and Friedmann, W. (1962) ‘The Changing Structure of International Law’: p.1147 
30 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: pp.10-11 
31 Ibid.: p.11 
32 Ibid. 
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This distinction between the international law of coexistence and cooperation will be 
central when asking (in chapter six) whether state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of 
international law. Afterall, if – as Henriksen states above – states are ‘inherently bound’ by 
the international law of coexistence, then the consent of states in relation to that law is 
rendered unnecessary. This is not true, however, for the international law of cooperation 
which, as explained above, is ‘optional’.  
 
1.2 The Relationship between International and National Law 
Before we move on to look at the processes by which international law is created, it will be 
useful to consider the relationship between international law and national legal systems, and 
to what extent the two overlap. 
 As explained above, there exist two substantive structures of international law: law 
relating to ‘coexistence’ and law relating to ‘cooperation’. The international law of 
coexistence doesn’t seem to pose much of a problem for municipal law as they operate within 
two separate spheres. As mentioned, the law of coexistence, from the perspective of the 
state, deals with ‘outward-facing’ issues (such as the law of war). Municipal law, on the other 
hand, deals with ‘inward-facing’ issues, such the rights and obligations that individuals hold 
in relation to each other and the state. In theory, then, each can operate without necessarily 
imposing on the other.  
 The international law of cooperation, however, creates a tension with municipal law. 
As stated above, cooperation exists when two or more states agree to turn an issue – that 
would otherwise have been dealt with by national law – into one of an international 
character.33 By its very nature, then, international law of cooperation ‘collides’ (or perhaps 
‘mixes’) with municipal law. This relationship between the international law of cooperation 
and municipal law has given rise to two competing theories as to how the two interrelate. 
                                                          
33 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
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These are the doctrines of ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’.34 Although there exist many variations of 
monism and dualism, the essential features of each are set out below.35 
Monism holds that ‘international law and national law essentially form a single legal 
order’ and that ‘international law can be applied directly in the national legal systems of 
states.’36 In other words, when a state, for example, signs a treaty, or a new law of customary 
international law develops, that new international law will be directly applicable in domestic 
law without the need for further legislative action. This is also called the doctrine of 
‘incorporation’ as international law is immediately incorporated into domestic law and the 
two form a single legal order.37 Thus, when municipal courts assess the law to adjudicate a 
dispute, they will consider all law; whether it has domestic origins or international origins. If 
there is a conflict between the two, international law will prevail.  It is worth noting that 
monism, as a doctrine, is mainly embraced by civil law countries, such as France and 
Germany.38 The most famous exponent of monism was Hans Kelsen.39 
In contrast with monism, ‘dualism’ says that ‘international law and national law are 
two separate legal systems that operate independently.’40 Dualism holds that international 
law is ‘the law applicable between sovereign States, and that municipal law applies within a 
state to regulate the activities of its citizens’.41 According to this view, ‘neither legal system 
has the power to create or alter rules of the other.’42 This is not to say that international law 
cannot have indirect effect in municipal law, only that international law – to have such effect 
– must first be ‘transformed’ into domestic law according to the procedures through which 
domestic law is ordinarily created (e.g. an Act of Parliament). Once transformed, international 
law will look no different to other examples of domestic law as it will sit alongside other 
domestic law in a state’s statute book; the only difference will be its origin. Thus, a municipal 
                                                          
34 Some commentators claim that the traditional doctrines of monism and dualism have lost their significance 
and suggest new approaches, such as ‘legal pluralism’ and ‘constitutionalism theory’. See, for example: 
Preshova, D. (2013) ‘Legal Pluralism: New Paradigm in the Relationship between Legal Orders’: p.288; and 
Kumm, M. (2004) The Legitimacy of International Law: Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis: p.907 
35 See, for example: Dupuy, P.M. (2011) ‘International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law’. 
36 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.14 
37 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.129 
38 Ibid.: p.130. For further examples of monist states, see: Crawford, J. (2012) Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law: pp.88-109 
39 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.14 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.129 
42 Ibid. 
 
   
37 
 
court will only look to municipal law, and not international law, when adjudicating domestic 
disputes.  
Dualism is mainly practised in traditional ‘common law’ countries such as the United 
States.43 In practice, however, many countries will operate under both doctrines (monism and 
dualism). The United Kingdom is a case in point. The UK is essentially a dualist state, however, 
as with most dualist states, English Courts will directly apply rules of customary international 
law, unless the customary rule specifically conflicts with an Act of Parliament or the UK 
Constitution does not allow it.44 Additionally, although most international law needs to be 
transformed into UK municipal law (as explained above), certain types of European Union law 
(primarily regulations) have direct effect in UK law without needing to be transformed into 
domestic law by, for example, an Act of Parliament.45 
This distinction between ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ has moral implications that will be 
discussed later in this thesis. This is because, in monist states, the ability of international law 
to impose obligations on citizens is dependent only (or primarily) on the actions of the 
executive. In dualist states, however, it is dependent on the actions of the legislature. This is 
morally relevant since executives and legislatures usually derive their own legitimacy through 
different means.  
Finally, it should be emphasised that, as a general rule, international law asserts its 
own supremacy over national law.46 This is true whether a state adopts a monistic or dualistic 
system. Article 13 of The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, for example, 
asserts that: ‘Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its 
constitutions or its laws as an excuse not to perform this duty’.47 Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties makes the same point in respect of treaties, providing: ‘A 
                                                          
43 For further examples of dualist states, see: Crawford, J. (2012) Brownlie’s Principles of Public International 
Law: pp.62-87 
44 There are a number of other unique scenarios in which English Courts will not incorporate customary 
international law. See, for example: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.139-40 
45 This is possible by virtue of Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. 
46 See, for example: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): Art. 27 
47 See: Kelsen, H. (1950) ‘The Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States’. It should be noted that The 
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States was submitted by the International Law Commission to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949, who subsequently commended it without actually 
formally adopting it (mainly because of a lack of interest on behalf of States).  
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party may not invoke the provision of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform 
a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to art. 46.’ Article 46 outlines an exception to this rule, 
namely, a treaty can be invalidated when an international law manifestly violates ‘a rule of… 
internal law of fundamental importance’.48  
 
1.3 Sources of International Law 
Thus far, we have looked at the function of international law, its substantive structure, and 
its relationship to domestic law. But how is international law actually made? The simple 
answer is: through a ‘source’. ‘Sources’ of international law refer to the instruments through 
which valid international law can be created. Thus, when we want to discover the content of 
international law, we need to consult the sources of international law.49 These legal sources 
enable us to ‘distinguish between norms of a legal character and those of a “merely” political, 
moral or ethical nature.’50 As explained previously, the international legal system is 
decentralised. As such – and unlike most domestic systems – ‘legal obligations may derive 
from more than one particular source.’ 51 
These sources are commonly identified with reference to Article 38(1) ICJ Statute. 
Article 38 is not a document specifying how international law can/must be made (no such 
document or treaty exists). Instead, the statute of the ICJ contains a listing of instruments that 
the Court may apply in deciding cases, and it is this listing that is often used as a starting point 
for a discussion of the sources of international law.52 Article 38(1) ICJ provides as follows: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a.) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the consenting states; 
b.) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c.) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
                                                          
48 See also: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.131 
49 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.21 
50 Ibid.: p.22 
51 Ibid.: p.21 
52 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.21 
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d.) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
To restate it simply, then, Article 38(1) says that the ICJ will recognise international law when 
its origin lies in: (a) an international convention (i.e. treaty); (b) international custom; (c) a 
general principle of law; or (d) a judicial decision or ‘teachings of publicists’. There is also an 
incidental source of international law – ‘equity’ – which appears in subsection 2 of Article 38. 
Article 38(2) states that: ‘This provision [i.e. Article 38(1)] shall not prejudice the power of the 
Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto’. Ex aequo et bono means 
‘according to the right and good’ or ‘from equity and conscience’. 
Article 38(1) also distinguishes between primary and secondary sources of law. 
Conventions, custom, and general principles are viewed as primary sources of law. Judicial 
decisions and teachings of publicists, however, are described as ‘subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law’ (i.e. secondary sources). The distinction between primary and 
secondary sources is made because the former are law creating (i.e. they create new rights 
and obligations) whereas the latter are law identifying (i.e. they merely apply or clarify the 
content of existing law).53 
It is worth noting that there is nothing to suggest that these sources represent an 
exhaustive list of the available sources of international law.54 The ICJ is not the arbiter of what 
constitutes a valid source of law and what does not. Through Article 38(1), the ICJ has not 
intended to ‘create’ or authorise sources of law, but merely to codify existing practice.  Article 
38(1) is also the target of much criticism for a number of reasons. For example, the concept 
of jus cogens (discussed later in this chapter and also chapter six), which arguably plays a 
fundamental role in modern international law, is not mentioned.55 I will now look at each 
source of international law and explain what they mean and how they operate in practice. 
 
                                                          
53 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.23 
54 Ibid.: p.21 
55 For further discussion regarding the criticisms levelled against Article 38(1), see: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. 
(2015) Public International Law: p.27 
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1.3.1 International Treaties 
‘Treaties’ (along with customary international law, see below) are one of the two main 
sources of international law.56 Indeed, Lord McNair, author of The Law of Treaties, described 
treaties as ‘the only, and sadly overworked workhorses of the international legal order.’57 
Kaczorowska-Ireland explains that ‘the expression “treaty” is used as a generic term to cover 
a multitude of international agreements and contractual engagements concluded between 
States. These international agreements are called by various names including treaties, 
conventions, pacts, declarations, charters, concordats, protocols, covenants, or by even less 
formal names such as “exchange of notes” and “memorandum of agreement”.’58 
The simplest way to think about treaties is to view them as contracts.59 Just as 
individuals within the domestic sphere may contract to create or exchange rights and 
obligations, so do states in the international sphere. Treaties are actually the only way that 
states can enter into a legal relationship with one another.60 As Klabbers explains: ‘if states 
want to make a deal (say, exchange territory), the only instrument at their disposal is the 
treaty. Likewise, they can effectively only use the treaty form if the ambition is legislative in 
nature (e.g. to protect against climate change or to guarantee human rights). The only 
instrument available to set up an institution such as the UN is, again, the treaty’.61 
 Treaties can either be ‘bilateral’ or ‘multilateral’. Bilateral treaties are the ones that 
most resemble domestic contracts and are concluded by two states. Bilateral treaties often 
set out the law governing a particular issue of mutual interest, such as trade between two 
states or the construction of joint infrastructure.62 Multilateral treaties, on the other hand, 
                                                          
56 See, for example: Cali, B. (ed.) (2010) International Law for International Relations: p.94 
57 McNair, A.D. (1961) The Law of Treaties (cited in Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.25). 
58 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.69 
59 It should be noted, however, that a distinction has been made between ‘law-making treaties’ (normative 
treaties) and ‘treaty contracts’. The former are created for ‘general or universal application and are intended 
for future and continuing observance’, whereas the latter are more like domestic contracts that deal with a 
particular matter (such as a construction project) (see: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International 
Law: pp.28-9). I have not included this distinction in the text, however, as it is a distinction regarding the 
content of the treaty at not the procedure as to how the treaty is made, i.e., ‘the binding force of a treaty 
comes from the consent of the parties, not from the subject matter or from the treaty’ (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 
A. (2015): p.28). 
60 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.24 
61 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.25 
62 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.24 
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are those concluded between larger groups of states (three or more). They will ‘often have 
general application and possess “law-making” features’.63   
 As mentioned above, treaties can be used to create international organisations. These 
treaties are referred to as ‘constituent treaties’.64 They can be either bilateral or multilateral, 
but are usually the latter. Constituent treaties are interesting because they usually confer on 
the international organisation a power (or ‘competence’) to create further legally binding 
instruments. For example, The Charter of the United Nations – the constituent treaty of the 
UN – gives the Security Council the competence to adopt resolutions that legally bind all 
member states.65 
Over time, international legal rules have developed regarding international treaties. 
These rules specify, for example, how treaties should be concluded, how they can be 
terminated, the conditions under which they are valid, how they are to take effect and be 
applied and so on. 66  These rules can be found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).67 The rules in this Treaty evolved through customary international law (see 
below) and were merely codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) in the VCLT.68 The 
VCLT applies only to treaties concluded between states.69  
 
1.3.2 International Custom 
Put simply, customary international law (CIL) is law that evolves through, and reflects, how 
states behave (i.e. their ‘custom’).70 The idea, roughly, is that legal rights and obligations can 
                                                          
63 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.24. Examples of such multi-lateral treaties would include the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Treaties of the European Union. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Charter of the United Nations (1945): Art. 25, and Chapters V, VI & VII; see also: Thirlway, H. (2014) The 
Sources of International Law: pp.33-34 
66 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.25-26 
67 See: Dörr, O. & Schmalenbach, K. (2012) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary.  
68 The International Law Commission was established in 1947 with the primary purpose of promoting the 
‘progressive development of international law and its codification’. Among other things, the Commission selects 
topics and makes proposals for draft conventions and codifications. In turn, this may lead to the adoption of 
important conventions. See: Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.33; see also: Boyle, A. & Chinkin, C. (2007) 
The Making of International Law: pp.183-200. 
69 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.26. For a more in-depth discussion on the law of treaties in general, 
see: Aust, A. (2013) Modern Treaty Law and Practice. 
70 See: Akehurst, M. (1974-75) ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’. 
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develop from norms. Thus, when identifying international law, the ICJ will consider the 
previous behaviour of the disputing states (or perhaps of states more generally).  
However, not all or any state practice can create international legal obligations. As 
seen above, Article 38(1) ICJ Statute defines CIL as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law’. This definition, notes Klabbers, contains two main requirements: (1) ‘there must be a 
general practice’, and (2) ‘this general practice must be accepted as law’ or accompanied by 
‘a sense of legal obligation.’71 This latter element is referred to as ‘the opinion juris sive 
necessitates, or just opinio juris’.72 The ‘general practice’ requirement is ‘objective’ in that one 
merely needs to observe the actual practice of states. The additional requirement that the 
state believes the practice to be legally binding, however, is ‘subjective’.73  
 As Kaczorowska-Ireland explains, general practice ‘is normally constituted by the 
repetition of certain behaviour on the part of States for a certain length of time’ regarding a 
particular matter.74 There seem to be at least four complications with the notion of ‘general 
practice’, or, at least, questions that need to be answered. The first is that it assumes that 
state practice is, to some degree, consistent. What happens, for example, if states breach an 
existing custom? ‘Does this’, as Klabbers asks, ‘imply that the existing rule is weakened and 
possibly a new one is being formed?’. The second difficulty is that general practice is, on its 
own, morally indifferent. What if, for example, the practice of states is morally lacking? Again, 
Klabbers asks: ‘if many states commit acts of torture, is the conclusion then inevitable that 
torture is allowed under customary international law, or can it still be said that torture is not 
permissible under customary international law?’ 75 Third, there is the question of ‘duration’.76 
At what point does behaviour become custom? In other words, how long does it take for the 
actions of a state to become ‘general practice’? Placing any particular length of time on this 
would seem arbitrary. Finally, how ‘general’ must the ‘general practice’ be in order to bind 
                                                          
71 See: Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99: para.55; 
and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 4: para.77. See also: Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.26 
72 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.30 
73 See: Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.25. See also: Neff, S.C. (2014) Justice Among Nations: A 
History of International Law: pp.252-253. 
74 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.31 
75 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.31; see also: Beckett, J. (2010) ‘Customary International Law’: p.122-
3; and Bederman, D.J. (2010) Custom as a Source of Law.  
76 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 4: para.77 
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third states?77 CIL has the potential to bind all states, whether or not their behaviour 
contributed to the development of the customary rule. To do so, however, the behaviour of 
states must be sufficiently general. But how many states are ‘sufficient’? It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to discuss the answers to these questions, but they are points worth 
bearing in mind in our later discussions.78  
The second requirement of opinio juris (that a state must believe its actions to be 
legally required) ‘plays the useful role of separating law from other normative control 
systems, such as etiquette or morality, or of separating legally warranted behaviour from 
merely politically expedient behaviour.’79 As Klabbers points out, ‘there are many practices 
which are deemed useful or pleasant in one way or another, but which it would be silly to try 
and enforce in a court of law, or to ask for compensation upon violation’.80 Opinio juris, 
however, presents its own difficulties for the international lawyer. This is because identifying 
opinio juris involves ascertaining the belief of a state; i.e., does a state believe its actions to 
be legally required or optional? The problem here, of course, is that ‘states rarely explain why 
they act or refrain from acting as they do’.81 
By pointing out the difficulties associated with CIL, I do not mean to pass judgement 
on its merit as a source of international law, nor am I suggesting that these difficulties are 
intractable. I merely mean to explain why many consider CIL to be ‘controversial’, and what 
sort of considerations need to be made when identifying CIL.82 Indeed, CIL is also thought to 
have many benefits. For example, as Klabbers argues, because customary law is based on 
social practices, it has the advantage that ‘it is usually deeply ingrained in the everyday life of 
that society’ and is thus more likely to be respected and obeyed.83 
 
 
                                                          
77 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.32 
78 For a more in-depth discussion relating to the issues surrounding ‘general practice’, see: Kaczorowska-
Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.31-4 
79 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.28 
80 Ibid. 
81 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.27 
82 See, for example: Kammerhofer, J. (2011) Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsian Perspective: pp.59-86 
83 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.26 
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1.3.3 General Principles of Law 
General principles of law are not directly legislated, but are rather ‘inferred’; typically by 
courts. Their ‘generality’ can refer to two different things. First, they could be principles of 
law that ‘form part of most, perhaps all, legal systems of the world’.84 In this way, the ICJ, 
when deciding a case, could infer the content of these principles from principles widely 
observed in municipal law.85 Second, general principles can be inferred from the nature of the 
international community itself.86 In this case, the content of the principles would be 
determined by the rules that are pre-requisite for a functioning international legal system 
made up of sovereign states to exist at all.  
Henrikson explains that general principles were inserted into Article 38(1) because the 
drafters87 ‘were concerned that treaties and custom were insufficient to provide all the legal 
answers needed. General principles of international law would prevent the Court being 
unable to decide a dispute due to a shortage of applicable law – so-called non liquet.’ 88 In this 
way, general principles can be viewed as “gap fillers” ‘that only needed to be consulted when 
a dispute could not be resolved on the basis of a treaty or customary international law.’ 89 
Examples of general principles include: the notion of good faith; the principle that no 
one shall be judge in their own cause; that people shall not be sentenced twice for the same 
act; and that there shall be no crime without a law.90 General principles are not, in any direct 
sense, ‘adopted’ or ‘legislated’; however, given their ‘generality’ (or ‘universality’), they are 
also fairly uncontroversial. As mentioned, it could be argued that general principles are 
necessary in that they constitute those principles without which a justice system could not 
exist. As Klabbers points out, it is ‘difficult to conceive of a legal order based on bad faith, or 
one where double jeopardy was the norm’.91 Another good example of a ‘necessary’ general 
principle would be pacta sunt servanda (that international agreements are binding).92 The 
                                                          
84 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.34-5 
85 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.48-9 
86 Ibid. 
87 The drafters of the original Article 38(1) were the Commission of Jurists.  
88 Lauterpacht, H. (1970) International Law: p.69. See also: Cali, B. (ed.) (2010) International Law for International 
Relations: p.94; and Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.34 
89 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.30 
90 Cheng, B. (1953) General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals: pp.103-160; see 
also: Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.34-5 
91 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.34-5 
92 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.30 
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whole notion of treaties, for example, would be rendered meaningless if this principle were 
not to apply.  
 
1.3.4 Judicial Decisions and ‘Teachings of Publicists’  
The final sources of law recognised by Article 38(1) are ‘judicial decisions’ and ‘teachings of 
publicists’. As explained previously, these sources are considered to be ‘secondary’ sources 
as they do not create law as such, but interpret existing law.  
This first thing to note with regards judicial decisions is that Article 38(1)(d) of the 
Statute of the ICJ states that the Court may use them as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law ‘subject to the provisions of Article 59’. Article 59 of the Statute 
of the Court provides that: ‘The decision of the Court has no binding force except between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case’. As Kaczorowska-Ireland explains: ‘there is, 
therefore, no binding authority of precedent in international law, and international court and 
tribunal cases do not make law. Judicial decisions are not, therefore, strictly speaking a formal 
source of law.’ 93 
 Although judicial decisions are supposed to play a mere interpretative function, there 
often exists a fine line between merely ‘identifying’ and developing or creating law.94 What 
happens, for example, if there is no law to interpret? ‘If an international tribunal is unable to 
discover an existing treaty or customary rule relevant to a dispute, any rule which the tribunal 
adopts in deciding the case will, in theory at least, form a new rule of international law.’95 As 
Helfer explains, ‘rulings that clarify ambiguities and fill in gaps in treaty texts are usually 
consistent with states’ expectations. At the margins, however, expansive interpretations can 
fundamentally change treaty bargains—as when international jurists find a treaty reservation 
to be invalid, sever the reservation, and apply the challenged treaty provision to the reserving 
state.’96  
                                                          
93 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.51 
94 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.31 
95 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.51 
96 Helfer, L.R. (2008) ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’: p.75 
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In this way, the ICJ has introduced several innovations into international law which 
have subsequently achieved general acceptance.97 ‘Interpretation’ will also inevitably involve 
a degree of flexibility. As such, some courts have been accused of interpreting the law in a 
way that is politically partisan or motivated, i.e. ‘judicial activism’.98 One frequent recipient of 
such accusations is the European Court of Justice (ECJ).99 The most famous example of ECJ 
judicial activism is perhaps the creation of the principle that European Union law has 
supremacy over the national law of member states.100  
Another arguable instance of ECJ activism was when it de facto incorporated the UK 
into the EU’s jurisdiction in relation to social policy and employment law – even though the 
UK had negotiated a de jure opt-out. As Hannan explains:  
‘Because Britain had an opt-out on social and employment policy, they [the EU] 
reintroduced the main pillar of that policy – a directive regulating paid holidays, 
maximum weekly working times and the like – as a ‘health and safety’ measure (the 
1993 Working Time Directive)… the British government protested that the measure 
was plainly social policy rather than health and safety – it allowed employees to work 
more than forty-eight hours a week, provided they were given overtime – but the ECJ 
decided that health and safety didn’t just mean being safe at work: it also meant 
looking after the “social well-being” of employees.’ 101 
 
                                                          
97 For example, see: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 174. In this case, the ICJ arguably created the following new general principles of international 
law: the principle of functional protection of an IGO; the principle of implied powers; and the principle of the 
objective legal personality of the UN. See also: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.51-
2 
98 For more discussion on judicial discretion and activism in general, see both: Ford, C.A. (1994) ‘Judicial 
Discretion in International Jurisprudence’; and Ginsburg, T. (2005) ‘Bounded Discretion in International Judicial 
Lawmaking’. 
99 See, for example: De Waele, H. & Van der Vleuten, A. (2011) ‘Judicial Activism in the European Court of Justice 
– The Case of LGBT Rights’; Freitas, L.V. (2015) ‘The Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice’; and 
Rasmussen, H. (1986) On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. 
100 See: Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
101 Hannan, D. (2016) Why Vote Leave: pp.106-7 
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To this end, Hannan claims that the ECJ ‘was behaving as a legislative rather than a judicial 
body’.102  
 There is also a view that judicial decisions are responsible for the development of jus 
cogens norms of international law. Jus cogens norms are extremely important in international 
law as (as is explained below) they are peremptory norms that apply to all states regardless 
of their consent. The view that these norms find their source in judicial decisions has been 
put forward by – among others – Mary O’Connell.103 It should be stressed, however, that the 
argument here is not that jus cogens norms are ‘created’ by judicial decisions per se, but 
merely ‘identified’. This is because – according to O’Connell – jus cogens are pre-existing 
principles of ‘natural law’. (This discussion will be extended in chapter six).  
The second subsidiary source of law recognised by Article 38(1)(d) is ‘the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’. Many international courts (other 
than the ICJ) and municipal courts ‘often refer to scholarly works to support their 
decisions’.104 The ICJ itself very rarely makes reference to such works, although some 
infrequent examples exist.105 Although ‘learned writings’ may have influence in the 
development of the content of future laws, they do not directly provide for the legal validity 
of existing laws, and as such should not be thought of as a formal source.106 
 
1.3.5 Other Sources of International Law 
There are a few other arguable sources of international law not mentioned in Article 38(1). 
Two of these are: ‘unilateral declarations’ and ‘secondary law of international governmental 
organisations’.107 
                                                          
102 Hannan, D. (2016) Why Vote Leave: p.107. Hannan goes on to argue that the ECJ has, since then, 
‘repeatedly extended the scope of the Working Time Directive, most recently ruling, in 2015, that the time 
spent travelling to and from your place of work must count towards your forty-eight hours’.  
103 O’Connell, M.E. (2012) ‘Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms’. 
104 See, for example: Bohlander, M. (2003) The Influence of Academic Research on the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
105 For examples, see: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.54 
106 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.53 
107 Some would argue that jus cogens obligations should also be included as a formal source of international 
law. I explain why I do not treat it as such further below. 
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Regarding ‘unilateral declarations’, the ICJ has previously ruled that statements or 
promises made by, for example, heads of state or foreign secretaries, can legally bind those 
states.108 It is important to note, however, that these unilateral statements – as with the other 
subsidiary sources of law – cannot create law in themselves, but are merely used to help 
‘judges clarify the precise meaning of a contested or unclear piece of treaty or custom.’109 
Clearly, as Klabbers explains ‘not all unilateral declarations will come to have binding effect. 
Some statements are best seen as declarations of fact or expressions of political opinions, 
such as an act of recognition’.110  
Another potential source of law is the ‘secondary law of intergovernmental 
organisations’.111 As mentioned above, treaties can be used to create intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs). Some notable examples would be the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation. The constituent treaties 
that create such organisations sometimes enable the organisation to create further 
legislation. As Buchanan notes, various IGOs, ‘though created and sustained through treaties 
made by states, are increasingly taking on law-making functions.’112 ‘In this respect’, notes 
Kaczorowska-Ireland, ‘it is important to make a distinction between primary and secondary 
law of IGOs. Primary law refers to the founding treaties i.e. a treaty establishing the relevant 
IGO. Secondary law, however, refers to acts adopted by IGOs on the basis of primary law.’113 
There is disagreement about whether these secondary legal obligations created by IGOs are 
foundational as a source of law.114 My own opinion is that they are not. Although these 
secondary laws accrue the same status as other types of international law, they cannot exist 
independently from an IGOs founding treaty. As such, it is the founding treaty that is the true 
source of this secondary law. 
 
 
                                                          
108 See, for example: Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) [1933] PCIJ Rep Ser 
A/B No 53. 
109 Cali, B. (ed.) (2010) International Law for International Relations: p.94 
110 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.35; see also: Eckart, C. (2012) Promises of States Under International 
Law.  
111 See: Alvarez, J.E. (2005) International Organizations as Law-Makers. 
112 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.80 
113 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.56 
114 Ibid. 
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1.4 Hierarchy of Sources 
The existence of multiple sources of international law raises the question of hierarchy: are 
some sources more important than others, and what happens when two or more sources 
conflict?115 The standard position is that, notwithstanding the distinction between primary 
and subsidiary sources of international law made in Article 38(1), there is no hierarchy 
between sources. In other words, conventions, custom, and general principles are all ‘deemed 
to have the same normative status.’116 This is not to say that, in any particular case, one source 
of law is not more central in establishing the content of the law than the others. Instead, 
normative equality between the sources merely entails that the source used to decide the 
content of the law will depend on the facts of each individual case, and not the normative 
superiority of the source. 
 There are, however, some potential exceptions to the general presumption of 
normative equality.117 The first is that of jus cogens obligations.118 As mentioned above, jus 
cogens laws are ‘peremptory norms of international law [that] apply to all states regardless 
of their consent to the treaties or conventions or practices that contributed to their 
creation’.119 It is this peremptory status that gives jus cogens obligations their normative 
superiority. Jus cogens norms are described in the Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties as a ‘norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only 
by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.’120 Such norms 
are generally thought to include the general prohibition of: aggressive war; genocide; torture; 
piracy; slavery; and other crimes against humanity.121 The superior status of jus cogens 
obligations was demonstrated in the Aloeboetoe Case (Judgment).122 
                                                          
115 Weil, P. (1983) ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’: p.413 
116 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.34 
117 See: International Law Commission (2006) ‘Conclusions of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law’: paras.324-409 
118 See: Orakhelashvili, A. (2006) Peremptory Norms in International Law; and Christenson, G.A. (1988) ‘Jus 
Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society’. 
119 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.190 
120 See also: Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: pp.387-8 
121 Voyiakis, E. (2010) ‘International Treaties’: p.104; see also: Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Institutions’: p.387 
122 Aloeboetoe Case (Judgment) IACtHR Series C No 15 (10 September 1993): paras.56-57 
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Some would argue that jus cogens obligations are sources of international law in 
themselves, and thus ought to be recognised independently in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. 
In other words, their legal validity – it is argued – is derived, not from the process by which 
they were made, but simply due to the substantive content of the jus cogens obligation. 
Although I have chosen not to include it as a source of law in its own right in this chapter, the 
debate about the true nature of jus cogens is expanded upon in chapter six. 
The second exception to the principle of normative equality is ‘obligations erga 
omnes’.123 Obligations erga omnes are obligations owed to the international community as a 
whole, rather than any one state in particular. It is in this sense that these laws are 
normatively superior to others.124 Thus, in practice, and unlike other obligations, breaches of 
obligations erga omnes ‘can be invoked by any state and not just by those which are the 
immediate beneficiaries of the obligation’.125 Reference to the concept of obligations erga 
omnes was made by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case: 
‘An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in 
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of 
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations ergas omnes.’126 
 
Obligations erga omnes are closely related to jus cogens obligations in the sense that all jus 
cogens obligations will be obligations erga omnes. The reverse, however, is not true as not all 
obligations erga omnes will be peremptory. So, for example, although all obligations 
protecting basic human rights are obligations erga omnes, some are not jus cogens 
obligations, e.g. the right to a fair trial, or the right to respect for private and family life.127 
                                                          
123 See: Ragazzi, M. (2000) The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes; and Tams, C.J. (2005) 
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law. 
124 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.35 
125 Ibid.: p.36 
126 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (New Application 
1962) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3: para.33  
127 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.47 
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‘The third and final category of privileged norms’ notes Henriksen, ‘is that of 
obligations under the UN Charter’.128 Specifically, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that: 
‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’. When read with Article 25 of the 
Charter – which provides that ‘Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council’ – the practical effect of Article 103 is that ‘states must 
comply with the Council’s resolutions even if it means that they thereby violate other 
international legal commitments.’129 
 
1.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen how international law is fundamentally different to domestic 
law in not having a single central authority from which laws emanate. Instead, international 
laws are primarily developed through the interrelations between multiple authorities, i.e. 
states. This ‘horizontal’ system of law creation is necessary if states are to have equal 
sovereignty. We further noted that ‘international law’ is not a homogenous concept, and can 
thus be separated between the law of ‘coexistence’ and ‘cooperation’. The former governs 
the way states (and possibly other entities) relate to one another. The latter governs instances 
whereby states use international law to address an issue formerly dealt with by domestic law. 
This chapter has also explained and summarised the primary sources of international law, 
including treaties, customary international law, and general principles.  
 A basic understanding of how international law is structured, and an appreciation that 
international law has multiple sources, will be essential for any nuanced discussion of whether 
state consent is necessary or sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. This is because, 
as we will discover, state consent does not relate to all types of international law in the same 
way.  
 The following two chapters will continue with the conceptual analysis of our other two 
key concepts: ‘political legitimacy’ and ‘state consent’ respectively. It is only once these 
                                                          
128 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.36 
129 Ibid. The exception to this would be that the Security Council could not oblige a member state to violate a 
jus cogens obligation. 
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concepts are properly understood that we will be in a position to adequately address our 
overarching question of whether state consent provides for the legitimacy of international 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
  
This chapter seeks to undertake a conceptual analysis of the key normative concept with 
which this thesis is concerned: legitimacy. It is important make clear at this early stage, 
however, that – as we are interested in the legitimacy of international law – we will be 
concerned with ‘political’ legitimacy; rather than legitimacy in general.  
Political legitimacy is that which pertains, ultimately, to political institutions or 
systems – i.e. those institutions or systems which – by various means and to various ends – 
attempt to coordinate human behaviour through issuing ‘rules’. The reason for this 
clarification is that legitimacy/illegitimacy is also frequently used to describe ‘events’ or 
‘actions’. For example, it was very common to hear the 1999 bombing of Kosovo, or the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, described in these terms.1 This is not the sense in which we will be analysing 
the term. As this chapter will demonstrate, however, this initial clarification does little to shed 
light on the myriad of ways in which the concept of legitimacy – in the political sense – is 
used.2  
Section 2.1 explains the difference between descriptive and prescriptive legitimacy – 
noting that this thesis is focused on the latter. Section 2.2 considers the question of the ‘moral 
function’ of legitimacy. In essence, this is the question of how the moral status of a legitimate 
institution differs from one that is illegitimate. Finally, section 2.3 explores the ‘basis’ of 
legitimacy. This is the question about which aspect of an institution one is actually evaluating 
in a legitimacy assessment; the ‘content’ of the rules it issues, or the internal ‘process’ by 
which those rules are made. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 See both: Coleman, K.P. (2007) International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of 
International Legitimacy: pp.20–23; and Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in 
International Law’: p.746 
2 Herein, any reference to ‘legitimacy’ should be taken to mean political legitimacy. 
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2.1 Descriptive vs Prescriptive Legitimacy 
If one were to scan the fields of political science and political philosophy for mention of the 
term ‘legitimacy’ (as I have, to a considerable extent, now done), one will notice vast 
discrepancies in how the term is used. Indeed, as Fallon observes, ‘those who appeal to 
legitimacy frequently fail to explain what they mean or the criteria that they employ’.3 It is 
not so much that they apply the term incorrectly, it is that there exist a number of things to 
which legitimacy may refer. As Steffek has also noted, ‘legitimacy is an opaque and elusive 
concept… and the literature fully reflects this ambiguity.’4 He further notes that this ambiguity 
is particularly prevalent in discussions surrounding international politics’.5 Thomas gives us a 
sense of the problem when he notes that:  
‘Legitimacy has many meanings. It has been deployed by actors at all levels of the 
international system, from activists to academics, from politicians to the press, from 
judges to bureaucrats, each of whom ascribe different meanings to the word. Indeed, 
it is not unusual for any given author to use the word multiple times in the one setting 
while ascribing different meanings to it every time. The plurality of these meanings, 
and the frequency with which the word itself is used, make it a difficult concept to 
systematize.’6  
 
Part of the confusion surrounding the concept – as noted by Steffek and others – is that there 
are ‘two completely different ways of approaching legitimacy’.7 Legitimacy can either be used 
‘descriptively’ or ‘prescriptively’ (i.e. ‘normatively’).8 If one uses legitimacy descriptively, they 
are attempting to describe some fact about the world. If one uses it prescriptively, however, 
they are making a moral claim.  
                                                          
3 Fallon, R.H. (2005) ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’: p.1790 
4 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.251 
5 Ibid.: pp.251-2 
6 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.733 
7 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.253 
8 This dichotomy between ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ legitimacy has been variously – but synonymously – 
referred to as the difference between: ‘empirical’ and ‘normative’ legitimacy (see: Hurrelmann, A. et al. (2007) 
Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics); ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ legitimacy (see: Vinx, L. (2007) Hans Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory of Law: Legality and Legitimacy: p.60); and ‘descriptive’ and ‘moral’ legitimacy (see: Applbaum, I.A. (2004, 
working paper) ‘Legitimacy in a Bastard Kingdom’: p.76).  
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 Descriptive legitimacy is usually equated with ‘sociological’ legitimacy (although, as I 
argue below, there is another – legal – sense in which legitimacy can be used descriptively).9 
As the name suggests, sociological legitimacy is the sense in which sociologists would use the 
term. Sociologists – amongst other things – observe and report on attitudes held by groups 
and individuals towards political institutions. Thus, for sociologists, legitimacy is a social fact 
about an institution: if those over whom the institution governs believe or perceive the 
institution’s rules to be normatively binding, then it is legitimate.10  This is the type of 
legitimacy Hurd is talking about when he says, for example, that ‘legitimacy… refers to the 
normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective 
quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor’s perception of the 
institution.’11 The renowned sociologist Max Weber referred to these normative beliefs about 
an institution as ‘Legitimitätsglaube’, and argued in a similar way to Hurd that ‘the basis of 
every system of authority… is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority 
are lent prestige’.12 
Put simply, then, if legitimacy is interpreted descriptively in the sociological sense, ‘it 
refers to people's beliefs about political authority’, or, as Buchanan puts it, ‘calling an 
institution legitimate in the sociological sense is a misleading way of saying that it is widely 
believed to have the right to rule.’13 This descriptive and sociological approach to legitimacy 
‘does not aim to privilege certain social arrangements over others and as such is a “value-
free” – concept.’14 To say that an institution is legitimate in this way is not to say that it ‘ought’ 
to command obedience for moral reasons, only that it does. This is contrary to the normative 
variant of legitimacy (discussed further below).  
Before moving on to consider legitimacy in the normative sense, however, there is a 
second type of descriptive legitimacy that is less often discussed than the sociological variant. 
                                                          
9 Allen Buchanan, for example, states that ‘‘Legitimate’ has both a sociological and normative meaning’. See: 
Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.79 
10 See, for example: Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.253; Buchanan, A. 
(2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.79; Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’; Machida, S. (2009) 
‘Globalization and the Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations’: p.373; and Beetham, D. (1991) The 
Legitimation of Power: pp.5-6 
11 Hurd, I. (1999) ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’: p.381 
12 Weber, M. (1964) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization:p.382; see also: Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political 
Legitimacy’. 
13 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.79 
14 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.253 
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This is legitimacy in the ‘legal’ sense.15 Legal legitimacy is when a law (or rule) is legitimate 
with reference to a particular structure of law creation. For example, a UK Act of Parliament 
would have legal legitimacy if it were passed in accordance with the constitutional law-making 
procedures of the UK (e.g. it was debated, scrutinised, amended, and voted for by simple 
majority in both Houses of Parliament and subsequently given Royal Assent by the reigning 
Monarch). Legal legitimacy, then, is a matter of descriptive fact; either a law has been created 
in accordance with the correct law-making procedures, or it has not.  
 Legal legitimacy – as with sociological legitimacy – is descriptive rather than normative 
since the mere fact that a law has been created through the established procedure does not 
automatically entail that it ought to be obeyed (as the procedure itself, for example, could be 
morally deficient). Of course, legal legitimacy could inform normative legitimacy as the mere 
status of valid ‘law’ may give a rule normative weight; but this is not necessarily the case. 
Although both descriptive, however, legal legitimacy is distinct from sociological legitimacy as 
it is perfectly possible for a law to be legally valid and yet also for subjects to believe that they 
hold no moral obligation to obey it (and vice versa).16 
Unlike either form of descriptive legitimacy (above), those who use legitimacy in the 
‘prescriptive’ (or normative) sense are not attempting to describe any fact about the world – 
whether it be the beliefs of those subject to political institutions or the validity of rules in 
relation to established procedures.17 Instead, they are making a moral evaluation.18 They are 
saying that certain institutions (i.e. those deemed legitimate) ought, in some way, to be 
obeyed or respected as such. It is with prescriptive, rather than descriptive, legitimacy that 
this thesis will be concerned. 
                                                          
15 David Beetham and Chris Thomas have also noted (separately) that legitimacy can be used in this ‘legal’ 
sense, as well as in the ‘sociological’ and ‘normative’ senses. See: Beetham, D. (1991) The Legitimation of 
Power: pp.3-6; and Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.729 
16 It will be noted that I am using the terms ‘legal legitimacy’ and ‘legal validity’ interchangeably. One should 
bear in mind, however, that some legal theorists make a distinction between them; whereby the former 
implies some normative quality, whereas the latter does not. For a more detailed explanation, see: Thomas, 
C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.737 
17 The exception here would be moral realists who do, in fact, belief that moral claims are attempts at 
describing some objective fact about the world. For a more in-depth discussion see: Sayre-McCord, G. (2017) 
‘Moral Realism’. 
18 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.80 
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Institutions are prescriptively legitimate if they have achieved some theorised 
‘benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority’19, or, as Beetham 
puts it, are ‘justifiable according to rationally defensible normative principles’.20 In this way, 
prescriptive legitimacy is most commonly the preserve of political philosophers as it is the 
task of the political philosopher to theorise this ‘benchmark of acceptability’ that institutions 
ought to meet. Of what this benchmark ought to consist is a topic of much debate, and will 
likely alter depending on the type of institution in need of legitimisation. This, however, is a 
topic that will be discussed further below. For now, it is simply important to understand that 
a prescriptively legitimate institution is one that deserves the predicate ‘legitimate’ whether 
it not it is widely believed to be legitimate.21 Of course, as Swift notes, the reasons why an 
institution might tend to be perceived as legitimate have a lot to do with the reasons why it 
might indeed be legitimate.22 As Swift also correctly stresses, however, this fact shouldn’t lead 
us to ‘blur the distinction between legitimacy and perceived legitimacy. A regime could be 
regarded as legitimate by those subject to it even if it was not in fact of a kind where they had 
good reason to do so.’23 
It may be useful, at this point, to reflect briefly on the assumptions underlying the very 
concept of ‘normative legitimacy’. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the idea of 
normative legitimacy only really makes sense if one assumes that political hierarchies are 
unnatural, and thus in need of special justification. The now common intuition that those who 
rule ought to possess a right to do so may seem uncontroversial to most, but this has not 
always been so. The question of political legitimacy only really surfaced – or even became 
intelligible – when individuals began to question the ‘naturalness’ of hitherto political order 
and political hierarchy. There exists a verse in the Anglican Hymn ‘All things bright and 
beautiful’ which, I find, is useful in understanding how – in general – pre-Enlightenment 
political society was conceived:  
‘The rich man in his castle, 
The poor man at his gate, 
                                                          
19 Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’ 
20 Beetham, D. (1991) The Legitimation of Power: p.5 
21 Steffek, J. (2003) ‘The Legitimation of International Governance’: p.252 
22 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.228 
23 Ibid.: p.229 
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God made them high and lowly, 
And ordered their estate.’24 
 
In other words, the fact that some people were rich and others poor, or some rulers and 
others rule-takers, was simply a reflection of the (divinely ordained) natural order of things. 
As soon as one arrives at the (liberal Enlightenment) position that no one rules by natural or 
divine right, and that all individuals are born with an equal moral status, then one is compelled 
to ask, by what ‘special’ right does one individual rule over another? Any attempt to rule over 
another is prima facie impermissible and thus stands in need of further justification.25 Those 
(institutions) who have established this further justification are said to be normatively 
legitimate. As Richard Flathman has also noted: 
‘In the form now most familiar, legitimacy as a distinct issue traces to the seventeenth 
century when… assumptions [about the divine or natural state of human affairs] were 
challenged by the view that human beings… are, by nature or before God, free and 
equal in at least one respect: no human being has natural or divinely ordained 
authority to rule them. In this picture, the only unproblematic authority is each 
person’s authority over herself. Government of any kind… demands justification’.26 
 
This understanding also broadly accords with Applebaum’s research which suggests that the 
normative notion of ‘legitimate government’ (as conceptually distinct from lawful 
government) materialised in France only in the late sixteenth century.27   
Returning to our previous discussion, although it is often clear that an author is 
referring to legitimacy in the normative – rather the descriptive – sense, many crucial 
questions are often left unresolved. Very often, an author will refer to an institution as 
legitimate when wanting to award that institution some measure of ‘moral justifiability’, 
                                                          
24 The hymn was first published in 1848 in Mrs Cecil Alexander's Hymns for Little Children.  
25 See: Valentini, L. (2011) ‘Coercion and (Global) Justice’. 
26 Flathman, R.E. (1993) ‘Legitimacy’: p.527 
27 Applebaum, I.A. (2004, working paper) ‘Legitimacy in a Bastard Kingdom’: p.82; see also: Thomas, C.A. 
(2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.734 
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‘goodness’ or ‘correctness’.28 However, a full account of the normative legitimacy of an 
institution will need to be able to provide, at a minimum, answers to the following three 
questions: 
1. What is the moral function of legitimacy? (I.e. in what way does the appellation 
‘legitimate’ alter the moral status of an institution?) 
2. What is the basis of legitimacy? (I.e. what features of an institution are relevant in 
determining its legitimacy?) 
3. What is the moral standard (benchmark) against which the legitimacy of an institution 
is determined? 
 
My own answers to questions one and two will be set out in sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively 
below. As for question three, this thesis does not attempt to provide a conclusive answer. 
Instead, I will be considering one potential standard of legitimacy (i.e. ‘state consent’) in 
relation to one particular type of institution (i.e. international law). What this thesis does not 
attempt to do is formulate a sufficient and necessary standard of legitimacy against which all 
international law can be judged.   
 
2.2 The Moral Function of Legitimacy 
When we ask: ‘what is the moral function of legitimacy’, we are essentially asking how the 
moral status of a legitimate institution differs from one that is illegitimate. As noted by Held 
& Maffettone, the traditional view is that legitimacy gives political institutions the ‘right to 
rule’.29 For example, Buchanan & Keohane write simply that: ‘to say that an institution is 
legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule’.30 Likewise, 
Christiano states that ‘an institution has legitimacy when it has a right to rule over a certain 
set of issues.’31 Conversely, this would straightforwardly imply that an illegitimate institution 
lacks the right to rule. (It is also worth noting that an institution’s right to rule is usually 
                                                          
28 See, for example: Moran, M. (2014) ‘Global Philanthropy’: p.380; Esty, D.C. (2002) ‘The World Trade 
Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis’; and Gray, C. (2007) ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security 
System’. 
29 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.117 
30 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.405 
31 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.69 
 
   
60 
 
thought to correlate to a subject’s duty or obligation to obey that institution).32 This account 
of the moral function of legitimacy has been repeated by multiple different authors.33 
Although there is often agreement that legitimacy entails the right to rule, rival 
theories of legitimacy differ on of what that right to rule consists.34 Traditionally, however, 
the right to rule has been interpreted as approximately the right to perform the functions of 
the modern state. This is unsurprising as – as noted by both Peter and Buchanan separately – 
historically, the philosophical literature on institutional legitimacy has been preoccupied, 
above all else, with the legitimacy of one kind of institution: the state.35 This is consistent with 
many of the definitions given for the right to rule. Buchanan, for example, in his early writings 
on this subject, states that the right to rule means the right to ‘attempt to achieve supremacy 
in the making, application, and enforcement of laws within a jurisdiction’36. Again, for 
Huemer, it is ‘the right… to make certain sorts of laws and enforce them by coercion against 
the members of its society.’37 These definitions are very similar to Max Weber’s famous 
conception of the state as an entity that claims ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
within a given territory.’38 
 However, with the rise of alternative forms political power – especially those beyond 
the nation-state (i.e. international political institutions) – this conception of legitimacy as the 
right to rule has started to appear unduly narrow.39 This is because there increasingly exist 
institutions that, although seemingly open to evaluations of legitimacy/illegitimacy, do not 
share the characteristics or functions of the state. Held & Maffettone explain this 
development as follows:  
‘From NGOs to transnational public and private bodies that issue standards and 
regulations, to the various UN agencies and the pillars of the international economic 
                                                          
32 See: Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: pp.99 & 102; and Huemer, M. (2013) The 
Problem of Political Authority: p.6 
33 See, for example:  Flathman, R.E. (1993) ‘Legitimacy’: p.527; Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political 
Authority; Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’; Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law’; Tasioulas, J. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law, Democratic Legitimacy and 
International Institutions’. 
34 Buchanan, A. (2010) The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.79 
35 Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’. See also:  Adams, N.P. (2018) ‘Institutional legitimacy’: p.84; and 
Buchanan, A. (2013) The Heart of Human Rights: p.174 
36 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.145 
37 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.5 
38 Weber, M. (1994) [1919] ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’. 
39 See: Adams, N.P. (2018) ‘Institutional legitimacy’: p.84; and Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’. 
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order such as the IMF and the WTO, the array of characteristics displayed by the 
institutions in question cannot be fully captured by traditional ideas concerning the 
exercise of political power. Many such institutions do not claim a right to rule, most 
cannot really attach penalties to their commands, the vast majority make no claim to 
exclusive jurisdiction, while even those institutions that come close to claiming a right 
to rule and attach some form of enforcement mechanism to their rulings do not rely 
on the use of coercion or, at least, do so in a very decentralized and/or indirect 
fashion.’ 40 
 
Held & Maffettone go on to recognise that ‘while these institutions have different 
constituencies, different goals and different ways of advancing such goals, we nonetheless 
portray them as legitimate or illegitimate.’41 In recognition of this, some have tried to expand 
the scope of legitimacy so as to include a broader range of institutions. One such attempt 
comes from Buchanan in his 2010 essay ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’. In it, Buchanan 
presents the idea that there exist ‘stronger and weaker senses’ of the right to rule.42   
The ‘strong’ sense is that which has traditionally been associated with the functions 
of the state. In this sense, then, the right to rule would consist of (amongst other things): the 
institution’s right to use coercion to secure compliance with the institution’s rules; the 
institution’s right to exclusive jurisdiction; the institution’s right to use coercion to prevent 
others from attempting to engage in governance activities in its domain; and the fact that the 
institution generates a moral obligation for subjects to obey its rules, rather than just moral 
reasons.43 
 However, by noting that there exist institutions ‘which do not rule in this robust way 
and do not even claim to do so’ (such as most international legal institutions), Buchanan 
develops a second ‘weaker’ conception of the right to rule.44 This weaker right would, broadly, 
give legitimate institutions the right to issue rules and seek to secure compliance with them 
through attaching costs to non-compliance and/or benefits to compliance (although not 
                                                          
40 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.132; see also: Adams, N.P. (2018) 
‘Institutional legitimacy’: p.84 
41 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.132 
42 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.81 
43 Ibid.: p.82 
44 Ibid. 
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necessarily coercively nor with exclusive jurisdiction).45 Such legitimate institutions would 
also only generate moral reasons for subjects to obey its rules, and not necessarily moral 
obligations.46 
 Buchanan, then, seems to be promoting a ‘dualist’ account of legitimacy.47 In other 
words, when we speak of the legitimacy of the ‘state’ and the legitimacy of most 
‘international legal institutions’, we are actually referring to two different concepts. The 
legitimacy of the former entails the right to rule in the strong sense, whereas the legitimacy 
of the later entails only a right to rule in the weak sense.  
 There are a number of objections that could be levelled against Buchanan’s account. 
The first comes from John Tasioulas. Tasioulas’ concern is that Buchanan’s dualist account 
undermines international law’s status as ‘fully-fledged law’.48 He argues that, ‘if it belongs to 
the essence of law to claim authority, and if the authority claimed by [international law] is a 
diluted version of that claimed by domestic law, [international law’s] status as the poor 
relation of domestic law is confirmed.’49 This seems to come down to the fact that, under 
Buchanan’s account, domestic law generates prima facie moral obligations of obedience, 
whereas international law generates only moral reasons. As such, international law lacks the 
same normative force as domestic law. For me, Tasioulas’ objection is convincing. 
International law may often differ in its content to domestic law (i.e. whether it asserts 
exclusive jurisdiction or an entitlement to use coercion), but the normative status it claims 
(i.e. the generation of a prima facie moral obligation to obey) remains the same.50 (Indeed, as 
seen in chapter one, international law actually asserts its own supremacy over domestic law). 
 There is another – related – problem I have with the approach that Buchanan has 
taken to rectify the traditionally narrow interpretation of legitimacy. This is that, instead of 
broadening the definition of legitimacy so as to incorporate a greater variety of institutions, 
Buchanan has simply created another unduly narrow concept. We are now left with two 
unduly narrow concepts rather than one. Buchanan has thus failed to overcome the initial 
                                                          
45 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: pp.83-84 
46 Ibid.: p.84 
47 This is the way in which Tasioulas refers to Buchanan’s position in: Tasioulas, J. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law’: p.98 
48 Tasioulas, J. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.98 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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problem as it is unlikely that Buchanan’s strong and weak conceptions of legitimacy will 
incorporate all those institutions that we appropriately assess in terms of legitimacy. Many 
institutions, for example, could fall between the two. For example, they might generate 
obligations, but not claim an entitlement to use coercion (such as the World Trade 
Organisation), or may claim an entitlement to use coercion, but not claim an exclusive 
jurisdiction (such as the UN Security Council), or may even claim exclusive jurisdiction (within 
certain competences), but not claim an entitlement to use physical coercion (such as the 
European Union).  
 Buchanan’s approach would thus seem to inevitably lead us down the path of 
developing a unique conception of legitimacy to match the differing functions of each and 
every institution. This would be messy to say the least, and would rid the concept of legitimacy 
of any common meaning. This would lead to the extended problem that reasonable 
comparison between institutions would be impossible. To say, for example, that the UK 
legislature and the UN Security Council are both legitimate would be not only to acknowledge 
that they perform different functions (which they do) but also to make two entirely different 
moral evaluations with differing moral implications. This is because the former would be 
legitimate in some stronger sense, and the latter in something weaker. Buchanan seems to 
have acknowledged this flaw himself as, only a few years after proposing this dualist 
approach, he observes the need to develop ‘a general account of institutional legitimacy that 
would apply both to the state and to other institutions, including international ones.’51  
 A separate attempt to deal with the traditionally narrow definition of legitimacy is 
made by Held & Maffettone in their 2016 essay ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’. They 
begin by noting that the traditional narrow concept of legitimacy – in which, ‘political 
legitimacy is often understood as the claim of an agent to have a right to rule over some other 
agent with respect to a given domain – is one that is ‘employed in technical discussions within 
political philosophy’.52 Held & Maffettone state that they, instead, will refer to legitimacy in 
‘the broader definition of the term’.53 Legitimacy in this broader sense, they say, ‘confers a 
certain standing on institutions. There are different ways of portraying the precise nature of 
                                                          
51 Buchanan, A. (2013) The Heart of Human Rights: p.174; see also: Adams, N.P. (2018) ‘Institutional 
legitimacy’: p.85 
52 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.117 
53 Ibid.: p.118 
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this standing, but we think that it is best to conceive it as a kind of respect for institutional 
directives’.54 
This broad definition of legitimacy has the advantage of unequivocally incorporating 
all political institutions, but also the major disadvantage of being uninformative as to how 
having ‘legitimacy’ would practically alter the moral relationship between an institution and 
its subjects. Simply being ‘respect-worthy’ doesn’t obviously necessitate any particular action 
in relation to those directives. One might respect the Roman Catholic Church, for example, 
but still feel no moral obligation to obey its teachings or even take them into consideration 
when making judgements as to how to behave. As such, it is not clear what the practical 
difference would be between a legitimate and illegitimate institution.  
Our understanding of the shortcomings of both Buchanan’s and Held & Maffettone’s 
different accounts helps to focus our attention on the central problem in formulating a useful 
and general conception of legitimacy. That problem is this: on the one hand, the conception 
needs to be broad enough to incorporate a whole range of relevant institutions, but on the 
other, be sufficiently informative as to how legitimacy alters the moral status of those 
institutions in relation to its subjects. The key to solving this problem, I believe, is in separating 
the ‘substance’ of an institutional directive, from that directive’s ‘normative status’.55  
The substance of a rule would include: the particular action that the directive is 
permitting, demanding, forbidding, encouraging etc.; the jurisdiction that it claims for itself; 
and any punishment, incentive or cost that it attaches for compliance/non-compliance. These 
substantive features of a directive, however, can be separated from the directive’s normative 
status. The normative status of a directive indicates the normative demands placed on those 
over whom the institution claims jurisdiction. For example, are those toward whom the 
directive is aimed under an ‘obligation’ to comply, or some weaker ask, such that they ought 
to consider the directive a good ‘reason to act’56, ought to ‘refrain from interfering’57 with the 
relevant institution, or ought simply to treat it with ‘respect’?58  
                                                          
54 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.117 
55 This same useful distinction is made by Tasioulas, see: Tasioulas, J. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International 
Law’: p.98 
56 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.99 
57 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.407 
58 Buchanan, A. (2013) The Heart of Human Rights: p.184 
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 We can see this distinction more clearly if we consider again the traditional moral 
function of legitimacy: that of altering the moral status of an institution such that it has a 
‘right to rule’. In this concept of ‘right to rule’ we can locate both the substantive element (i.e. 
‘ruling’) and also the normative element (i.e. having a ‘right’ to do so).  
‘Ruling’ is the substance of what the institution is actually doing. As we saw above, 
however, there is not only debate over of what ruling consists, but also over whether some 
institutions can really be said to ‘rule’ at all.59  The ‘right’ to rule is the normative status that 
the institution is claiming for itself in relation to whatever it is doing (whether that is actually 
‘ruling’ or something else). As mentioned, having a ‘right’ to something usually involves others 
having a corresponding ‘obligation’. Again, however, as we saw previously, there are some 
who argue that not all institutions claim this type of normative status. In other words, not all 
institutions claim that others owe them obligations.60  
Hitherto, philosophers have – for the most part – written about legitimacy as if its 
moral function were not just to alter the normative status of an institution’s directives, but 
also to give some indication as to what the substance of those directives can or can’t be. This, 
I argue, is the wrong approach. As I see it, legitimacy alters the normative status of an 
institution’s directives regardless of the substance of those directives. 
 The reason for this comes down to why we think institutions are in need of legitimacy 
in the first place. In essence, institutions are in need of legitimacy, not because of the content 
of what they say or how they think others ought to behave, but because of the actual 
normative demands that they place on others. Institutions that merely request that others 
give their directives ‘respect’, or that they consider them as constituting a moral ‘reason’ for 
action are not, I would argue, morally significant enough to necessitate a special justification 
(whatever the actual substance of its directive). The need for special justification only really 
                                                          
59 Most non-state-based actors in global governance do not attempt to rule in any traditional sense. Instead, 
they seek to influence or inform the rule-making of others. For example: ‘civil society actors and NGOs’ (see: 
Scholte, J.A. (2014) ‘Civil Society and NGOs’); ‘credit-rating agencies’ (see: Sinclair, T.J. (2014) ‘Credit Rating 
Agencies’); and ‘think tanks’ (see: McGann, J.G. (2014) ‘Think Tanks and Global Policy Networks’). 
60 A good example of such an institution would be the ‘Basel Committee for Banking Supervision’ (BCBS). 
Although the BCBS posits ‘rules’ relating to global standards for the prudential regulation of banks, they 
demand no obligation of obedience; the rules are merely voluntary. As it says in the Basel Committee Charter: 
‘The BCBS does not possess any formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. Rather, 
the BCBS relies on its members' commitments’. 
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arises when that institution begins to claim that others must (i.e. are under an obligation to) 
comply with their directives.  
It is worth noting at this point that I consider an obligation to be something that is 
owed to another as of right, and thus ‘could’ justifiably be enforced, whether or not a means 
of enforcement is practically available. This raises a further problem, however, because there 
are multiple ways in which an obligation could be enforced; some more morally permissible 
than others. We’d be unlikely to accept, for example, that any means of enforcement were 
permissible. My response to this problem is two-fold. First, in an ideal world, the institution 
to whom the obligation is owed will also have rules stipulating mechanisms for enforcement 
and possibly punishment. If the rules of the institution are legitimate, then these latter rules 
regarding enforcement – whatever they happen to be – will also be legitimate.  
Second, if the institution does not have rules relating to enforcement, then any 
enforcement of the right would be illegitimate. However, this is not to say that enforcement 
would not be morally justifiable. This is because – as I will argue momentarily – a legitimate 
law or action is one that finds its normative status with reference to content-independent 
features (i.e. how the law is made and not of what the law consists).61 Thus, if enforcement 
action were taken in the absence of legitimate rules specifying the form that that action 
should take, then that action would need to refer to content-dependent features for its moral 
permissibility. Needless to say, it is not within the scope of this thesis to assess the criteria 
that action aimed at enforcing an obligation must satisfy to qualify as morally justifiable.  
My conclusion, then, would be that the moral function of legitimacy is to alter the 
moral status of an institution in such a way that that institution now has a right to do 
‘whatever it claims a right to do’. Correspondingly, those over whom the legitimate institution 
claims jurisdiction have an obligation to do whatever it is the institution claims they have an 
obligation to do. The two key things to remember are that: 1.) it doesn’t matter (for the 
purposes of legitimacy) ‘what’ an institution is actually trying to do, and 2.) an institution is 
only in need of legitimacy if it claims a special ‘right’ to do something (with corresponding 
special obligations for those over whom it claims jurisdiction).  
 
                                                          
61 See, for example: Flathman, R.E. (1993) ‘Legitimacy’: p.527 
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2.3 The Basis of Legitimacy 
In the section above, we looked at what it would mean – morally – for an institution to be 
legitimate rather than illegitimate. What we have yet to consider, however, is how one would 
make a determination as to a particular institution’s legitimacy. In other words, how can we 
judge whether an institution is – in actual fact – legitimate. 
 As mentioned earlier, one would ultimately need to develop a moral standard against 
which to judge an institution. If the institution fulfilled that moral criteria, then it would be 
legitimate, and hence justifiably demand the requisite rights and obligations. For example, 
one might say that, for an institution to achieve legitimacy, it should demonstrate certain 
democratic qualities or, perhaps, uphold a minimal level of human rights. However, before 
one begins to formulate their standard of legitimacy, they need to make a decision as to what 
aspect of the institution their standard will relate. In other words, which aspect of the 
institution is of moral relevance, and thus under moral consideration? This question has been 
referred to by Thomas as ‘the basis for legitimacy’.62 There seem to be at least two broad 
choices available.  
 First, one could examine the content or substance of the rules that the institution 
creates, or the values realised by the institution more broadly.63 This approach, then, would 
be indifferent to the way in which those rules were made, and concern only the consequence 
of those rules on others. This ‘substantive’ basis for legitimacy, therefore, is ‘interested in the 
aim served by the object of legitimation’.64 Ernst Haas presents a substantive basis for 
legitimacy when he claims that ‘[o]rganizational legitimacy exists when the membership 
values the organization and generally implements collective decisions because they are seen 
to implement the members’ values’. 65 This also seems to be the position of Ngaire Woods, 
who says that an institution’s ‘legitimacy in large part depends on the quality of the outcomes 
they produce, that is, if they do their job well or not.’66 She goes on to add that ‘results not 
                                                          
62 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.749 
63 Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’ 
64 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.751 
65 Haas, E. (1990) When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations: p.87; see 
also: Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.751 
66 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: p.34 
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process matter most, or to express it in the language of some political scientists, the quality 
of the outputs matter more than… inputs.’67  
 Others, however, argue that standards of legitimacy should focus not on what the 
primary rules of an institution are, but on how those rules are made within the institution. In 
other words, one should be more concerned with the procedural features of an institution 
that underlie the decisions made.68  
 Barker, for example, is of this view when he says that an institution’s legitimacy 
depends on ‘the procedures which they follow in taking or exercising power, rather than from 
the substance of what they do or what they say they wish they do.’69 Buchanan agrees and 
says that, although we often speak of the legitimacy of ‘rules and laws’ as though they are 
separate from the institution from which they derived, ‘institutional legitimacy is primary in 
so far as the legitimacy of particular laws… depends on the legitimacy of the institutions that 
make, interpret, and apply the laws.’70 The view that legitimacy assessments should be based 
on the ‘procedural’ rather than ‘substantive’ qualities of an institution is shared by many 
other theorists.71  
 In reality, when focusing on ‘institutional process’ as the basis of legitimacy, one is 
actually referring to the ‘secondary rules’ of an institution (rather than ‘primary’). These are 
the ‘constitutional-type’ rules which determine the ‘making, changing and destruction of 
[primary] laws’.72 As Thomas Franck explains: ‘a process, in this sense, is usually set out in a 
superior framework of reference, rules about how laws are made, how governors are chosen 
and how public participation is achieved.’73  
 Some theorists, however, clearly don’t believe a dichotomous choice between a 
‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ basis for legitimacy is necessary, and instead opt for a hybrid 
                                                          
67 Woods, N. (2002) ‘Global Governance and the Role of Institutions’: p.34. Another example would be Charlotte 
Ku who writes that ‘authority… must be earned with an increased emphasis on performance as a basis for 
legitimacy’ (see: Ku, C. (2014) ‘The Evolution of International Law’: p.37). 
68 Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’; see also: Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in 
International Law’: p.749 
69 Barker, R. (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State: p.23 
70 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: pp.79-80 
71 See, for example: Friedman, L.M. (1977) Law and Society — An Introduction: p.139; Christiano, T. (2010) 
‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.120; Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.207; and 
Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.6 
72 Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: pp.749-50 
73 Franck, T.M. (1990) The Power of Legitimacy among Nations: p.17 
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approach. Barnett and Finnemore, for example, argue that ‘the legitimacy of most modern 
public organizations depends on whether their procedures are viewed as proper and correct 
(procedural legitimacy) and whether they are reasonably successful at pursuing goals that are 
consistent with the values of the broader community (substantive legitimacy)’ [emphasis 
added].74 Similarly, Peter states that ‘political legitimacy is a virtue of political institutions and 
of the decisions—about laws, policies, and candidates for political office—made within them’ 
[emphasis added].75  
My own position is that legitimacy assessments ought to focus solely on the 
procedural aspects of an institution. Consequently, I believe that standards of legitimacy 
ought to be criteria pertaining to the way in which rules are made within an institution, and 
not the substance of the rules themselves. It is worth pointing out from the outset, however, 
that this does not mean that I consider the content of rules to be of no moral significance 
whatsoever. All it means is that I do not consider it to be of moral significance when making 
an assessment of legitimacy. (What I mean by this will become clear in the paragraphs below). 
 My preference for procedural over substantive legitimacy is based on a deeper belief 
of why I think legitimacy is a valuable attribute for an institution to possess. At its simplest, 
legitimacy is valuable because it – to a greater or lesser extent – solves the problem of 
disagreement in collective decision-making. Collective decision-making is crucial for any 
political enterprise. If individuals made decisions separately, they would never be able to 
achieve the type of coordinated behaviour that is necessary to achieve certain collective 
goods.76 Decision-making thus needs to be collective.  
However, experience shows us that collective decision-making is plagued by 
disagreement, both in terms of which collective goods should be aimed for, and how they 
should be attained. Without some sufficient level of agreement, it is hard to see how moral-
based support for any particular collective decision could be achieved. (I stress moral-based 
support as individuals who disagree could be forced into compliance. I will take it for granted, 
                                                          
74 Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics: 
p.166 
75 Peter, F. (2014) ‘Political Legitimacy’ 
76 See: MacCallum, G.C. (1987) Political Philosophy: pp.91-2 
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however, that – wherever possible – it is better for individuals to be persuaded to cooperate 
for moral reasons rather than due to fear of punishment or use of force).77 
It is because of the problem outlined above that legitimate decision-making 
institutions are valuable, and why legitimacy should pertain to the ‘procedure’ of that 
decision-making and not the ‘outcome’. As Christiano explains: ‘the moral function of the 
legitimacy of decision-making processes is to confer morally binding force on the decisions of 
the institution within a moral community even for those who disagree with them and who 
must sacrifice [emphasis added].78 In other words, ‘subjects have moral reasons to go along 
with the legitimate authority even when they disagree with it. This enables societies to pursue 
basic moral purposes in a coordinated fashion.’79 Having a legitimate ‘procedure’ creates a 
moral reason for individuals to support a decision-making institution even when a decision 
does not create a moral reason by virtue of its content. The underlying assumption here is 
that it is easier to reach agreement for the moral justifiability of a decision-making procedure 
than it is for the content of a decision. I believe this assumption is justified. 
Thus, writes Christiano, the substantive approach to legitimacy cannot serve the 
public function of legitimacy as well as the procedural approach as, in the former, ‘authority 
is based on the quality of the outcomes, which are precisely the subject of disagreement 
among the members’.80 Jeremy Waldron makes the same point acutely when he writes that, 
‘any theory that makes authority depend on the goodness of political outcomes is self-
defeating, for it is precisely because people disagree about the goodness of outcomes that 
they need to set up and recognise an authority.’81 
                                                          
77 Buchanan argues that there are also instrumental (rather than intrinsic) advantages to moral-based support 
over mere force. He says that: ‘moral reason-based support can enable an institution to function successfully 
when there are lapses in its ability to coerce and during periods when there is reason for some to doubt that it 
is indeed advantageous for all relative to the non-institutional alternative’. He goes on to add that, ‘moral 
reason-based support can reduce the costs of achieving compliance, which might be prohibitively high if the 
threat of coercion were the only reason for compliance. See: Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law’: p.81. See also: Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.228; and Cromartie, A. (2003) 
‘Legitimacy’: p.93 
78 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.69; see also: 
Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.120; and Christiano, T. (2012) 
‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.382 
79 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.382; see also: Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Law’: p.81 
80 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.382 
81 Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement: p.245 
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The position that institutional legitimacy depends on decision-making procedures and 
not outcomes does not mean that there are not better or worse outcomes. What is important 
from the standpoint of legitimacy, however, is not the quality of the outcomes, but that those 
outcomes are justified to people, even when they disagree with them. The fact that the 
decision may be ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ does not – by itself – justify the imposition of that decision 
on others. As Swift explains, ‘knowing what would be the right law is quite consistent with 
recognizing that others disagree in a way that would make it illegitimate for you to impose 
your view on them. The very fact that people disagree about what’s right, and yet all are to 
be ruled by the laws that are made, means that we need a mechanism for dealing with 
disagreement. That mechanism must itself be morally justified’.82 
 In a similar way, it is important not to confuse legitimacy with the concept of (political) 
‘justice’.83 Although these two concepts are similar in that they concern moral evaluations of 
institutions, they are nevertheless distinct. As Held & Maffettone explain, ‘the difference 
between the two lies in the fact that legitimacy seems to allow more latitude, so to speak, 
compared to justice. In other words, legitimacy is often thought to be a less demanding 
standard of evaluation for institutions and political arrangements’.84 They go on to say that 
‘justice is about what we think is ideal, while legitimacy is closer to what we think we can 
accept morally speaking: institutions may be considered to be legitimate even if we do not 
deem them to be fully just’.85 This general understanding of legitimacy as a ‘less demanding’ 
institutional quality than justice is one that was first delineated by Rawls86 and one that has 
subsequently been adopted by multiple authors.87 
 The consequence of holding this view (together with our earlier discussion as to the 
moral function of legitimacy) is that some institutions (i.e. those that are legitimate) are owed 
an obligation of obedience, even when they are not fully just. Some may be perturbed by the 
idea that we can have a moral obligation to obey a rule, even though we believe it to be 
                                                          
82 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.211 
83 I say ‘political’ justice here only to contrast it with the concept of ‘distributive’ justice. See: Held, D. & 
Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.11 
84 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016a) ‘Globalization, Global Politics and the Cosmopolitan Plateau’: p.11 
85 Ibid.: p.12 
86 Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. 
87 See, for example: Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.81; Buchanan, A. & Keohane, 
R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.409; Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Law’: p.115 
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contrary to the requirements of justice. However, as Buchanan & Keohane explain, there are 
at least two very good reasons why we should not cling to the notion that only just institutions 
can exact from us an obligation of obedience:  
‘First, there is sufficient disagreement on what justice requires that such a standard 
for legitimacy would thwart the eminently reasonable goal of securing coordinated 
support for valuable institutions on the basis of moral reasons. Second, even if we all 
agreed on what justice requires, withholding support from institutions because they 
fail to meet the demands of justice would be self-defeating from the standpoint of 
justice itself, because progress toward justice requires effective institutions. To 
mistake legitimacy for justice is to make the best the enemy of the good’.88 
 
Notwithstanding the above (which I think is broadly correct) there exists a more fundamental 
difference between the concepts of legitimacy and justice. Justice, although interested in 
institutional design, also seems to be focused on ‘outcomes’. In other words, for a law or set 
of laws to be just, they would need to produce morally good – if not ideal – outcomes. In this 
way, justice is content-dependent; it matters what the laws actually say in their substance and 
the effect they have upon the world. Legitimacy, however – as I have argued above – is 
content-independent. The legitimacy of a law depends on how that law was made, and not 
on what that law actually says. This is why legitimacy helps solve the problem of disagreement 
that plagues considerations of justice: it is easier to agree on morally justified processes 
through which laws are made than it is to agree on the morality of the content of the law.89 
For this reason, it is also important to point out that legitimacy does not offer us a 
complete picture of when we have obligations to obey institutions. Instead, it only tells us 
when we have a content-independent obligation to do so. In this way, legitimacy is sufficient 
for the creation of obligations, but not necessary, for the simple reason that obligations may 
also be created for content-dependent reasons.  
                                                          
88 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.412 
89 Defining legitimacy as referring to a ‘content-independent’ justification to obey, however, can led to moral 
difficulties. For example, what if a subject has a content-independent obligation to obey an institution, but at 
the same time a content-dependent obligation to disobey that same institution? In such circumstances, the 
subject would seemingly have both an obligation to obey and an obligation to disobey (just for different 
reasons). This dilemma will be discussed (and hopefully adequately resolved) in section 5.2. 
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What legitimacy does do, however, is offer us a complete picture of when obligations 
are owed to an institution simply because it is ‘that’ institution. Legitimacy-based obligations 
derive not from ‘what’ they say, but from ‘where’ they come (i.e. a legitimate institution). All 
other obligations that may be owed to institutions (say, because of reasons of justice) are 
merely ‘instrumental’. In other words, the obligation is not owed ‘to’ the institution per se, 
but (for example) to one’s fellow citizens. In this case, the institution is simply acting as a 
vehicle through which one can fulfil their pre-existing obligations to others. 
 
2.4 Summary  
This chapter began by making clear the distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’ (or 
normative) legitimacy – noting that the sense in which this thesis will use the term is the 
latter. As explained, political institutions are prescriptively legitimate if they have achieved 
some theorised ‘benchmark of acceptability’ of political power or authority. Any use of 
legitimacy in this normative sense should be able to provide a conception of: the ‘moral 
function’ of legitimacy; the ‘basis’ of legitimacy; and also the moral ‘benchmark’ by which 
legitimacy is assessed.  
I made it clear that this thesis does not attempt to formulate any novel moral 
benchmark for political legitimacy. Instead, it takes just one purported benchmark (i.e. state 
consent) and asks whether that benchmark is necessary or sufficient to legitimate one 
particular type of institution (i.e. international law). As such, this chapter did not concern itself 
with this latter consideration. It did, however, argue for a particular conception of the moral 
function of legitimacy, and also identify those features of an institution that need to be 
assessed when determining the legitimacy of that institution. 
As for the moral function of legitimacy, I argued that that traditional understanding of 
legitimacy as giving an institution a ‘right to rule’ in a ‘strong’ sense was outdated and 
unhelpful when assessing the legitimacy of many new institutions; especially those operating 
in the international sphere. I also observed that, very often, other writers on this subject have 
written about legitimacy as if its moral function were not just to alter the normative status of 
an institution’s directives, but also to give some indication as to what the substance of those 
directives can or can’t be. This, I argued, is the wrong approach and, instead, legitimacy should 
be seen as altering the normative status of an institution’s directives regardless of the 
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substance of those directives. My conclusion followed that the moral function of legitimacy is 
to alter the moral status of institution in such a way that that institution now has a right to do 
whatever it claims a right to do. Correspondingly, those over whom the legitimate institution 
claims jurisdiction have an obligation to do whatever the institution claims that they have an 
obligation to do. 
The final section in the chapter considered which aspect of an institution was of moral 
relevance when making a legitimacy judgement. I made the argument that, in determining 
legitimacy, one should consider the ‘process’ by which an institution develops its rules rather 
than the actual content of those rules per se. The reason for this is based on why legitimacy 
is of value as a moral concept in the first place. At its simplest, legitimacy is valuable because 
it helps institutions solve the problem of disagreement in collective decision-making. 
Legitimacy confers moral obligations on subjects to obey rules, even when they disagree with 
the content of those rules (which they inevitably will). Thus, legitimacy cannot depend on the 
content of those rules, for to do so would be to rid legitimacy of its value. 
 The analysis of the concept of legitimacy that we have conducted in this chapter will 
help to focus on, and remove ambiguity from, the discussions to follow (particularly in 
chapters four to six). One may disagree with how I’ve chosen to conceptualise legitimacy in 
this chapter and, as a result, may disagree with some of the conclusions I draw later in this 
thesis that are consequent on this conceptualisation. At the very least, however, it will be 
clear for those people from where their disagreement derives. I also hope that this chapter 
has helped to clarify some of the existing confusion in the literature about the concept of 
legitimacy, and will help others more clearly formulate their own conceptions of legitimacy – 
even if they differ from mine. 
The next chapter will analyse the last of our three key concepts: state consent (as well 
as consent more generally). Chapters four to six will then attempt to consider the central 
question of this thesis: the extent to which state consent is necessary or sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law.  
 
 
3 
CONSENT & STATE CONSENT 
 
For centuries, the dominant and traditional view1 on the legitimacy of the international legal 
system has been ‘state consent’.2 In other words, international law is legitimate if and only if 
it is created by the consent of states.3 Under my conception of legitimacy (as discussed in 
chapter two), therefore, the state consent theory of legitimacy holds that agents (typically 
states) have a moral obligation to obey international law (whatever its content) if that law 
has received the consent of relevant states. 
As we will discover, the dominance of the theory of state consent is not without 
challenge. Notwithstanding this dissent, consent is seen to be a ‘fundamental principle’ of 
international law – the ‘enduring force’ of which, notes Helfer, is demonstrated in: the ‘The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties4; the writings of august commentators5; and the 
frequent reassertions of state control over the creation of new legal obligations6.’7 Louis 
Henkin exemplifies the state consent view of international legal legitimacy when he writes 
that a ‘state is not subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such 
authority’.8 Even those – such as Guzman – who distance themselves from the type of 
categorical approach expressed by Henkin still acknowledge ‘the fundamental role that 
consent plays in the international legal system’.9 
It is important to note that state consent may be communicated in different ways and 
(as we saw in chapter one) used to create different types of international law. As Buchanan 
usefully explains, ‘the legitimacy of treaty law is assured by the explicit consent of states, the 
                                                          
1 By ‘dominant and traditional’ I mean the one that is, and has traditionally been, applied in practice (not the 
one that most philosophers endorse). 
2 Buchanan, A. (2011) ‘Reciprocal Legitimation’: p.6. (Note that Buchanan & Keohane call this view the 
‘International Pedigree View’, see: Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions’: p.413).  
3 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.412 
4 Especially Article 34. 
5 See, for example: Henkin, L. (1995) International Law: Politics and Values: p.28; and Simma, B. (1986) 
‘Consent: Strains in the Treaty System’: pp.485 & 494 
6 See: Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process (1985) UN: pp.148-58 
7 Helfer, L.R. (2008) ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’: p.72 
8 Henkin, L. (1989) ‘International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions’: p.27 
9 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.5 
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legitimacy of customary international law is assured by a kind of implicit consent inferred 
from the behaviour of states, and the legitimacy of law generated by global governance 
institutions is assured by their being created and sustained by state consent’.10 
 Chapters four, five, and six of this thesis will be devoted to critiquing the claim that 
state consent is either sufficient or necessary for the legitimation of international law. Before 
that, however, a number of important issues in relation to (state) consent will need to be 
clarified and explained. First (section 3.1), I will seek to explain the moral foundations of 
consent in general; that is, the way in which giving consent can alter the normative standing 
of an agent in relation to others. Second (section 3.2), I consider the doctrine of state consent, 
and the current relationship between state consent and international law. Finally (section 
3.3), I consider the extent to which state consent underpins international law in practice. First, 
then, I turn to consider the moral foundations of consent theory in general.  
 
3.1 Consent and Normative Standing 
Broadly, our consent to the actions of others ‘conveys to them special rights to do what would 
otherwise be prohibited – thus justifying those actions – while generating for us a special 
obligation to permit or assist their actions.’11 In this way, when one consents to something, 
one can be thought of as being involved in a transaction of rights and obligations: ‘A’, through 
consenting, gives ‘B’ the right to do ‘’. In transferring this right to ‘B’, ‘A’ places upon him or 
herself an obligation to allow for B’s exercise of that right. 
An important aspect of a consent transaction that it is worth emphasising is the fact 
that consent allows agents to do something that – minus the consent – would not have been 
morally permissible. 12 If it had been permissible without consent, then the giving of consent 
would have been superfluous. What makes something permissible (at least in the rights-based 
conception of morality that I adopt) is whether one has the right to do it, and, as mentioned, 
                                                          
10 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.90 
11 Simmons, A. J. (2010) ‘Political Obligation and Consent’: p.315; see also: Dworkin, G. (1988) The Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy: p.86 
12 See, for example: Miller, F.G. & Wertheimer, A. (2010) ‘Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions’; Kleinig, 
J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.4, 6, & 10; Simmons, A. J. (2010) ‘Political Obligation and Consent’: p.306; 
Dworkin, G. (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy: p.86; and Edmundson, W.A. (2011) ‘Consent and Its 
Cousins’: p.336 
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the right to do something is exactly what a consent transaction transfers from ‘A’ to ‘B’. As a 
basic example, in most value-systems, ‘A’ is thought to need to consent to sexual relations 
with ‘B’ precisely because ‘B’ does not have a general right to have sexual relations with ‘A’. 
‘B’ needs to obtain a ‘special’ right to do so. This special right can only be given to ‘B’ by an 
agent already in possession of that right, namely ‘A’. This transfer of the special right is what 
we call ‘consent’. 
It is also crucial to point out at this point that, although consent can create ‘special 
rights’, consent theory is not a ‘foundational’ theory of morality or of ‘rights’ per se. This is 
clear from the definition of consent as ‘conveying to others special rights to do what would 
otherwise be prohibited’. This means that consent operates ‘within’ or ‘on top off’ a pre-
existing notion of which types of action would be morally permissible in relation to other 
agents. In this sense, consent presupposes some form of ‘natural rights’ that can only be 
altered through consent.13 
 In practice, a consent transaction may take many forms; whether it be a promise, a 
contract, an authorisation, and so on.14 Whatever the form, however, consent will always be 
a ‘deliberate… performance of acts or omissions whose conventional or contextual point is to 
communicate to others the agent’s intention to undertake new obligations and/or convey to 
others new rights (with respect to the agent).’15 Following the Hofeldian analytical system, it 
is also worth recognising that the right transferred, created, or forgone in a consent 
transaction could take a number of different forms, for example: a privilege (i.e., a ‘liberty’); 
a claim; a power; or an immunity.16  
 Although consent is often intuitively morally appealing (as in the case of sexual 
relations outlined above), we need to pinpoint exactly the normative function that consent is 
playing. In his essay ‘Informed Consent’, Nir Eyal offers seven possible answers to this 
                                                          
13 Of what these ‘natural rights’ consist precisely, and how they came to exist, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For our purposes, it is enough to recognise that consent theory does, in fact, presuppose the existence 
of such things. Having said that – and given the values that consent seeks to protect – consent theory does 
seem to presuppose a version of natural rights centred around the concept of ‘individual autonomy’. This, 
however, is discussed further in the main text of the thesis. 
14 Simmons, A. J. (2010) ‘Political Obligation and Consent’: pp.305-6 
15 Ibid.: p.306 
16 These four basic components of rights – privileges, claims, powers, and immunities – are known as ‘the 
Hohfeldian incidents’ after Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918), the American legal theorist who discovered them. 
See: Hohfeld, W. (1919) Fundamental Legal Conceptions. See also: Bergelson, V. (2010) ‘Consent to Harm’: 
p.169; and Wenar, L. (2015) ‘Rights’ for a delineation of how each of these incidents manifest in practice. 
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question.17 Although informative, discussing all seven would be to go beyond the scope of 
this essay. Instead, I will focus on the dichotomous choice presented by Thomas Beauchamp. 
In his essay ‘Autonomy and Consent’, Beauchamp argues that, broadly, consent can be viewed 
as fulfilling one of two normative functions: ‘autonomy protection’ or ‘harm prevention’.  
If justified in terms of autonomy protection, the moral force of consent derives from 
the simple premise that, if one agrees to be subject to a particular action, that action cannot 
be wrong. This notion is adequately expressed by a maxim of private law: volenti non fit injuria  
(‘the willing person is not wronged’).18 This premise is a classically liberal one, which – in direct 
opposition to paternalism – views individuals as rational and autonomous, and capable of 
deciding for themselves what is in their own best interests. Put simply, theorists advocating 
this position prioritise the formal ‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’ of the individual above that individual’s 
‘well-being’ (as judged by anyone other than the relevant individual). There are those, 
however, who disagree that the value of consent derives primarily from its protection of 
autonomy. Instead, they believe that consent’s moral force comes from its ability to protect 
agents from harm (needless to say, ‘harm’, in this context, cannot be interpreted merely as a 
‘violation of autonomy’ or else it would be substantially the same as the ‘autonomy 
protection’ position; only semantically different).19 Onara O’Neill, for example, argues that 
‘consent is a way of ensuring that those subjected to invasive interventions are not abused, 
manipulated or undermined, or wronged in comparably serious ways’.20  
The requirement of consent on the basis of autonomy protection is an ‘intrinsic’ 
argument as it protects a quality we find intrinsically valuable (i.e. autonomy). The 
requirement of consent on the basis of harm prevention, however, is an ‘instrumental’ 
argument. This is because consent achieves beneficial outcomes (i.e. the prevention of harm). 
The consensus among consent theorists is that, although consent often serves the well-being 
of the consenting individual, consent is fundamentally justified in terms of autonomy 
protection.21 For example, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
                                                          
17 Eyal, N. (2012) ‘Informed Consent’. The seven justifications for consent that Eyal discusses are: protection; 
autonomy; preventing abusive conduct; trust; self-ownership; non-domination; and personal integrity.  
18 Simmons, J.A. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations: p.66; see also: Hobbes, T. (2013) De Cive: 
ch.III, sec.7; and Hobbes, T. (1968) Leviathan: ch.15. 
19 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.59 
20 O’Neill, O. (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics: p.82 
21 Miller, F.G. & Wertheimer, A. (2010) ‘Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions’: p.83 
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‘stated emphatically that the purpose of consent provisions is the protection of autonomy 
and personal dignity.’22 This strikes me as the more plausible of the two options. Those who 
argue that consent is justified in terms of harm prevention do so – I contend – because they 
want to allow for the possibility that, in cases where one’s consent ostensibly harms that 
individual, that consent can be ignored. But such a position allows for a type of paternalism 
where others can claim to know what constitutes harm to an individual better than the 
individual for themselves. Given that this is exactly the type of paternalism that consent 
theory seeks to reject, consent must primarily be justified in terms of autonomy protection; 
not harm prevention. Having said that, I also agree with Miller & Wertheimer when they say 
that ‘the tension between these values is overstated’.23 They go on to argue that ‘the value 
we ascribe to autonomy is strongly tied to the agent’s well-being. If human beings consistently 
made choices that did not advance their interests, it is hard to imagine that we would come 
to value what we call their autonomy or their right to make such decisions.’24 
‘Autonomy’ is an ‘essentially contested’ concept that has been used in a number of 
competing ways.25 What follows, then, is just one possible interpretation of the concept; 
although it is the one I believe to be the clearest and most intuitive. Autonomy literally means 
‘self-rule’. However, there are multiple ways in which an individual can be ‘self-ruling’, and 
consent only protects a certain type of self-rule. Thus, consent only protects one aspect of 
autonomy; not autonomy as a whole (or rather, not autonomy in all its possible guises).  
Autonomy has two distinct, yet related, components. The first is do with one’s ability 
to be in control of the formulation of one’s desires or how one chooses to act. This has been 
referred to as ‘personal’ autonomy.26 The second is to do with one’s ability to be in control of 
the realisation of those desires. To make the contrast with personal autonomy, I have labelled 
this ‘public’ autonomy.  
To have personal autonomy, one’s desires need to be an expression of their ‘authentic 
self’.27  Thus, in formulating those desires, or deciding how to act, one should be free from 
                                                          
22 Cited in: Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.59 
23 Miller, F.G. & Wertheimer, A. (2010) ‘Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions’: pp.83-4 
24 Ibid. 
25 See, for example: Christman, J. (2015) ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’. See also: Gallie, W.B. 
(1955) ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’. 
26 Dworkin, G. (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy: pp.34–47 
27 Christman, J. (2015) ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’. 
 
   
80 
 
‘manipulative’ or ‘self-distorting’ influences. These could come in the form of ‘internal’ 
manipulative influences, such as a pathology affecting the brain, or a severe addiction. It could 
equally come in the form of ‘external’ manipulative influences, such as emotional 
manipulation from another agent. 
Public autonomy is distinct from personal autonomy because, although one may be 
able to ‘formulate’ their desires autonomously, they may not be able to realise those desires 
in the real world. One could have (or lack) public autonomy in a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ sense.28 
If one has ‘negative’ public autonomy, one is free from – or at least in control of – external 
‘barriers, obstacles or constraints’.29 Such constraints could, for example, take the form of 
legal obligations or physical coercion. If one has ‘positive’ public autonomy, however, one has 
the ‘possibility of acting’ in the sense that they have the resources enabling them to act (such 
as education, wealth, or natural talent).30 This distinction between negative and positive 
public autonomy has also been referred to as the difference between ‘formal’ and ‘effective’ 
freedom respectively.31  
It is important to understand that consent can only protect autonomy in terms of 
‘negative public autonomy’, and not ‘positive public autonomy’ or ‘personal autonomy’ 
(either internal or external). In other words, consent prevents against the ‘arbitrary’ 
imposition of external constraints; it does not equip one with the resources necessary to 
realise their desires, nor does it ensure that one has formulated their desires ‘authentically’. 
Having said this, it is still important to remember that consent is designed to prevent the 
arbitrary imposition of external constraints that would otherwise restrain the realisation of 
one’s ‘personal autonomy’. If one has little or no personal autonomy to realise (say, because 
they are heavily under the influence of some drug) then that agent’s consent would have no 
moral force as it would not be fulfilling its function of helping to realise the agent’s authentic 
desires. Thus, although consent does not increase the personal autonomy of an agent per se, 
it does ensure that only those who are sufficiently ‘personally autonomous’ can give consent. 
Take the example of employment. The requirement of consent to employment contracts 
                                                          
28 This distinction roughly corresponds to the well-known distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. 
See, for example: Berlin. I. (1958) Two Concepts of Liberty; and Carter, I. (2016) ‘Positive and Negative Liberty’. 
29 Carter, I. (2016) ‘Positive and Negative Liberty’. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: pp.61-65 
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means that individuals cannot be forced to work, and that any work in which individuals do 
participate will be consistent with their personal autonomy. Young children are not able to 
consent to employment contracts precisely because they are not thought to have sufficient 
personal autonomy. The requirement that one needs to consent to employment contracts (or 
any other potential external imposition), however, cannot protect one’s positive public 
autonomy as, for example, it cannot force an employer to offer them employment in the first 
place.  
In sum, autonomy can be divided into two broad components: personal and public. 
Personal is the ability to formulate desires, whereas public is the ability to realise desires. 
Public autonomy can further be divided into positive and negative halves. Positive public 
autonomy is broadly one’s access to resources, such as natural talents, wealth, education etc. 
Negative public autonomy is to be free from, or in control of, arbitrary or unwanted external 
interference in the realisation of one’s desires (e.g. from government or other individuals). 
Consent protects one’s public negative autonomy. Thus, all future references to consent 
protecting autonomy, or freedom, will be referring to this particular aspect of autonomy. 
Further, in their overriding concern for autonomy protection, consent theorists necessarily 
assume that individuals are naturally morally free agents. As morally free agents, individuals 
are only legitimately bound by the ‘unnatural’ demands of others because of a free and 
voluntary undertaking to be so bound. (I emphasise ‘unnatural’ here because – as mentioned 
above – consent theory does not deny the existence of ‘natural’ rights and obligations. Most 
obviously – and although born ‘morally free’ – all agents must logically accrue a natural moral 
obligation not to violate the natural autonomy of others). It follows that, ‘since the individual 
is the author of his or her own special obligations, such obligations in no way impair the moral 
autonomy of the person.’32 As Christiano puts it, by consenting, an agent is, in a real sense, 
imposing an obligation on themselves, and thus the obligation cannot be thought of as a 
violation of their autonomy.33  
With its concern for the autonomy protection of all, consent also derives normative 
force from another value: equality. This is so because no one is more justified than anyone 
else in imposing obligations on another against their will. Consent thus precludes the 
                                                          
32 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: p.25 
33 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.382 
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possibility of natural hierarchies (at least amongst those with sufficient personal autonomy) 
as everyone has an equal right to autonomy. This is consistent with the idea that autonomy ‘is 
considered a criterion of political status, in that autonomous agency is seen as [a] necessary… 
condition of equal political standing.’34 Autonomy, however, only protects equality in this 
minimal or ‘formal’ sense described above (i.e. equal political status). It does not, on its own, 
protect or promote equality of ‘outcome’ (such as equal levels of wealth), nor (in itself) any 
of the various conceptions of equality of ‘opportunity’.35 
In sum, consent’s normative appeal derives from its premise of all as being ‘free and 
equal’. I will refer to this justification for consent many times throughout this chapter and rest 
of the thesis, although it should be remembered exactly to what this refers: free = negative 
public autonomy, and equal = formal equality.  
It is worth pointing out at this juncture that, now that we know the values and 
assumptions on which consent theory rests, it is easier to observe why some may choose to 
reject consent theory as a satisfactory basis on which to conduct relations between moral 
agents. To briefly state a few of these reasons without discussing them in depth, one may not 
be convinced by the normative significance of consent theory because: one believes 
paternalism to be morally justified (either in general or in specific circumstances); it preserves 
only ‘formal’ autonomy and not ‘effective’ autonomy; one rejects the notion that individuals 
are naturally morally free agents (as many religious traditions tend to hold); or because 
consent theory preserves only ‘formal’ equality (i.e. equality of political status) and not 
equality of ‘opportunity’ or ‘outcome’. I present this non-exhaustive list of objections simply 
to assist others in navigating their objections to consent theory or, conversely, to inform those 
who wish to defend consent theory against the objections to which they will need to develop 
answers.  
An appreciation of the normative underpinnings and assumptions behind consent 
theory (and the objections to them) is crucial for understanding the arguments made against 
state consent theory in the second half of this thesis. For example, in concerning itself with 
‘autonomy protection’, consent theory presupposes the existence of agents with autonomy 
                                                          
34 Christman, J. (2015) ‘Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy’. See also: Feinberg, J. (1986) Harm to Self: 
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (Volume 3). 
35 See, for example: Arneson, R. (2015) ‘Equality of Opportunity’. 
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worth protecting. The central argument made in section 5.1 (the ‘problem of authorisation’) 
is that states are not agents with autonomy worth protecting. As such, consent theory is ill-
suited to conducting relations between states. Similarly, the fact that consent theory is 
‘uninterested’ in achieving ‘effective freedom’ or ‘equality of opportunity’ or ‘outcome’ lead 
many to criticise it as resulting in impermissible unfairness. This is the objection to consent 
theory considered in section 5.2 under the heading ‘the problem of immoral state consent’.  
 
3.2 Valid consent 
Of course, consent can only have the type of normative force set out in this section if it is 
valid.36 In other words, ‘putative’ consent does not automatically entail that a right has – in a 
moral sense – been created or transferred. Invalid consent, therefore, would not be ‘morally 
efficacious’.37  As far as I can determine, there are just two general criteria for valid consent; 
both of which must necessarily be fulfilled.38 These two criteria are that:  
1. The giving of consent must be sufficiently voluntary (i.e. the consenter must be 
‘free’); and, 
2. The consenter must have sufficient knowledge about to what it is they are 
consenting (i.e. the consenter must be ‘informed’). 
 
Each of these criteria are designed to guarantee the autonomy of the consenting agent. As 
explained above, if consent does not protect autonomy, then it is not fulfilling its normative 
function.  
The condition that consent ought to be given voluntarily protects one’s autonomy 
straightforwardly.39 To say one acted voluntarily is to say, at the very least, that they acted in 
the absence of coercion. Of course, as Horton notes, it is ‘notoriously a matter of vigorous 
                                                          
36 Simmons, A. J. (2010) ‘Political Obligation and Consent’: p.318 
37 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.25 
38 See, for example: Feinberg, J. (1986) The Moral Limits of Criminal Law: Harm to Self: p.316; Huemer, M. (2013) 
The Problem of Political Authority; Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation; Flathman, R. (1972) Political Obligation; 
Simmons, J.A. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations; Bix, B. H. (2010) ‘Contracts’: p.253; Gillon, R. 
(1985) ‘Consent’: p.1700; Bergelson, V. (2010) ‘Consent to Harm’: p.175; Frohock, F.M. (1989) ‘Liberal Maps of 
Consent’; Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.13; and The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969): Art. 48-52. 
39 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.69 
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dispute as to what is to count as an instance of coercion.’40 Indeed, some theorists would 
want to go further and argue that the ability of an agent to act voluntarily can be undermined 
by more than just coercion, and could also be encumbered by, for example, moral and social 
pressures, internal compulsions, and even a lack of reasonable alternatives.41 My own 
position as to what constitutes coercion, and as to what type of action limits voluntarily 
behaviour, will be discussed in chapter four (section 4.1). However interpreted, there is little 
disagreement to the general rule that one cannot be acting autonomously and also non-
voluntarily.  
The condition that the consenter must have sufficient knowledge about to what it is 
they are consenting also straightforwardly protects the autonomy of the consenter.42 If, for 
example, a person is deceived or has crucial information withheld from them, then their 
consent to an obligation-generating act does not appear to be an expression of their true will. 
Again, however, there are different levels of knowledge, and as such there is much debate as 
to what constitutes a ‘sufficient’ level of knowledge for consent to be valid.43 This will be 
analysed in greater depth in chapter four (section 4.2).  
It is important to make clear that an agent can give voluntary but uninformed consent, 
and also informed but non-voluntary consent. In the first instance, one may voluntarily sign a 
contract, but be deceived or misled as to its meaning and implications. In the second instance, 
one can involuntarily hand over their wallet to a thief with a gun, but be completely informed 
as to what they are doing and the consequences of thereby (not) doing it. In both these 
examples, the consent given would be invalid. 
 Other necessary conditions – besides ‘voluntariness’ and ‘knowledge’ – have been 
proposed for valid consent. One, put forward by Beauchamp, is that the consenter must have 
the intention of consenting.44 Another, put forward by Hyams, says that the consenter must 
be able to communicate their consent using an appropriate method.45 Although both 
                                                          
40 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: p.31 
41 Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.15; see also: Olsaretti, S. (1998) ‘Freedom, Force and Choice’. 
42 Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.16 
43 Bix, B. H. (2010) ‘Contracts’: pp.253-4 
44 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: pp.65-68 
45 Hyams, K. (2008) ‘Political Authority and Obligation’: pp.13-14 
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reasonable conditions, I will briefly explain why I don’t believe it is necessary to add them to 
the list of criteria for valid consent.  
 The intention condition can be read in one of two ways. First, it could refer to 
‘intending to communicate consent’. Second, it could refer to ‘intending the consequences of 
the consent’. I’ll begin with the former. My contention is that ‘intention’, read in this way is, 
in practice, the same as the voluntariness condition. Although one could intend to give non-
voluntary consent (e.g. handing one’s wallet to the gunman), it seems impossible for one’s 
consent to be voluntary, yet unintentional. Say an office worker stretches his hands in the air 
at the exact moment – unheard by him – the boss asked those volunteering to work late that 
evening to raise their hands. The ‘consent’ given here is entirely unintentional. Although the 
worker ‘voluntarily’ put his hands in the air, he didn’t voluntarily put his hands in the air with 
an understanding of its significance; i.e. he didn’t voluntarily consent. Thus, if ‘intention’ is 
interpreted as ‘intending to communicate consent’, then it can be subsumed with the 
‘voluntariness’ condition.  
 The second interpretation of the intention condition could be ‘intending the 
consequences of the consent’. This is the sense in which Beauchamp discusses it. Beauchamp 
argues that ‘intention’ should not be confused here with ‘desire’. 46 According to Beauchamp 
– and I agree – intending the consequences of an action should mean having foresight that 
they will occur, even if they are undesired.47 For example, one may not desire to be scarred 
by surgery, but consenting to the surgery – with the knowledge that scarring will occur – 
means that one intends to be scarred. What is important here is the knowledge that one will 
be scarred.48 Thus, given Beauchamp’s interpretation, there seems to be no obvious reason 
why this condition of valid consent could not fall within the broader ‘knowledge’ condition; 
for, if one does not intend an outcome, it means they didn’t know that that outcome would 
occur (not merely that they didn’t desire it). My argument here, then, has been that 
‘intention’ matters when consenting, but only to the extent that intention is evidence of 
either ‘voluntariness’ or ‘knowledge’. There is thus no need to include ‘intention’ as a 
condition of valid consent in its own right.  
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The condition of the consenter being able to communicate their consent using an 
appropriate method is very rarely a problem with express consent. With tacit consent, 
however, since the consenter is, by definition, not making any active expression of consent, 
it is often harder to determine whether this condition has been fulfilled. As outlined by 
Huemer, there are a number of ways in which tacit consent could be communicated. ‘In some 
situations’, says Huemer, ‘one expresses agreement to a proposal simply by refraining from 
opposing it. I call this “passive consent”.’49 ‘In other cases’, he continues, ‘one commits 
oneself to accepting certain demands by soliciting or voluntarily accepting benefits to which 
those demands are known to be attached. I call this “consent through acceptance of 
benefits”.’50 Huemer also acknowledges the possibilities of tacit consent through ‘presence’ 
(i.e. by remaining in some location) and also through ‘participation’ (i.e. by participating in 
the practice for which consent should be given).51 
What is important to note is that, with tacit consent, the method of communication, 
or act of consent, is decided for the consenter. The consenter is effectively told: ‘If you do, or 
do not do, action ‘X’, you thereby consent to ‘Y’’. The consenter can thus communicate their 
consent through actions that would not usually be taken to be a sign of consent (such as 
raising one’s hand to signal consent). Because the method of communication is decided for 
the consenter, it has been argued by some – such as Keith Hyams – to be crucial that the act 
must be one to which the consenter would not have been permitted to perform anyway (had 
the act not been specified as consent).52 As Hyams explains, this requirement allows us to get 
around the problem that arises from useful acts – or indeed acts to which we have a moral 
right – counting as consent. As such, the consenter ‘has nothing to lose by that act’s being 
specified as an act of consent.’53 This is one of the key objections to Locke’s famous ‘residence 
as tacit consent’ argument. Briefly – and perhaps crudely – Locke argued that, by residing 
within the territory of a state, one is tacitly consenting to obey the laws of that state.54 But 
Locke’s position assumes that the state otherwise has a moral right that we do not take 
                                                          
49 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.22 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.: p.23 
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residence within the state (without thereby consenting to its laws).55 Given that most people 
are born into their country of residence, it is far from clear that states do have this moral 
right.  
I agree with Hyams’ above argument entirely. That said, the condition of ‘appropriate 
communication’ seems to be subsumed within the more general condition that consent be 
voluntary. For example (going back to Locke’s example) if the state does not have a moral 
right that we do not reside within the state, but nevertheless reinterprets our residence as a 
sign of consent, then the state is effectively coercing us to obey the law, especially if the costs 
of leaving the state (both financially and socially) are unreasonably high. Thus, to the extent 
that consent under these conditions can be seen to be given at all, it is not given voluntarily. 
For this reason, I think it unnecessary to make ‘communication’ a further condition of valid 
consent.  
In sum, therefore, the conditions of ‘voluntariness’ and ‘knowledge’ are not only 
necessary, but also sufficient conditions for valid consent. The next section considers the way 
in which consent has developed, from being a means by which domestic law is justified in 
relation to individuals, to a means by which international law is justified in relation to states 
and the individuals within those states. 
 
3.3 State Consent, Sovereignty and International Law 
Consent theory, in its political form, developed with considerations about the legitimacy of 
domestic law in relation to individuals. As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the 
Enlightenment assumption that the individual is naturally free compelled many to ask by what 
‘special’ right one rules over another. In other words, how are political obligations consistent 
with this fundamental conception of the individual? One of the earliest attempts to resolve 
this tension came from the consent theorists; notably Hobbes, Grotius, Locke and 
Pufendorf.56 In the consent-based approach to legitimacy, ‘an institution [traditionally the 
state] is legitimate… only if its subjects-to-be have consented to it... The basic idea is that 
                                                          
55 Hyams, K. (2008) Political Authority and Obligation: p.14 
56 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.118; see also: Simmons, A.J. (2001) 
Justification and Legitimacy; and Hampsher-Monk, I. (1993) A History of Modern Political Thought.  
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what binds us to an institution is the voluntary acceptance of its authority.’57 Consent theory 
accounts for the legitimacy of institutions straightforwardly. If a person agrees to be subjected 
to a particular institution, then that person has an obligation to obey that institution’s rules.58  
The consent approach to legitimacy provided a dramatic transformation in the way 
the political sphere was conceived.59  Under the consent view, it is those who are ruled that 
determine the political obligations owed to the ruler(s); and not the rulers themselves.60 Also 
ingrained in the liberal Enlightenment conscience of the time was a fear of misplaced 
paternalism. In his essay, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, Immanuel 
Kant ‘expresses many of the tendencies shared among Enlightenment philosophies of 
divergent doctrines.’61 Kant defines ‘enlightenment’ as humankind's release from its self-
incurred immaturity; ‘immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the 
guidance of another.’62 The Enlightenment, explains William Bristow, was thus seen – at least 
in part – as ‘the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own 
intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act.’63 This general antipathy 
toward paternalism is a central motivation for the development of consent theory as consent 
protects against unwanted interference.64 It is important to note, therefore – as has been 
noted previously – that consent theory does not necessarily prioritise an agent’s well-being, 
but rather their autonomy (in the sense outlined above). As J.A. Simmons explains: ‘the 
method of consent protects the individual from becoming bound to any government which 
he finds unpalatable, be it a good one or a bad one, one which injures him or one which 
protects him from injury. What is protected, then, is not primarily the individual himself, or 
his interests, but rather his freedom to choose whether to become bound to a particular 
government’.65 
                                                          
57 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.118 
58 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.20 
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60 Ibid.. For historical discussions of autonomy, see: Schneewind, J. B. (1998) The Invention of Autonomy; and 
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‘As the process of state formation gathered force in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries, the principle of government by consent gradually gained ground by 
being invoked repeatedly by a series of groups who sought to obtain a share of emerging state 
power.’66 By the end of the eighteenth century, the idea of consent as the basis of political 
legitimacy had been widely accepted in the Western world. The U.S. Declaration of 
Independence (1776), for example, argues that the just powers of government derive solely 
from ‘the consent of the governed.’67 The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
(1789) states essentially the same thing in Article III: ‘The principle of any sovereignty resides 
essentially in the Nation. No body, no individual can exert authority which does not emanate 
expressly from it’.  
 The focus of this thesis is, of course, the state consent theory of the legitimacy of 
international law. The simplest way of viewing this theory is to transpose the traditional 
consent-based view of legitimacy (within the domestic sphere) to the international sphere. 
According to this account, international law is legitimate if it has been created via the consent 
of the states over which it rules. It is important to note that this account is not merely 
normative in the sense that it is a proposal for what ought to be the case. It is also largely 
descriptive of the way that international law is purported to be created and legitimated in 
practice.68 (This is in contrast to ‘domestic consent theory’ which is arguably not descriptive 
of the process by which laws are made and legitimated).  
This section, therefore, aims to give a brief account of how we got to where we are 
today; in other words, how and why it is that state consent is the primary means by which 
international law is created and legitimated. It is important to note that the doctrine of state 
consent was not hypothesised by philosophers, from abstract principles, at any one moment 
in time. Instead, the doctrine evolved over hundreds of years in response to historical 
circumstance. As Kaczorowska-Ireland confirms: ‘The basic structure, and many principles, of 
international law, are deeply rooted in history.’69 It is thus important to review that history if 
we want to understand how and why we got to where we are today.  
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Nevertheless, this is the exception rather than the norm. 
69 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.6 
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While some of the basic concepts of international law can be observed as existing 
between political communities thousands of years ago, the modern system of international 
law is traced back only 400 years; alongside the development of the modern sovereign state.70 
International law, as we think of it today, is essentially the law that regulates conduct 
between independent and sovereign states.71 The idea that state consent is the basis of 
international law only becomes intelligible when one appreciates the development of three 
distinct, yet overlapping, concepts: the sovereign state; the state as an artificial person; and 
positive law (as opposed to ‘natural’ law).  
There are two elements to the concept of the ‘sovereign state’: the ‘state’ itself, and 
the notion that it is ‘sovereign’. There are many competing theories as to how, why, and when 
the ‘state’ actually developed.72 This is, however, not a discussion that will be had here. What 
concerns us more is the idea that the modern state came to be thought of as ‘sovereign’. The 
idea of sovereignty developed against the backdrop of the religious wars that followed the 
onset of the Protestant Reformation in Europe (1524-1648). These wars were characterised 
by a struggle for authority between religious factions. Reflecting on these wars, the French 
philosopher, Jean Bodin, reasoned that ‘the conflict would be solved only if it was possible 
both to establish the existence of a necessarily unrestricted ruling power’73 with the 
competency ‘to overrule all religious and customary authorities’.74 Bodin ‘viewed the problem 
of order as central and did not think that it could be solved through outdated medieval 
notions of a segmented society’.75 Rather, ‘an “ordered commonwealth” depended upon the 
creation of a central authority that was all-powerful’.76 This was essentially the basis of 
sovereignty: ‘that there must be within every political community or state a determinate 
sovereign authority whose powers are decisive and whose powers are recognized as the 
rightful or legitimate basis of authority.’77 
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As explained by Held & Maffettone, the doctrine of sovereignty developed in two 
distinct dimensions:  
‘The first [is] concerned with the “internal,” and the second with the “external” 
aspects of sovereignty. The former involves the claim that a person, or political body, 
established as sovereign rightly exercises the “supreme command” over a particular 
society. Government – whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic – must enjoy 
the “final and absolute authority” within a given territory. The latter involves the 
assertion that there is no final and absolute authority above and beyond the sovereign 
state. In the traditional conception of external sovereignty, nothing but the will of the 
sovereign can effectively bind the state.’78  
 
The distinguishing mark of sovereignty was not only that it demanded supreme authority 
within a defined territory, but also that it was a quality of the ‘state’, and not of any particular 
individual ‘sovereign’ ruler. This distinction is explained clearly by Skinner: ‘while the 
sovereign is the rightful head of the state, he is so by virtue of his office not his person. A ruler 
exercises power in the light of his possession of sovereignty, which is a temporary ‘gift’ and 
not a personal attribute’.79   
 It is easy to understand why Bodin saw this distinction as crucial. Bodin was keen to 
establish permanence and stability. Sovereignty held by individuals would be precarious and 
fragile and would last only as long as the individual survived or as long as they could command 
authority (as was often the case in medieval Europe). This gave effect to the idea that the 
authority of the state was distinct from the authority of the ruler, and thus the state was – as 
Hobbes was later to phrase it – an ‘Artificiall Man’.80 The idea that the state could have an 
agency of its own would be fundamental in the application of consent theory to the 
international sphere as we recognise it today. Public international agreements are not 
concluded between individuals, but between ‘states’ as artificial persons. The individuals who 
actually sign the agreements are merely representatives of the sovereign state. Thus, the 
                                                          
78 Ibid.; see also: Hinsley, F. H. (1986) Sovereignty; and Cassese, A. (1995) Self-Determination of Peoples: A 
Legal Reappraisal. 
79 Skinner, Q. (1989) ‘Lecture 2: The Idea of the Modern State’; see also: Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the 
Global Order: p.40 
80 Hobbes, T. (1968) Leviathan: p.81; see also: Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: p.40 
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death of any one signatory does not entail the termination of the agreement, as it might 
within ordinary domestic contracts between individuals. 
  One of first formal and lasting recognitions of state sovereignty was established 
during the Peace (or Treaty) of Westphalia in 1648.81 The Treaty, which brought an end to the 
Thirty Years’ War in Europe, ‘was an attempt to limit the devastation and wars that came 
about as a result of external intervention.’82 The signatories believed that recognition of 
sovereignty ‘would serve as a mechanism of peace by creating “territorial states” which were 
in control of their own domestic affairs.’83 Almost three hundred years later, in 1945, the 
principle of sovereign equality was enshrined in Article 2(1), of the Charter of the United 
Nations. In effect, ‘a sovereign state is empowered… to exercise exclusive and total 
jurisdiction within its territorial borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to 
intervene in its internal affairs.’84 
 The idea of sovereignty in the Westphalian sense also presupposes a theory of 
‘positive’, as opposed to ‘natural’, international law. The early theorists of international law – 
i.e. those theorists who believed that international conduct ought to be regulated in some 
way – were invariably advocates of natural law.85 These (mostly Spanish) theorists – such as 
Francisco Vitoria (1492 – 1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548 – 1617) – believed that the Spanish 
wars of conquest ought to adhere to divine and natural laws, even though such activity was 
being conducted outside of any (recognised) jurisdiction.86 The Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius 
(1583 – 1645)  – who is often cited as the father of international law – later excised theology 
from international law whilst maintaining the natural law approach.87 For him, the law of 
nature was founded exclusively on reason.88 Thus, Grotius believed that states and other 
entities ought to abide by natural law – deciphered though the use of reason – when 
interacting with one another. Following Grotius, however, ‘a split can be detected and two 
different schools identified. On the one hand, there was the traditional ‘naturalist’ school, 
                                                          
81 Sens, A. & Stoett, P. (2009) Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions: pp.47-48 
82 Ibid.: p.48 
83 Ibid. 
84 Evans, G. & Sahnoun, M. (2002) ‘Responsibility to Protect’. 
85 Shaw, M.N. (2008) International Law: p.22 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid.: p.24 
88 Ibid. 
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exemplified by Samuel Pufendorf’.89 On the other, there were the exponents of ‘positivism’. 
One of the principal initiators of the positivist school was the English Judge, Richard Zouche.90 
It was also later enunciated and developed by, among others, Auguste Compte, John Austin 
and Jeremy Bentham.91 
Positivism essentially argues that international laws are not ‘discovered’ or ‘reasoned’, 
according to some natural law, but are rather created by states through their interactions 
with one another. According to the positivists, ‘agreements and customs recognised by the 
states were the essence of the law of nations’.92 A strict Westphalian view of sovereignty 
necessitates such a positivist approach, for if states are truly sovereign, then they cannot be 
subject to any higher law, divine or otherwise. The only laws to which a sovereign state can 
coherently be subject – the theory goes – are those that arise from the exercise of their own 
sovereignty, i.e. their consent. 
Although the doctrine of state consent developed in theoretical form during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it only really began to be asserted in practice in the 
nineteenth century. The rapid development of trade and communications in the nineteenth 
century necessitated the proliferation of international law to help coordinate the new links 
and relations between states.93 In turn, the proliferation of international law necessitated an 
agreed upon and recognised source of that law, and the dominant theory, state consent, 
became that recognised source. Additionally, the nineteenth century, ‘with its business-
oriented philosophy, stressed the importance of the contract as the legal basis of an 
agreement freely entered into by both (or all) sides’.94 Given that, by this time, states were 
considered to be independent and free ‘agents’, the relations between them naturally 
mimicked the relations between individuals in the domestic sphere. The only difference 
between individuals and states, in this sense, was that states were truly sovereign. Thus, not 
only did international agreements take the form of contracts, but the nature of those 
contracts could not be bound or determined by any higher law or authority.95  
                                                          
89 Shaw, M.N. (2008) International Law: p.24 
90 Ibid.: pp.24-5 
91 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.3 
92 Shaw, M.N. (2008) International Law: p.25 
93 Ibid.: pp.27-8 
94 Ibid.: p.9; See also: Freidmann, W. (1967) Legal Theory: pp.573-6 
95 See, for example: Jellinek, G. (1905) Allegemeine Rechtslehre; and Shaw, M.N. (2008) International Law: p.9  
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 This section, then, has provided a brief overview of how and why the state consent 
theory of legitimacy came to be the dominant model of international law. Although this has 
been a descriptive account, it is useful to understand what assumptions are being made in 
practice when we come to engage in the normative analysis of state consent (in the following 
chapters). For example, the current system is based on the assumptions that: states are 
‘sovereign’; that they are ‘artificial persons’; and that a ‘positivist’ approach (rather than a 
‘naturalist’ one) is the ‘correct’ basis of law. 
We are now approaching a point where we can critically evaluate the claim that state 
consent is either necessary or sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. First, however, 
I will briefly consider the extent to which state consent is the basis of international law in 
practice. 
 
3.4 Is State Consent the Basis of International Law? 
At this point in the thesis, I feel it is important to pre-empt the following objection: ‘It is all 
very well looking at whether or not state consent would legitimate international law’ the 
argument may run, ‘but your discussion is based on the unsubstantiated premise that current 
international law does, in fact, derive from state consent’. This is a legitimate objection which 
deserves proper attention. In chapter six, I will talk at greater length about those types of 
international law that arguably hold the strongest claim not to be the product of state 
consent. In the following paragraphs, therefore, I will cover only very briefly the different 
types of law and the extent to which they can be said to derive from state consent. 
In chapter one, I explained that there were – at least according to Article 38(1) ICJ, 
four primary sources of international law: treaty law, customary international law, general 
principles, and judicial decisions. Of these sources of international law, the treaty is the one 
most unequivocally based on the consent of states. As expressed clearly in Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, no state can be bound by treaty obligations without 
their prior consent. Consent to treaties is given explicitly; usually in the form of a signature by 
a state representative. The fact that treaty law derives from state consent, therefore, is 
essentially uncontested. 
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Customary international law (CIL) is also thought to rest of the consent of states. 
However, unlike with treaties where that consent is explicit, ‘a state’s consent to custom is 
thought to be tacit or implied’ through that state’s actions.96 This is because CIL develops 
through the general practice of states. Thus, if a state notices a customary international law 
developing, but does not wish to be so bound, it can make its opposition known. If opposition 
is not demonstrated, then states can reasonably be thought to have consented to that 
customary law. As I will discuss in section 6.2.2, however, there are examples where states 
have become bound by CIL, even when it is not reasonable to assume that they gave their 
tacit consent (notably in the case of ‘newly-formed’ states).  
If treaties and custom are traceable to a state’s consent to be bound, this is less 
obvious with general principles.97 This is because general principles are often used by courts 
to adjudicate a dispute when there is a paucity of relevant treaty or customary law. Since 
these principles are not adopted or legislated, they cannot easily be traced back to 
expressions of state consent. It is also worth noting, however, that the ICJ ‘has never decided 
a case solely and expressly on the basis of a general principle of law’.98 This is very likely for 
the reason that to do so would be to ‘render it vulnerable to the critique that the state losing 
out never accepted the principle in question, and this is something the Court is no doubt keen 
to avoid.’99 This, then, adds weight to the notion that state consent is considered the normal 
method by which to accrue international legal obligations. I do, however, believe that many 
general principles would be legally binding on states whether or not states accepted those 
principles or gave their consent. The reason for this is explained in chapter six.  
Finally, judicial decisions are – in themselves – clearly not direct expressions of state 
consent. That said, however, to the extent that a state had consented to the jurisdiction of 
the court making the decision, judicial decisions could arguably be conceived as enjoying 
indirect state consent. This debate, however, is superfluous in so far as – as explained in 
chapter one – judicial decisions should not be thought of a creating law per se. Instead, they 
interpret existing law, and to the extent that judicial decisions are ‘innovative’, they are still 
                                                          
96 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.30 
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constrained by the parameters of existing law in a way that the other sources of law are not. 
It is not clear, therefore, that judicial decisions would need to be derived directly from state 
consent in order to be legitimate.  
 An additional point I want to address in this section is one made by Jan Klabbers. 
Klabbers writes that ‘the old system’ of state consent ‘is losing vitality in the wake of the 
emergence of actors other than states and with “network governance” complementing 
traditional diplomatic intercourse.’100 He goes on to explain that: 
‘The two major sources of international law, custom and treaty, both work on the 
assumption of regular, formalized contract between regular, formalized entities: 
states… [However] it is also clear that much authority is exercised by entities that are 
not related to states; this applies to large companies, but equally to non-governmental 
entities that may have no formal authority but whose authority rests on their 
expertise on a given topic, or on the fact that they are known as principled actors who 
may command some form of respect. The big challenge for international lawyers is to 
come to terms with the activities of such actors and, somehow, to decide when their 
work gives rise to international law, and when it does not’.101 
 
Whilst I am in general agreement with the sentiment of Klabbers’ writing, an important 
distinction needs to be made between the power to influence the composition of 
international law, and the power to ‘create’ it. It is certainly true, as Klabbers observes, that 
entities such as large companies and NGOs are exerting greater authority on the international 
stage, but this is not the same as saying that international law finds its source in their actions. 
These entities are still obliged to lobby states when seeking to influence the creation of 
international law because, ultimately, states are still the actors that create it. 
In sum, my own conclusion is that, although it is disputed the extent to which state 
consent acts as the source of legal obligations in practice, it is clear that it plays some role for 
most international law (again, see chapter six for a more detailed discussion). I also want to 
emphasise that, although this thesis assumes the significance of state consent in creating and 
                                                          
100 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.40; see also: Van Hoof, G.J.H. (1983) Rethinking the Sources of 
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legitimating international law, its value (i.e. the value of the thesis) is not dependent on 
proving the proposition that all or even most international law derives from state consent. 
The purpose of this thesis is merely to ask: to the extent that state consent is the source of 
international legal obligations, is it necessary and/or sufficient? It is for others to decide ‘the 
extent’, and thus, perhaps, the relevance of this thesis. For me, the normative part of the 
question is valuable regardless of the descriptive analysis. 
 The final point worth considering (when asking the extent to which the legitimacy of 
international law is based on state consent theory) is a semantic one. When one refers to 
‘state consent’, it is important to separate ‘purported’ state consent from ‘ideal’ state 
consent. In other words, an ostensible act of state consent may not be a morally efficacious 
instance of state consent. We have already seen, for example, that consent should be 
sufficiently ‘free’ and ‘informed’ to hold normative significance. Thus, although we may 
observe that state consent was given to an international law, that state consent may have 
been non-voluntary or uninformed. Additionally – as has been pointed out – consent theory 
(in an ideal form) assumes certain ‘background’ conditions; such as the existence of moral 
agents with autonomy worth protecting, and a normative framework (possibly of natural 
rights) that helps us determine when consent is necessary.  Again, although we may observe 
that state consent has ostensibly been given, any absence of these background conditions 
may diminish the normative significance of that consent.  
The distinction between ‘purported’ and ‘ideal’ state consent, then, is crucial – 
especially when considering the objections made to state consent theory (as is done in the 
following chapters). This is because, when assessing an objection, we should always ask: is 
the objection arguing that a particular instance of state consent does not satisfy the 
conditions of consent theory, or that (state) consent theory is – even when ‘ideal’ – a theory 
incapable of legitimating (international) law? 
 
3.5 Summary  
This chapter began by examining the way in which consent – in general – alters the normative 
standing of an agent in relation to others. Simply put, a consent transaction transfers, creates 
or forgoes a right to perform/not perform an action that would otherwise have been 
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impermissible. In this way, I argued that the normative function of consent is to protect the 
autonomy of the consenting agent. More specifically, I argued that consent seeks to protect 
what I call the ‘public negative autonomy’ of an agent. As a corollary, consent also protects 
the formal equality of agents (understood as equal political standing). I also argued that, for 
consent to be morally efficacious (i.e. to actually alter the normative standing of agents) it 
needs to be ‘free and informed’.  
 Consideration was then given to the way in which political consent has developed, 
from being a means by which domestic law is justified in relation to individuals, to being a 
means by which international law is justified to states and the individuals within those states. 
A brief account was offered of how and why it is that state consent came to be the primary 
means by which international law is created and legitimated. I explained that the notion of 
state consent as the basis of international law only becomes intelligible when one appreciates 
the historical development of three distinct, yet overlapping, concepts: the sovereign state; 
the state as an artificial person; and positive law. 
Finally, this chapter considered the extent to which state consent can claim to be the 
basis of international law in practice. I noted that the answer to this question largely depends 
on the source of a law. International laws created through treaties, for example, are almost 
always based on the explicit consent of states. International law which finds its source in 
‘general principles’, however, is unlikely to be the product of state consent. 
This chapter, along with the two preceding chapters (chapters one and two) have been 
concerned with a conceptual analysis of the key terms employed in this thesis: ‘international 
law’, ‘political legitimacy’, and ‘state consent’. We have thus built a solid base from which we 
can move to assess the normative question of whether state consent does, in fact, provide 
for the legitimacy of international law. This normative analysis will take up the remaining 
three chapters of the thesis (chapters four, five, and six). 
 
 
 
4 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF STATE CONSENT (PART 1)  
 
For the remainder of the thesis (chapters four, five and six), I will be evaluating the extent to 
which – if at all – state consent legitimates international law. First, I will consider whether 
state consent is sufficient for the legitimacy of international law (chapters four and five); that 
is to say, is state consent, on its own, able to legitimate international law. Second, I consider 
whether state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of international law (chapter six). If state 
consent is necessary, then it is just one condition – of potentially many – that must be satisfied 
if international law is to be legitimate. If state consent is unnecessary, then international law 
can be legitimate without the consent of states. I will start, however, by looking at the 
sufficiency of state consent. 
There are multiple arguments for why state consent should not be thought sufficient 
for the legitimacy of international law. The current chapter and the next will critically engage 
with those arguments I believe to be the most challenging to the theory of state consent. 
These are: the problem of ‘non-voluntary’ state consent (section 4.1); the problem of 
‘uninformed’ state consent (section 4.2); the problem of ‘authorisation’ (section 5.1); and the 
problem of ‘immoral’ consent (section 5.2). This chapter will consider the first of these two 
arguments which pertain specifically to the ‘validity’ of state consent. 
Before discussing these arguments, there is an important distinction (mentioned in 
the previous chapter) that is worth re-stating: The statement ‘state consent is insufficient for 
the legitimacy of international law’ could mean one of two things. First, it could mean that 
purported state consent (i.e. state consent ostensibly given in practice) is (often) insufficient 
to legitimate international law. Second, it could mean that valid state consent is insufficient 
to legitimate international law. The first position holds that valid state consent could be 
sufficient to legitimate international law, but valid state consent is often not given in practice. 
The second position holds that, even if valid, state consent is not sufficient to legitimate 
international law. 
 I will now turn to the first argument for the insufficiency of state consent in 
legitimating international law; that of ‘non-voluntary’ state consent. 
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4.1 The Problem of Non-Voluntary State Consent 
The claim is often made, by theorists such as Buchanan, that ‘what currently counts as 
consent is not sufficiently voluntary’ to legitimate international law.1 For example, says 
Buchanan, ‘when the losers in a war sign a peace treaty literally at gun-point, this can count 
as state consent under international law’.2 Elsewhere, Buchanan & Keohane make a similar 
point about the involuntariness of consent by claiming that, for a weak or small state, ‘the 
consent given to global governance institutions such as the WTO is hardly voluntary, since the 
state would suffer serious costs by not participating’.3   
This argument is one that challenges the validity of state consent.4 As was discussed 
earlier (in chapter three), the primary function of consent is to protect the autonomy of the 
consenter, and the requirement that consent should be voluntary is fundamental to 
autonomy protection. It would be a contradiction to say that an agent acted involuntarily yet 
autonomously.5 It is also important to note that Buchanan’s argument (and that of others) is 
not claiming that state consent cannot legitimate international law, only that, in practice, it 
often does not (due to its being insufficiently voluntary).  
In this section, I will consider three general scenarios under which state consent to 
international law may be said to be involuntary; and thus invalid. These are, state consent 
given under conditions of: (1) physical/military force; (2) political or economic pressure; and 
(3) asymmetric bargaining positions between states. In the first scenario, the consent state A 
gives to state B is arguably involuntary because of military force exerted by state B on state A 
(in order to illicit A’s consent). In scenario two, the consent state A gives state B is arguably 
involuntary because state B has made state A’s enjoyment of certain political or economic 
benefits (not directly related to the immediate agreement) conditional upon state A’s consent 
to the current agreement. Finally, in the third scenario, the consent state A gives to state B is 
                                                          
1 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.187 
2 Ibid. 
3 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.414. See also: 
Steinberg, R.H. (2002) ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’. 
4 Legally, non-voluntary consent (i.e. consent obtained under duress) is void ab initio. See: Bergelson, V. (2010) 
‘Consent to Harm’: p.175 
5 Olsaretti would disagree that voluntariness is necessary for autonomy, although this is premised on her 
particular conception of ‘voluntariness’, which I will argue against in this section. See: Olsaretti, S. (1998) 
Freedom, Force and Choice: p.73 
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arguably involuntary because state A is far more dependent on the success of the agreement 
than state B. State B thus ‘forces’ state A to consent to a particular arrangement though the 
‘threat’ of withdrawal from negotiations altogether. Before we go on to consider these 
scenarios, however, it is necessary to say something about the nature of ‘voluntariness’. 
 
4.1.1 Voluntariness vs Freedom  
To improve clarity in our present discussion, the first point that needs addressing is the 
relationship between the concepts ‘voluntariness’ and ‘freedom’.6 Some authors appear to 
be using the terms interchangeably, whereas others propose a clear distinction. Nozick, for 
example, falls within the former camp. He does not use ‘voluntariness’ and ‘freedom’ 
synonymously as such, but, for him, the two terms are conceptually inseparable.7 In other 
words, one acts voluntarily when they are free, and involuntarily when they are unfree. More 
specifically, Nozick argues that one’s freedom is impinged when another unjustifiably 
interferes with their action.8 (‘Unjustified’, here, would refer to the fact that the ‘interferer’ 
has not acted within their rights). All subsequent actions made by the recipient of the 
interference in relation to that initial unjustified interference are involuntary.9 For example, 
imagine one is forced, by their parents, to get married, but are given the ‘freedom’ to choose 
exactly to whom they get married. For Nozick, this latter choice regarding whom to marry 
would be involuntary as they do not have the freedom not to get married at all. Thus, 
voluntariness is dependent on freedom.  
 Olsaretti, on the other hand, accuses Nozick of conflating ‘voluntariness’ and 
‘freedom’, and wants to make a clear distinction between the two.10 Essentially, whereas 
Nozick refers to a prior state of freedom to determine the voluntariness of a choice, Olsaretti 
argues that voluntariness should be determined by considering the nature of the choice in 
                                                          
6 For the purpose of the following discussion, ‘freedom’ is defined broadly as ‘free from coercive external 
interference’.  
7 Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia 
8 Ibid.: p.262 
9 Ibid. 
10 Olsaretti, S. (1998) Freedom, Force and Choice: p.69 
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isolation.11 As a consequence, one can be unfree yet act voluntarily at the same time (and 
vice versa). She gives the following two examples to demonstrate her point: 
(1) C is the inhabitant of a city, located in the middle of a desert, which she is free to leave. 
However, C, who would wish to leave, knows with absolute certainty that if she leaves 
the city she will not be able to survive the hardship of the desert and she will die. Her 
choice to remain in the city is not a voluntary one.  
(2) C1 is the inhabitant of an insurmountably walled city which she is unfree to leave. 
However, her city has all that anyone could ever ask for and C1, aware of this, has no 
wish to leave it. She voluntarily remains in her city. 12  
 
Olsaretti points out that ‘in the first example, freedom does not suffice for voluntariness; in 
the second, unfreedom does not undermine voluntariness’.13 
Olsaretti’s account, in itself, looks fairly convincing, but she is using the term 
‘voluntary’ to mean something fundamentally different to the way it is used in most 
discussions about consent theory. Olsaretti is using voluntariness descriptively, or, put 
another way, her conception of voluntariness is ‘non-moralised’. For her, voluntariness is a 
descriptive fact about the choices available to an agent, relative to that agent’s preferred 
choice, and independent of the actions of others. Nozick’s conception of voluntariness, 
however, is moralised. For Nozick, two scenarios could be identical in terms of the choices 
available to an agent and their desires, yet one may be voluntary, and the other not, 
depending on why they are in the position there are in. Consider the following two scenarios: 
(1) D, who does not want to die, is being threatened at gun point to hand over his 
wallet to a thief. D agrees to hand over his wallet in exchange for not being killed. 
(2) D1, who also does not want to die, is a starving worker who needs to find 
employment to survive. An employer comes along and offers him a job. D1 agrees 
to work for the employer in exchange for money, so he can buy food to survive. 
 
                                                          
11 Ibid.: p.65 
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For both Nozick and Olsaretti, D, in scenario 1, is neither free nor acting voluntarily. It is the 
status of D1, however, on which they disagree. For Olsaretti, although D1 may be free, his 
decision to accept the job would not be voluntary as there are no other reasonable 
alternatives. In terms of voluntariness, then, Oslaretti argues that there is no difference 
between D and D1.14 Nozick, however, says D1 acts voluntarily precisely because he is free. 
The employer acts within his rights and causes no harm by offering D1 a job (if anything, the 
employer does a moral good).  
 We should remember that the question we are asking is whether consent is voluntary 
such that we should recognise that consent as having the moral force required to alter the 
normative relationship between the agent giving consent, and the one receiving it. Intuitively, 
there seems to be a fairly clear moral distinction between the two scenarios outlined above. 
At the very least, the bindingness of the agreement between the worker and the employer 
seems more convincing than that between the victim and the thief – precisely because of the 
difference in behaviour between the employer and the thief. This tells us that we do need a 
moralised conception of voluntariness, and, unlike Olsaretti’s approach, we should not judge 
the voluntariness of consent independently of the behaviour of the agent to whom the 
consent is being given. Using voluntariness in this moralised sense is also consistent with the 
way in which the term has been used in the literature on consent theory. I will thus continue 
on this basis; referring to voluntariness as dependent on freedom.  
 
4.1.2 Constraints on Freedom 
Although the above discussion has argued for the dependency of voluntariness on freedom, 
it does not yet tell us what exactly constitutes a restraint on freedom (and thus voluntariness) 
itself. There appear to be three categories of things that could potentially constrain one’s 
freedom: (1) internal influences; (2) external influences; and (3) circumstantial facts. 
Explaining these potential forms of constraint will help to inform our discussion as to the 
voluntariness of state consent in the three different scenarios outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter. 
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In terms of influences – at a very general level – an individual could act involuntarily 
due to both internal and external reasons (relative to the individual). An example of an 
internal reason could be that a person is under the influence of some drug, or has a brain 
tumour that affects their behaviour. In such instances, such individuals are often considered 
not to be self-governing, and are unfree as they are being ‘controlled’ by something other 
than their ‘authentic selves’15; even if only by internal constraints. Any consent given under 
such circumstances would thus not be considered normatively binding. An example of an 
external influence, on the other hand, could be locking someone in a dungeon or holding a 
gun to their head, forcing them to act in a particular way. An individual subject to such an 
influence would clearly not be self-governing and would be unfree to act according to their 
authentic selves. Since we are interested in state consent, I will only consider external 
influences that may affect voluntary behaviour. This is simply because internal influences do 
not seem to apply to states in the same way they do to individuals.  
It is important to note that ‘not all [external] influences exerted on another person are 
controlling. Many influences are resistible, and some are welcomed. The category of 
[external] influence includes acts of love, threats, education, lies, manipulative suggestions, 
and emotional appeals, all of which can vary dramatically in their impact on persons.’16 
Beauchamp suggests a useful categorisation of external influences. These are: persuasion, 
manipulation, and coercion.17 Persuasion, understood here, is when ‘a person comes to 
believe something through the merit of reasons another person advances. This is the 
paradigm of an influence that is not controlling and also warranted.’18 Thus, persuading an 
agent or a state to consent would not limit the autonomy of that agent and would not, 
therefore, invalidate the consent. 
 Manipulation lies somewhere between persuasion and coercion, and ‘involves getting 
people to do what the manipulator wants through a non-persuasive means that alters a 
person’s understanding of a situation and motivates the person to do what the agent of 
influence intends.’19 Propaganda would be a good example of manipulation. Whether or not 
                                                          
15 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.67 
16 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.69 
17 Ibid.; see also: Faden, R.R. & Beauchamp, T.L. (1986) A History and Theory of Informed Consent: ch.10 
18 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.69 
19 Ibid.: p.70 
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manipulated consent would be invalid is difficult to answer, and, I think, would ultimately 
depend on the facts of each individual case. In any event, manipulation seems to have the 
potential to render an act of consent ‘uninformed’ rather than ‘involuntary’ (see section 4.2). 
If one consents to an action on the basis of propaganda or misinformation, their autonomy 
(in general) may be compromised, but it is difficult to see how their freedom (specifically) is 
challenged. After all, the agent is still at perfect liberty not to consent.20 The issue of 
manipulation will be returned to, therefore, in the following section on ‘uninformed’ consent.  
 Whereas manipulation alters one’s understanding of a situation, ‘coercion’ alters the 
situation itself, and in such a way that the number of options available to an agent, as to how 
to act, are narrowed. Actual coercion will always invalidate consent as it forces one to act in 
a way contrary to their wishes, or in a way that they otherwise would not have acted. It thus 
robs them of their autonomy. In many circumstances, however, it is ‘notoriously a matter of 
vigorous dispute as to what is to count as an instance of coercion.’21 By way of explanation, 
Horton asks:  
‘When are the unpleasant consequences of an action to be understood as simply 
following from the action and when as coercively induced? When does persuasion 
become coercion? For example, labour contracts within a capitalist economic system 
are characteristically viewed as coercive exchanges by Marxists while defenders of the 
free-market typically see them as paradigmatic instances of free exchange.’22  
 
Coercion, then, is clearly the most morally problematic form of external influence, as well as, 
arguably, the most ambiguous. Although theorists may disagree as to what constitutes an 
instance of coercion, all (to my knowledge there are no exceptions) would agree that actual 
coercion limits an agent’s freedom and thus their ability to give valid consent.  
Some theorists, however, whilst still agreeing that coercion limits freedom, argue that 
coercion is not exhaustive of those things that limit freedom. For example, many would want 
to argue that ‘circumstantial facts’ could also limit freedom in so far as they limit the number 
                                                          
20 We must assume here, for the sake of argument, that the misinformation was not such as to make the agent 
believe that their freedom had been compromised and that they had no reasonable option but to consent. 
21 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: p.31 
22 Ibid. 
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of choices available to someone.23 Circumstantial facts are not the result of the (direct) 
interference of other agents. A circumstantial fact often thought to diminish one’s freedom 
is a lack of resources. Without sufficient resources, one is not free to do many of the things 
they otherwise might. For example, there may be no external agent forcibly preventing one 
from going to school, but if one lacks the money to pay for school, then they are not ‘free’ to 
attend.  
On the one hand, then, we have those who argue that only coercion constitutes a 
constraint on freedom. On the other, we have those who hold the additional belief that 
circumstantial facts can also constitute a constraint on freedom. This debate, for the sake of 
analytical clarity, can usefully be viewed as a debate between two competing schools of 
thought: ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ (sometime called ‘social’) liberalism. Classical liberals – such 
as Robert Nozick, Freidrich Hayek and Isiah Berlin (drawing on the older work of people like 
Adam Smith and Wilhelm von Humboldt)24 – are generally of the opinion that, for something 
to count as a constraint on one’s freedom, it must be: ‘physical’ in character; ‘external’ to the 
agent whose freedom is being diminished; and a ‘deliberate intentional’ action.25 Someone 
like Thomas Beauchamp sums up the classical liberal position well when he says that there 
exists a constraint on freedom ‘if and only if one person [or agent] intentionally uses a credible 
and severe threat of harm or force to control another.’26 Conversely, modern liberals – such 
as T.H. Green, Leonard Hobhouse, and J.A. Hobson27 – believe that non-physical, non-
external, and non-intentional things could also be considered an abridgement of freedom; 
such as poverty or lack of education. The reason for including these ‘circumstantial’ features 
as constraints on freedom is – modern liberals would argue – because freedom is meaningless 
unless one has the effective (rather than merely ‘formal’) ability to enjoy it.28  
  
 
                                                          
23 See, for example: Olsaretti, S. (1998) Freedom, Force and Choice: p.72 
24 See, for example: Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia; Hayek, F. (1944) The Road to Serfdom; Berlin, 
I. (1958) Two Concepts of Liberty; Smith, A. (1776) The Wealth of Nations; and Von Humboldt, W. (1792) The 
Limits of State Action. 
25 Vincent, A. (2010) Modern Political Ideologies: p.37 
26 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.69; see also: Nozick, R. (1969) ‘Coercion’. 
27 See, for example: Green, T.H. (1882) Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation; Hobhouse, L. (1893) 
The Labour Movement; and Hobson, J.A. (1909) The Crisis of Liberalism.  
28 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.61 
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4.1.3 When is State Consent Non-voluntary? 
The conceptual analysis of ‘voluntariness’ and ‘freedom’ above means we are now in a better 
position to analyse the three general scenarios under which – it has been argued – a state’s 
consent could be rendered non-voluntary (or ‘unfree’). These were: (1) physical/military 
force; (2) political or economic pressure; and (3) asymmetric bargaining positions. 
Coercion of a state to consent through physical or military force is clearly an 
abrogation of that state’s autonomy, and any consent procured by such a means would be 
non-voluntary and thus invalid. Both classical and new liberals would agree on this point as 
both acknowledge that coercion is a constraint on freedom. International law is, itself, 
unambiguous on this issue. Articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
state that any treaty concluded on the basis of such coercion (or threat of coercion) to a state 
or its representatives shall be void.29 Here we can return to Buchanan’s example of peace 
treaties being signed at gun-point. Take, for example, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) that 
formally brought WWI to an end, and set the post-war conditions for the defeated Germany. 
The Treaty was primarily drafted by the British, French, and Americans. The German’s were 
not consulted as to the terms of the Treaty at all. Among many other terms, the Treaty 
stipulated that Germany must admit guilt for starting the War, pay significant reparations 
(mainly to France and Belgium), give up vast swathes of territory to various surrounding 
countries (including crucial industrial territory), and was forced to severely limit the size and 
capability of her military forces. Once the Treaty had been drafted, the Germans were given 
two ‘choices’: 1.) sign the Treaty, or, 2.) be invaded by the Allies. Needless to say, Germany 
signed the Treaty.30 Putting to one side one’s views as to the justifiability of the Treaty itself, 
it would be a stretch to think of Germany’s consent to this Treaty as being ‘voluntary’. 
This leaves us with a problem, however, because the Treaty of Versailles is commonly 
thought to be a legitimate example of international law.31 Given our conclusion regarding the 
                                                          
29 Article 52 VCLT states that: ‘a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in 
violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’. 
30 Trueman, C.N. (2016) ‘The Treaty of Versailles’. 
31 It should be noted however – as is noted by Kaczorowska-Ireland – that the ‘modern’ rule against the use of 
force ‘does not operate retroactively. If a treaty was procured by force before the use of force was made illegal 
the validity of the treaty is not affected by this subsequent change in the law’ (see: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. 
(2015) Public International Law: p.101). This explains why the Treaty of Versailles is still considered by lawyers 
to be legitimate. My main concern here, however, is with ‘moral’ legitimacy and not necessarily legal 
legitimacy or ‘validity’. It is thus still useful to use the Treaty of Versailles as an example.  
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invalidity of physically coerced consent, we must choose between one of two options: First, 
we can argue that, since the consent given by Germany to the Treaty was invalid, the Treaty 
itself is not legitimate international law. Alternatively, we could maintain that the Treaty is 
legitimate law, but that it is so by virtue of some other means, and not by state consent. The 
first option preserves the sufficiency of state consent as a method of legitimation, but is 
intuitively unappealing. Conversely, the second option is more appealing, but would entail 
that state consent had no part to play in its legitimation.32 This does not entail, however, that 
state consent is insufficient for the legitimacy of international law; only that it may not be 
necessary. After all, state consent could be just one of multiple sufficient means by which to 
legitimate international law.  
My response to the above is moulded by my conception of legitimacy as set out in 
chapter two: because I believe legitimacy creates only content-independent obligations, I 
would argue that the Treaty of Versailles was not legitimate in relation to Germany, but its 
imposition was nevertheless (plausibly) morally justifiable. In other words, Germany is still 
morally obliged to abide by the terms of the Treaty, but not because of ‘how’ the treaty was 
made (i.e. not because it is legitimate), but because of ‘what’ the Treaty says. As I argued in 
chapter two, legitimacy is not the only source of obligation; it is just the only source of 
‘content-independent’ political obligation. Germany’s obligation to obey is thus not a legal 
one, but a moral one dependent on the content of those obligations.  
It could also be argued that the Treaty is legitimate under the state consent model 
(even though consent was not given) because the Treaty was necessary in re-establishing 
international public order; order that is pre-requisite for a system of voluntary association 
based on state consent. On this view, to insist that the Treaty is illegitimate without state 
consent is self-defeating as a system of state consent could not exist without it. (This line of 
thinking will be developed further in chapter six). Notwithstanding the complexities 
surrounding the Treaty of Versailles and similar such treaties, I maintain it is uncontroversial 
to propose that state consent elicited through physical coercion – or the threat of it – is prima 
facie non-voluntary and invalid. 
                                                          
32 It could be noted here, however, that if the defeated state had either explicitly or tacitly consented to laws 
regulating post-war conduct, (such that victors could impose obligations on the defeated), then treaties such 
as the Treaty of Versailles could, in fact, be legitimated with reference to state consent.  
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I move now to the second proposed form of coercion, that of economic and political 
pressure. The issue of how to evaluate the effect of economic and political pressure on the 
voluntariness of state consent is trickier than blatant physical coercion. For instance, as 
Klabbers asks, ‘how does one rate the scenario in which state A threatens to withhold 
development aid unless state B opens its markets, accepts a new boundary or joins a military 
alliance? Or what if state A threatens to withhold development aid unless B ratifies a human 
rights convention?’33 A recent actual example of such pressure relates to a (possible) 
forthcoming agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. In her letter 
to the President of the European Council – Donald Tusk – which triggered ‘Article 50’ and the 
process of the UK leaving the EU, Prime Minister Theresa May wrote the following: 
‘The Government of the United Kingdom wants to agree a deep and special 
partnership between the UK and the EU, taking in both economic and security 
cooperation. At a time when the growth of global trade is slowing and there are signs 
that protectionist instincts are on the rise in many parts of the world, Europe has a 
responsibility to stand up for free trade in the interest of all our citizens. Likewise, 
Europe's security is more fragile today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. 
Weakening our cooperation for the prosperity and protection of our citizens would be 
a costly mistake.’34 
 
This statement was interpreted by some as being a ‘blatant threat’ to end British crime and 
security co-operation with the EU if the EU fails to ‘give’ the UK a free-trade deal after Brexit.35 
The ‘blatantness’ of this ‘threat’ may be up for dispute, but this example is indicative of the 
type of political or economic pressure that may be put on one state (or group of states) by 
another in the negotiation of new international law.36 
                                                          
33 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.60 
34 May, T. (2017) Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50: p.6. (‘Article 50’ refers to article 
50 of the Treaty on European Union; the clause that allows member states to withdraw their membership). 
35 Waugh, P. (2017) ‘Theresa May Accused Of “Blatant Threat” To End EU Security Links If Brussels Fails To 
Agree Trade Deal’. 
36 It should be noted that, in a speech Theresa May gave on 17 February 2018 in Munich, she said: ‘Europe’s 
security is our security. And that is why I have said – and I say again today – that the United Kingdom is 
unconditionally committed to maintaining it’.  
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The debate as to whether such economic and political pressure should constitute 
coercion was a contentious issue at the 1969 Vienna Convention (where the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) was concluded). Developing states, in particular, 
argued that such cases also constituted coercion.37 Indeed, ‘19 Asian, African and Latin 
American countries proposed an amendment to the VCLT aimed at ensuring that treaties 
concluded through the exercise of economic or political pressure were invalid’.38 However, 
the end result was that article 52 of the Vienna Convention limited coercion to military 
pressure, on the theory that, ‘if it were also to take economic and or political pressure into 
account, there would be very few valid treaties left. To soften the blow, a declaration was 
attached to the 1969 Final Act of the Vienna Conference holding that exercising economic and 
political pressure was to be condemned, but without this leading to tangible legal 
consequences.’39 The text of the declaration condemned: ‘The threat or use of pressure in 
any form, whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another 
State to perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of 
the sovereign equality of States and the freedom of consent.’40 
I hesitate here to make any pronouncement as to whether – as a rule – economic and 
political pressure should be thought of as a form of coercion or, more generally, whether it 
constrains the type of freedom needed to give valid consent. Part of the difficultly is that 
economic and political influence can come in many different forms; some more obviously 
coercive than others. What I will emphasise, however, is that what we are interested in 
presently is not whether political or economic pressure is ‘moral’, but whether it actually 
diminishes a state’s reasonable choices to such an extent that their consent can no longer be 
considered voluntary. For example, we may not think it ethical for state A to threaten to 
withdraw its defence spending on state B unless state B signs a preferred trade deal with state 
A, but that doesn’t necessarily render state B’s consent involuntary.  
One may be tempted to take a Nozickian approach and argue that political and 
economic pressure is only a constraint on freedom if the state exerting that pressure does 
                                                          
37 See: Yasseen, M.K. (1968) Report on the Ninth Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee. 
38 See: United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (1968) UN: pp.269-92 & 328-29. 
39 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.60 
40 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (1968) UN: p.329 
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not act within their rights.41 This can’t seemingly refer to legal rights, however, as 
international legal rights (under a positivist view) are only created through state consent; and 
thus the argument becomes circular. If, instead, we are referring to moral (or natural) rights, 
then it seems we still have all our work ahead of us in agreeing what those moral rights 
include. Drawing on the previous example, we would need to answer such questions as: does 
the UK have the right to withdraw from defence cooperation with the EU? Put another way, 
does the UK have a moral obligation to cooperate on defence with the EU? If so, why, and 
why only the UK and not other states? If the UK does not have a moral obligation to 
cooperate, under what circumstances might it have such an obligation, and when do those 
circumstances apply? As I say, this is not a problem that I can hope to solve here but, as a rule, 
the closer political and economic pressure resembles coercion (i.e. interference that is 
physical, external, and intentional),42 then the more likely it is to undermine the freedom of 
consenting states to give valid consent. 
The final potential restriction of freedom (that I will consider) is when two negotiating 
parties have vastly unequal bargaining positions, and thus the stronger party is able to 
‘coerce’ the weaker party into accepting the stronger party’s preferred deal. ‘The basic idea’, 
explains Christiano, is that ‘two states may arrive at an agreement whose benefits are highly 
asymmetric between those states because one state is credibly able to threaten withdrawal 
from the arrangement while the other is not’.43 A number of theorists – including Held & 
Maffettone – hold the view that asymmetric bargaining could, in fact, render state consent 
involuntary: ‘if consent must be “free” in order to be valid, the large imbalances in economic 
and political power between negotiating parties clearly cast a shadow on its validity.’ 44  David 
Lefkowitz also takes this position when he argues that: ‘In light of the costs their citizens are 
likely to suffer if they refuse, the consent of economically and militarily weak states to 
bilateral or multilateral treaties frequently fails to qualify as voluntary.’45  
One should be clear at this point about how bargaining asymmetries differ as a 
potential form of coercion from that of economic and political pressure. In the latter case (as 
                                                          
41 Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia. 
42 Vincent, A. (2010) Modern Political Ideologies: p.37 
43 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125 
44 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.121 
45 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.108 
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was discussed above), state A will intentionally attach formal or informal costs to an 
agreement in an attempt to pressure state B into consenting. Asymmetric bargaining, 
however, is simply a matter of circumstance whereby state A is less reliant on the consent of 
state B (for achieving its goals) than state B is on state A. Of course, the distinction between 
these two potential forms of coercion may be blurred in practice, but the difference can still 
be appreciated in conceptual terms.  
 The question of whether bargaining asymmetries constitute a constraint on freedom 
brings the debate between classical and new liberalism (discussed above) to the fore. As a 
broad generalisation, classical liberals would reject that bargaining asymmetries undermine 
the freedom of the consenting state as no actual coercion is involved. A weaker state may be 
faced with limited options, but this is not the result of physical, external, and intentional 
action by another state; it is merely a circumstantial fact. Of course, one may want to argue 
that stronger countries are ‘physically’ and ‘intentionally’ responsible for the relative 
inequality of states in that they have moulded the international system to be as such.46 In 
other words, asymmetric bargaining is a result of previous intentional, external, and physical 
action, and should consequently not be thought of as merely an arbitrary or circumstantial 
fact. Although I am sympathetic to this position, given the causal complexity that would likely 
be involved, it is a very challenging position to prove. This difficulty only increases when one 
considers that most of those individuals responsible for present-day bargaining asymmetries 
in the international system are no longer alive, or at least no longer in office. In this way, one 
could make the case that current state representatives of stronger states are no more 
responsible for present inequalities than are the representatives of weaker ones.  
This, however, is not the argument that new liberals necessarily want to make. 
Instead, they would want to return to the argument that what matters is the simple fact that 
the weaker state has few or no options but to consent, and not why it has such few options. 
(This was the essential point being made by Olsaretti earlier in this chapter). Having few 
options itself reduces voluntariness, and any consent given by a state in such a limited 
position should not be considered morally binding as no real choice was made. 
                                                          
46 See, for example: Pogge, T. (2010) ‘The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty’. 
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 Personally, I think that bargaining asymmetries should not constitute a constraint on 
freedom. This is not, I should be clear, because I think bargaining asymmetries are not an 
issue of moral concern; I think they are. I merely think that they should not be considered a 
threat specifically to ‘voluntariness’. In this way, I agree with Berlin when he argues that 
liberty should not be confused with the conditions under which it is exercised.47 It is my 
contention that, on the whole, modern liberals – at least in the context of this debate – are 
confusing freedom with considerations of ‘fairness’. They are making the mistake of 
concluding that, because consent is being given to an unfair arrangement, it is unfree. 
Consent theory, as we saw previously, is not conditional upon fairness; its purpose it to 
protect autonomy. Thus, under consent theory, institutions are made legitimate, not because 
they are fair, but because they preserve – or are consistent with – the autonomy of those 
over whom they rule. As far as I can see, it is no contradiction to say that voluntary consent 
was given to an unfair agreement. To quote Berlin once more: ‘liberty is liberty, not equality, 
not fairness’.48 Modern liberals, therefore, would do better to critique the fundamental 
premise of consent theory rather than the procedural validity of consent. The real question, 
then, is whether one should reject consent theory as a method of legitimation because it is 
indifferent to fairness. This will be discussed further below (see section 5.2).  
Even if one were to concede, however, that bargaining asymmetries constitute a 
constraint on weaker states’ voluntariness, there exist a couple of practical issues as to how 
one should respond. First, although we might consider the relative disadvantage of weaker 
states in a bargaining process as a constraint on voluntariness, the consequence would be to 
judge all agreements made between strong and weak states as invalid. This option seems only 
to restrict the autonomy of weaker states further. There may be a strong case for reforming 
the international system so as to reduce structural inequalities, but invalidating the consent 
of weaker nations doesn’t seem to be the way to achieve this. 
The second response is a point made by Judge Richard Posner. In considering whether 
to allow for the rescission of contracts whenever contracting parties are in such dire economic 
circumstances that they have no practical alternatives to entering the agreement, he pointed 
out that doing so may actually be ‘contrary to the interests of the parties in bad economic 
                                                          
47 Berlin, I. (1969) [1958] ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’: pp.122-25 
48 Berlin, I. (1969) [1958] ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’: p.125 
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circumstances. If a poorly situated party could always get out of such agreements, few other 
parties would enter agreements with it.’49 This is another example of how one might 
inadvertently diminish the future autonomy of weak states in an attempt to increase it. 
 
4.1.4  Summary 
In sum, of the three categories of external influence, ‘coercion’ is the only one that 
undermines the ‘voluntariness’ of a consent transaction. Of the three potential forms of 
coercion discussed, physical/military force is the only one that – in my opinion – clearly 
diminishes a state’s freedom. This gives rise to a problem, however, since we can point to 
examples of (arguably) legitimate international law that were the result of physical coercion. 
As explained, however, this problem did not show that state consent was insufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law; only that it may be unnecessary. Finally, I argued that, 
although ‘bargaining asymmetries’ are potentially morally problematic, they should not be 
considered as constraining specifically the ‘voluntariness’ of states to consent/not to consent. 
The general argument made in this section, then, is not that state consent – when 
valid – cannot legitimate international law, but that, in practice, state consent is sometimes 
invalid and yet still claims to legitimate international law. I consider this to be a criticism 
primarily directed towards the international legal system (rather than state consent theory 
per se) and its occasional failure to abide strictly by its own principles. One could, I suppose, 
interpret this section as a criticism of state consent as well. For example, one may argue that 
the nature of the international system is such that consistently achieving ‘voluntary’ state 
consent is not possible. In this way, we may need to opt for a model of international legal 
legitimacy that is more conducive to the current nature of the international system. I am not, 
however, convinced by such an argument. 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Bix, B. H. (2010) ‘Contracts’: p.256 
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4.2 The Problem of Uninformed State Consent 
Another criterion of valid consent is that the consenting agent should have knowledge, or be 
‘informed’, about to what it is they are consenting.50 Like ‘non-voluntary’ consent, it is a 
necessary requirement to preserve the autonomy of the consenter. One’s consent cannot be 
autonomous if they do not have an appropriate understanding of the thing to which they are 
consenting or have some reasonable expectation about the consequences of such consent.51 
As Simmons states, ‘an individual cannot become obligated unless he… performs an 
obligation-generating act with a clear understanding of its significance.’52 This is precisely the 
reason why we often view the consent of young children to be invalid; children do not 
(always) have a sufficient understanding of the relevant facts that would make their consent 
autonomous.  
In the case of state consent, it has been argued that, when participating in 
international agreements, poorer developing countries can often only assemble small 
delegations with limited expertise.53 As a consequence, say Held & Maffettone, some states 
are ‘simply unable to process all the relevant information that would allow them to be fully 
informed about the agreements they are subscribing to.’54 Their consent to those agreements 
are thus insufficiently informed to be a true exercise of autonomy and thus to validate their 
consent. (Indeed, this was the claim made by Libya in relation to a treaty it had signed with 
France in 1955.55 ‘Libya argued that this treaty should be interpreted favourably to Libya 
because, at the time of negotiation, Libyan negotiators lacked experience compared to that 
of the French’).56 Again, like ‘non-voluntary’ consent, this argument is not claiming that state 
consent cannot legitimate international law, only that, often, it does not due to it being 
insufficiently informed. 
Before we make any conclusions about whether an argument such as this is 
convincing, we need to ask some basic questions about ‘knowledge’ and its relation to 
                                                          
50 Legally, consent given by a person who cannot understand the nature of that to which he consents is void ab 
initio. See: Bergelson, V. (2010) ‘Consent to Harm’: p.175 
51 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.68 
52 Simmons, J.A. (1979) Moral Principles and Political Obligations: p.64 
53 : Held, D. (2004) Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus: pp.95-96 
54 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.121 
55 See: Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ Rep. 
56 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.102 
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consent. For example, how much knowledge/information is sufficient for valid consent? What 
if the information possessed by each party to an agreement is unequal? Who is responsible 
for ensuring the consenter is informed? What type of information is morally relevant? What 
type of action constitutes ‘deception’, and is all deception enough to invalidate consent? And 
finally, can an agent consent to an agreement to which it is impossible to know the 
consequences, or even impossible to know in advance what obligations may arise? 
 
4.2.1  ‘Sufficient’ Knowledge, and the Responsibility to be Informed 
In relation to the question of how much knowledge is sufficient for valid consent, Beauchamp 
writes that, ‘at a minimum, persons understand only if they have acquired pertinent 
information and have relevant beliefs about the nature and consequences of their actions.’57 
He goes on to say that, ‘their understanding need not be complete, because a grasp of the 
material facts is generally sufficient, but in some cases a person’s lack of awareness of even a 
single risk or missing fact can deprive him or her of adequate understanding.’ 58  
Although it is easy to agree with Beauchamp that a grasp of the material facts would 
be sufficient, it is not obvious that a grasp of the material facts is always necessary. As Kleinig 
explains, ‘some people may choose to consent irresponsibly by refusing to inform themselves 
about the circumstances under which they are giving their consent. A may consent to enter 
into a business partnership with B without looking carefully at its financial prospects.’59 In this 
example, one intuitively feels inclined to conclude that, although A was not ‘informed’, this 
was A’s own fault, and thus the consent should still be considered valid. What seems to be of 
moral relevance, then, is not necessarily whether an agent is informed, but whether there 
existed the reasonable possibility that the agent could have been informed had they 
attempted to inform themselves. This makes sense if one remembers (as discussed in chapter 
three) that the purpose of consent is autonomy protection, and not necessarily the well-being 
of the consenter.  
The above example also tells us that some knowledge is more morally relevant than 
others. In other words, the knowledge that A was entering into a business agreement with B, 
                                                          
57 Beauchamp, T.L. (2010) ‘Autonomy and Consent’: p.68 
58 Ibid. 
59 Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.16 
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and that there may be some financial consequences (either good or bad), was sufficient for 
the consent to be ‘informed’.60 Additional information as to the precise nature of those 
financial consequences was not necessary to validate the consent because there was (for the 
sake of argument) nothing preventing A from acquiring that knowledge. 
But what if an agent wanted to acquire additional information relevant to their 
consent, but were unable to do so due to their own inability to process or gather the 
information? This was the concern raised by Held & Maffettone above in relation to state 
consent. To set the context, they explain that:  
‘Having a seat at a negotiating table in a major international organisation or at a major 
conference does not ensure effective representation; even if there is a parity of formal 
representation. It is often the case, for example, that developed countries have large 
delegations equipped with extensive negotiation and technical expertise while poorer 
developing countries often depend on one-person delegations, or even have to rely 
on the sharing of a delegate.’61  
 
The first point to make in response to this problem is that the relative lack of information held 
by poorer states (compared to their richer negotiating partners) does not seem to present 
any moral concern in and of itself. ‘Knowledge’ is not – what philosophers like to call – a 
‘positional good’; a good whereby giving more to some necessarily entails giving less to 
others.62 In other words, the simple fact that rich states possess a lot of information does not 
necessarily detract from the ability of poorer states to acquire information; or, equally, it 
doesn’t affect the value of the information already held by poorer states. This is all merely to 
point out that our concern should not be with the ‘relative’ inequality of information when 
looking at ‘informed consent’ (although it could be relevant when looking at ‘asymmetrical 
bargaining’ as was done above). Instead, we should be solely concerned with the ‘absolute’ 
level of information held by states and whether it is sufficient to validate consent. Put simply, 
we should take a ‘sufficientarian’, rather than an ‘egalitarian’, approach to knowledge. 
                                                          
60 Bergelson, V. (2010) ‘Consent to Harm’: pp.175-6; see also: Westen, P. (2004) The Logic of Consent: pp.290-1 
61 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.121; see also: Held, D. (2004) 
Global Covenant: pp.95-6 
62 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.124 
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I have already argued that – for consent to sufficiently protect autonomy – the 
information possessed by an agent does not need to be comprehensive, although the agent 
does need to be aware of the essential facts of the agreement to which their consent is being 
given. It is difficult to give an account of what the ‘essential facts’ would be without studying 
a specific example. However, in the case of international agreements, I would say that an 
accurate representation of the agreement in treaty or written contract form – as is usually 
the case – is a sufficient level of information. I would go so far as to say that a state’s 
understanding of the contract is not necessarily a morally significant factor when it comes to 
the knowledge condition. After all, as we saw previously, this lack of knowledge and 
understanding could be the result of choices that the consenter has or hasn’t made 
themselves. One cannot force an agent to take in or understand information. Indeed, forcing 
them, in itself, would be a violation of their autonomy. If the agent wants more knowledge, 
or wants to understand, but can’t because of a lack of resources, then that agent would be 
irresponsible to give their consent given their circumstances. Of course, one could envisage a 
situation whereby a weaker state was not in a position to ‘non-consent’ on the basis of limited 
information due to other constraining circumstances. I am completely sympathetic to this, 
although this would be a problem specifically with the ‘voluntary’ nature of the consent (as 
discussed above), and not a problem pertaining to the lack of information.  In sum, it is 
important – if we are to preserve autonomy – that the responsibility for the acquisition of 
knowledge, and the understanding of that knowledge, should fall primarily with the consenter 
themselves.  
 
4.2.2  Deception 
Having said all this – and although I would argue that no other agents have an obvious 
obligation to ensure that the consenter is informed – there does seem to exist a clear 
obligation to ensure that information is not intentionally withheld from the consenter, or that 
the consenter is not ‘deceived’. Lack of knowledge through deception – as being grounds for 
invalidating consent – is already established in international law. Article 49 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that: ‘If a State has been induced to conclude a 
treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the State may invoke the fraud 
as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty’. 
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The meaning of ‘deception’ itself, however, is not always so clear-cut. As Kleinig 
explains, ‘deceptive knowledge failures may affect consent in more than one way. An old – 
albeit problematic – legal distinction between “fraud in the factum” and “fraud in the 
inducement” suggests how misinformation may sometimes negate consent but at other times 
not do so yet nevertheless provide the consenter with a significant cause for complaint’.63 
‘Fraud in the factum’ is likely to be very rare in the concluding of international agreements as 
one party would need to be deceived as to the very fact of what the agreement was about.  
‘Fraud in the inducement’, however, may be more common. This would involve one 
party giving spurious reasons, for example, as to why the agreement would be advantageous 
to the other party. It is hard to tell – without consulting the facts of a particular case – whether 
such deception would be enough to invalidate consent due to a lack of knowledge. If, for 
example, state B withheld crucial information from state A – information such that the 
meaning or primary purpose of the agreement would’ve altered had it been known – then we 
could say that the consent given to such an agreement is invalid. If, however, state B published 
the estimated increase to state A’s GDP as a result of the forthcoming trade deal between 
them – and those estimates turned out to be wrong, even badly wrong – I don’t think this is 
enough to invalidate the consent previously given. (It is worth pointing out that I don’t think 
this latter case would be an example of ‘fraud in the inducement’ unless state A produced 
those estimates in bad faith, i.e., in full knowledge that they were spurious). Even then, 
however, I am hesitant to conclude that the resulting consent would be invalid, as we would 
be making the assumption that state B had no choice but to accept those estimates as fact. 
Given that the estimates were produced by the opposing side in the trade negotiation, one 
would expect state B to note the clear conflict of interest and thus treat the estimates with 
some caution. 
 
4.2.3  Open-ended Agreements 
The final issue I will discuss in relation to the knowledge condition is whether it is possible to 
consent to – what might be called – an ‘open-ended’ agreement. This is similar to the case of 
‘fraud in the inducement’ in so far as it concerns a lack of information as to the consequences 
                                                          
63 Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: pp.16-7; see also: Perkins, R.M. (1969) Criminal Law: pp.964-66  
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of consent, but different in that, in this case, the lack of information is not as a result of 
intentional action. An ‘open-ended’ agreement would be such that neither party could know 
in advance to what obligations the agreement could give rise. Lefkowitz explains how this 
might be the case when he says that ‘states increasingly consent to general frameworks that 
are then filled in by treaty-based but partly autonomous bodies that exercise quasi-legislative 
and/or quasi-judicial powers. As a consequence, states may find themselves subject to 
obligations they did not intend nor even suspect they would acquire when they consented to 
the original framework.’64 The Treaties of the European Union are the most obvious current 
example of this in international law.65 In signing the Treaties, member states are transferring 
vast legislative powers – albeit within certain competency areas – to the EU Commission and 
other EU institutions. It is thus impossible for member states to know in advance the future 
obligations to which they may be subject.  
 The problem of open-ended agreements could be taken in two different directions. 
On the one hand, we may want to allow agents to consent to such agreements as they 
presumably have ‘knowledge’ about the lack of information regarding future obligations. In 
this way, their autonomy remains intact. On the other hand, the greater one’s ignorance over 
such matters ‘the less compelling it will be to describe the agent’s consent as the exercise of 
control over [their] life rather than as an abdication of control to another.’66 In this way, their 
consent would be an act of relinquishing the very thing that it is supposed to protect: their 
autonomy. Consent would then lose its justification as a method of legitimation as it is no 
longer fulfilling its role of autonomy protection. 
 My instinct is to opt for the former position. This is because the purpose of the 
knowledge condition is to ensure that the consenting agent is aware of what they are actually 
– and currently – giving their consent; it is not about whether we think the giving of consent 
was wise. As long as the agent is aware that future unknown obligations may arise, or that 
they are consenting for another agent to have decision-making power over them, then that 
consent is still informed. (I should caveat, however, that I think consent given to an 
                                                          
64 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.108; see also: Kumm, M. (2004) ‘The Legitimacy 
of International Law’: p.914 
65 By ‘Treaties’ it is meant both the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (a.k.a., the Treaty of 
Rome 1957) and the ‘Treaty of European Union’ (a.k.a., the Maastricht Treaty 1992).  
66 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.108 
 
   
121 
 
arrangement from which one can never withdraw – such as slavery – is invalid. However, this 
is for reasons of the ongoing ‘voluntariness’ of that consent, rather than of whether it was 
informed). 
 
4.2.4 Summary 
In reading this section, one may be concerned that I have set the bar too low in terms of what 
counts as informed – and thus valid – consent. I acknowledge that, compared to other writers 
on this issue, I am less protective of ‘poorer’ states with limited information, and generally 
believe that only essential information is sufficient for valid consent. I justify my position, 
however, with reference to an underlying concern as to the consequence of the alternatives. 
Although one may sympathise with the position of poorer and developing states (as set out 
by Held & Maffettone above), the alternative appears even less appealing, i.e., refusing to 
recognise their consent and thus denying them the possibility of signing international 
agreements at all. Refusing to deal with some states because they are, in some sense, lacking 
in competence, is akin to the justification for not recognising – as morally efficacious – the 
consent of children. Even with good intentions, we are in danger of infantilising weaker states. 
Such a position would also go against the grain of international law – and thus the sovereign 
equality of states – which states that ‘every state possesses capacity to conclude treaties’.67 
Similarly, allowing such states to rescind their consent after an agreement has come into 
effect – due to a lack of information – may encourage such behaviour even when it is not 
warranted. This might also dissuade richer states from dealing with poorer states at all as 
their consent – and therefore the bindingness of the agreements entered into – is more 
temperamental. Again, this would not be to the advantage of developing nations.  
In conclusion, then, as with ‘non-voluntary’ state consent, the problem of uninformed 
state consent is not necessarily arguing against the sufficiency of state consent in theory; only 
that existing state consent is sometimes invalid. I have argued that, to be sufficiently informed 
to give valid consent, a state need only be aware of the essential facts and meaning of the 
agreement to which their consent is being given. I have also argued that – with the exception 
of instances of deception – states are primarily responsible for their own acquisition of 
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knowledge. As the essential facts and meaning of international laws are usually set out in 
easily accessible treaty-form, therefore, I argue that it is very unlikely that state consent will 
be given without sufficient knowledge. 
 
4.3  Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have considered just two arguments for why state consent may not be 
sufficient for the legitimacy of international law; both relating to the purported invalidity of 
that consent. As explained in chapter three, for consent to be valid (i.e. alter the normative 
standing of an agent in relation to another) then it must be both ‘free’ & ‘informed’.  
In the first section (on the problem of ‘non-voluntary’ state consent), I considered 
three general scenarios under which state consent to international law may be said to be 
involuntary; and thus invalid. These were: (1) physical/military force; (2) political or economic 
pressure; and (3) asymmetric bargaining positions. I argued that only the first of these 
scenarios would limit the voluntariness of state consent. This was, I argued, because it is the 
only scenario that properly constitutes an instance of ‘coercion’. In turn, coercion (in contrast 
to ‘persuasion’ or ‘manipulation’) is the only type of external influence that violates the 
voluntariness of a consent transaction.  
 The first section also argued for a ‘moralised’ (as opposed to ‘non-moralised’) 
conception of voluntariness. In relation to consent, this argument led to the conclusion that 
we should not judge the voluntariness of consent independently of the behaviour of the agent 
to whom the consent is being given. In other words, even if one has a very limited number of 
choices as to how to act, as long as that limitation is not the product of the direct or 
intentional action of another, one’s actions are still voluntary. As a consequence, any consent 
given in such circumstances would be – ceteris paribus – valid and morally efficacious. The 
implications of this for the state consent theory of legitimacy in relation to international law 
is as follows: if an international law has received state consent, and if that consent was not 
the result of the coercion of another state, then (ceteris paribus) that consent would be 
sufficient to legitimate that international law, even if that state felt as though they were 
‘compelled’ by circumstance to give their consent.  
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 In the second section (on the problem of ‘uninformed’ state consent), I argued that, 
to be sufficiently informed to give valid consent, a state need only be aware of the essential 
facts and meaning of the agreement to which their consent is being given. As long as this 
threshold is reached, the inequality of information or knowledge between the parties 
involved in the consent transaction should not influence or determine the validity of the 
consent given. I have also argued that – with the exception of instances of deception – states 
are primarily responsible for their own acquisition of knowledge. The implications of this for 
the state consent theory of legitimacy in relation to international law is as follows: if an 
international law has received state consent, and if that consent was not the result of 
deception, then (ceteris paribus) that consent would be sufficient to legitimate that 
international law, even if that state was only aware of the essential facts and meaning of that 
to which they were consenting. 
It is my general conclusion that, to be sufficient for the legitimation of international 
law, it is necessary that state consent is free and informed (i.e. valid). The problems of free 
and informed consent do not undermine the state consent ‘theory’ of legitimacy as the theory 
itself posits that consent must be valid. They do, however, tell us that the mere ‘appearance’ 
of state consent in practice is not necessarily sufficient and that we should ensure that that 
consent is valid. Given the meanings I have attributed to the terms ‘free’ and ‘informed’, my 
own position has been that achieving valid state consent (and thus potentially legitimate 
international law) is less demanding than many other theorists writing on this subject have 
hitherto suggested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF STATE CONSENT (PART 2) 
 
The previous chapter considered the problem of both non-voluntary and uninformed state 
consent as two arguments against the sufficiency of state consent to legitimate international 
law. This chapter looks at the second two arguments against the sufficiency of state consent 
that this thesis will consider: the problem of ‘authorisation’ and the problem of ‘immoral state 
consent’ respectively.  
 Whereas the problems of non-voluntary and uninformed consent are applicable to 
consent theory in general, the problem of authorisation is an issue specifically relevant to 
consent when given by states rather than individuals. This is because – as seen in chapter 
three – consent functions to protect the autonomy of moral agents. However, individuals are 
a very different type of moral agent than states; if the latter are moral agents at all. Thus, the 
normative function of consent is less obvious when given by states, and – as the argument 
goes – the consent given by states is therefore not sufficient to legitimate law in the same 
way that it might be when given by individuals. This is, in essence, the argument levelled by 
the problem of authorisation, which will be discussed directly below in section 5.1. 
 The problem of immoral state consent is a problem that goes to the heart of consent 
theory and is one that applies equally to the consent of states as that of individuals. It is also 
a problem that threatens to undermine the concept of legitimacy as I have defined it in 
chapter two. This is because the problem of immoral state consent claims that the legitimacy 
of international law (and law in general) must depend – at least in part – on the content of 
any particular international law. Since state consent is a purely procedural means by which to 
legitimate law (i.e., is concerned only with ‘how’ a law is made and not ‘what’ that law says), 
it cannot be sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. The problem of immoral consent 
will be considered in the latter half of this chapter in section 5.2. First, however, we turn to 
the problem of authorisation. 
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5.1 The Problem of Authorisation 
As stated earlier (in chapter three, section 3.1), when consenting, one is involved in a 
transaction of rights and obligations: ‘A’, through consenting, gives ‘B’ the right to do ‘’. The 
reason B needs to obtain A’s consent to do ‘’ is because ‘’ places an obligation on A. 
Imposing an obligation on A, without consent, would be to undermine A’s autonomy and 
formal equality. Thus, A’s consent is needed to reconcile A’s autonomy and formal equality 
with the imposition of the new obligation. If ‘’ were also to impose an obligation on ‘C’, 
then, for the same reason, C’s consent would additionally be required. If C did not consent, 
then only A, and not C, would be under any new obligations as A (presumably) does not have 
the right to consent on C’s behalf. This logic is straightforward and intuitively appealing, but 
is worth restating for the discussion below.  
 In international law, a state has full legal personality. As such, it has the capacity to 
enter into legal relationships and, importantly, to incur international legal obligations – as 
well as rights.1 Given this status of states as full legal personalities, their ability to consent to 
the ‘imposition’ of international legal obligations is seen as unproblematic. In the same way 
that individuals in the domestic sphere may unproblematically contract with one another to 
accrue rights and obligations, states have the same capacity internationally. Indeed, 
traditionally, states were considered to be the only actors with international legal 
personality.2 Within the last century, however, this has changed.  
‘Individuals’ (along with other entities)3 are now also considered as having their own 
international legal personalities – albeit ‘partial personality’. (The reason for this partiality is 
that ‘the extent of their rights and obligations… are ultimately controlled by States’).4 The 
notion that individuals may have obligations deriving directly from international law was 
recognised for the first time by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1928 
Case Concerning Competences of the Courts of Danzig’ (Advisory Opinion).5 It was held in this 
case that ‘an exception to the principle that individuals are not subjects of international law 
                                                          
1 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.166 
2 Ibid. 
3 Such as Intergovernmental Organisations. See: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
4 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.166 
5 Case Concerning Competences of the Courts of Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1928] PCIJ Rep Ser B No 15. See 
also: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.194-5. 
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arises if the intention of the contracting parties was to adopt a treaty which creates rights and 
obligations for individuals’.6  The direct relationship between individuals and international law 
was then confirmed by the infamous 1946 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) at Nuremberg, which read, in part: ‘crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced’.7  
 There are now multiple examples of obligations directed towards individuals in 
international law.8 These obligations tend to find their source either in the treaties that 
establish international courts – such as the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court9 
– or stand-alone treaties – such as the 1948 Genocide Convention.10 Perhaps the most 
extensive example of the application of international law to individuals is EU law. In a famous 
case (Costa v ENEL), the ECJ confirmed that: ‘By creating a Community… the Member States 
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body 
of law that binds both their nationals and themselves [emphasis added]’.11 In other words, 
the international legal obligations of the EU fall on the individuals within the members states 
as well as the member states themselves. From the above examples, then, it is clear that – at 
least in some instances – both individuals and states accrue obligations under international 
law.12  
However, whereas states incur obligations under international law by consenting on 
behalf of themselves, individuals do not. Instead, individuals also incur their obligations 
through the consent of the state in which they reside. This development poses a serious 
                                                          
6 Case Concerning Competences of the Courts of Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1928] PCIJ Rep Ser B No 15. 
7 ‘Judgement of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946’ (1947): p.221 
8 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: pp.306-8 
9 Another example would be the 1945 London Agreement that created the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (see: Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.308) 
10 Other important treaties include the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, 
and the various universal human rights conventions. As Henrikson argues, ‘mention should also be made of the 
numerous treaties that authorise and/or oblige state to prosecute certain offences, such as the 1984 
Convention against Torture and the numerous ‘counter-terrorism’ conventions, including the 1971 Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 1979 Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages and the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism’ (see: 
Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.308) 
11 Costa v ENEL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585. 
12 For an in-depth analysis of the position of individuals in relation to international law, see: Parlett, K. (2011) 
The Individual in the International Legal System. 
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problem for any straightforward theory of consent. As explained above, it is not ordinarily 
possible for one entity to consent on another’s behalf. Ceteris paribus, for a state to consent 
on an individual’s behalf is for the individual not to have consented at all. Thus, those 
individuals within a state are having obligations imposed on them without their consent 
which, needless to add, undermines their autonomy and formal equality. The fact that 
individuals reside within the state should not distort our reasoning on this issue. So far as the 
theory of consent is concerned, those individuals are third parties. Thus, in the same way that 
a state cannot ordinarily consent on behalf of another state, they cannot consent on behalf 
of those individuals.  
This reasoning tells us that, although international laws may be legitimate in relation 
to ‘states’ (who purportedly give their consent), they are not legitimate in relation to 
individuals (whose consent is non-existent). It is difficult to see how this is not a hammer blow 
for the proposition that state consent is (in itself) sufficient for the legitimacy of international 
law (at least in relation to individuals).  
Before we go on to consider some of the responses to this problem, it is worth noting 
that, for some, this problem goes deeper.  For them, this problem is not confined to those 
situations when international law imposes obligations directly on individuals. Instead, it 
extends even to situations whereby the only entity incurring obligations is the state itself.  
To explain: those who argue that state consent is sufficient for the legitimacy of 
international law (at least in relation to states themselves) are making the assumption that 
states, as with individuals in the domestic sphere, have the intrinsic right to give consent. 
According to Buchanan and many others, however, this assumption is false. The problem, says 
Buchanan, is that the theory of state consent subscribes to the view that Charles Beitz calls 
the ‘Autonomy of States’.13 This is the ‘discredited and erroneous’ treatment of states ‘as if 
they were moral persons in their own right, rather than merely being institutional resources 
for human beings’.14  
The central point here is that it is not possible to separate – in practice – the autonomy 
of the state from the autonomy of the individuals within it (in the same way that we can 
                                                          
13 Beitz, C. (1979) Political Theory and International Relations: p.71 
14 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: pp.304-5 
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separate the autonomy of distinct individuals). Although states are considered separate legal 
entities from individuals, they are not separate moral entities. Indeed, they are not moral 
entities at all; they have no intrinsic moral status that can be undermined by the imposition 
of obligations. Rather, states are morally significant only insofar as they are instrumental in 
preserving the autonomy of the individuals within. This is perhaps why Jeremy Waldron 
argues that individuals should be considered the ‘true’ subjects of international law, in moral 
if not formal terms.15 
This conflation between the ‘legal’ and ‘moral’ status of states has likely arisen with – 
as discussed in chapter three – the historic conception of states as ‘artificial persons’. 
Although states mimic the actions of individuals in developing ‘contracts’, they should not be 
considered as having the same moral status. Thus, it is wrong to think of states as having the 
‘right’ to consent as if they were moral entities. Instead, the state is merely a tool or 
mechanism through which the individuals comprising that state can project their autonomy 
collectively and internationally. As Kumm puts it: ‘The state… is just the institutional 
framework within which citizens govern themselves. Anything that imposes constraints on 
states also imposes constraints on citizens and how they govern themselves’.16 Consequently, 
even international obligations directed specifically at a state are of moral significance only (or 
at least primarily) with reference to the individuals within the state. It would thus seem – 
following the logic of consent theory – that if consent is needed at all (and I think it is in this 
case) then it is ultimately needed from those individuals, and not the ‘state’ acting separately 
from those individuals. It is for this reason that I agree with Christiano when he concludes: 
the legitimacy of international law ‘must ultimately be grounded in the interests of 
individuals, not of states.’17 
This argument, then, as with the previous one above, leads us to the conclusion that 
state consent (in itself) is insufficient to legitimate international law; in the previous case 
because some international laws create obligations directly for individuals, and in this case 
because, even when an obligation ostensibly binds only a ‘state’, that obligation has moral 
                                                          
15 Cited in: Thomas, C.A. (2014) ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’: p.747. See: Waldron, 
J. (2011) ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’: pp.325-27 
16 Kumm, M. (2004) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.910 
17 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.82 
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significance only for the individuals within the state, and thus also seemingly requires, 
ultimately, the consent of those individuals.  
It should briefly be caveated that the problems just outlined are ones primarily for 
‘monist’ states; rather than those that are ‘dualist’ in relation to international law. As 
explained in chapter two, when a monist state consents to international law, that 
international law automatically binds the relevant legal entities within the state. The same is 
not true for dualist states. Legal entities in (purely) dualist states cannot be bound directly by 
international law – only domestic law. Thus, any international law to which a dualist state 
gives its consent must first be converted into domestic law through the ordinary domestic 
legislative process. Legal entities in the dualist state are therefore technically only ever 
obeying domestic law (even though the text of that law may have had its origins in an 
international agreement). Thus, as long as the domestic law-making process is legitimate, 
then that law is legitimate. Whether or not the dualist state’s consent had the effect of 
legitimating the original international agreement is morally superfluous as that law is anyway 
legitimated through a domestic law-making procedure.18 Having said this, very few states are 
entirely dualist in practice (even if they claim, constitutionally, to be so). The problems 
highlighted above, then, would still seem to apply to nearly all states to varying degrees. 
It would therefore appear that, in both cases, state consent could only have the ability 
to legitimate international law if individuals somehow authorised their states to consent on 
their behalf. Afterall, as Lefkowitz correctly states: ‘one agent may consent on another’s 
behalf only if the latter authorizes him to do so, since only then will the resulting obligations 
be properly characterized as a product of the obligated agent’s control over his life’.19 State 
consent should, therefore, be viewed as a type of ‘proxy’ consent.20 Understood from this 
perspective, when states transfer rights and obligations through state consent, they are doing 
so on behalf of their citizens. Consequently, state consent is only valid to the extent that it is 
                                                          
18 The moral question here would then become whether the domestic law-making procedure was necessary or 
sufficient to legitimate that law – but that is a separate issue that would apply equally to all domestic law, and 
one that goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
19 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: pp.107-8 
20 I will not look here at the possibility that individuals may directly consent to international law, rather than 
authorising states to do so on their behalf. This is because this thesis aims merely to examine the theory of 
‘state’ consent; not ‘individual’ consent. 
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an adequate proxy for the consent of its citizens. The question then becomes, how is this 
authorisation given? 
 
5.1.1 Authorisation of State Consent through Individual Consent  
The intuitive answer to the above question, from the viewpoint of consent theory, is simply 
for individuals to ‘consent’ to the state’s ability to consent on their behalf. This would be 
something akin to the ‘lasting power of attorney’ legal mechanism in the United Kingdom.  
 The opening and most glaring problem with this solution, however, is that citizens 
have not, in fact, consented for their states to act as their proxy in relation to international 
law. This is essentially the same problem that has plagued the theory of consent in relation 
to domestic law-making procedures. As Horton explains, ‘the central problem for consent 
theorists, as with all voluntarist theories, has been to discover any action in the personal 
history of most individuals which meets the conditions necessary for the ascription of political 
obligation; that is, to discover any act registering the appropriate consent’.21 The point here 
is that we are born into our political communities, and most people (save perhaps 
‘naturalised’ citizens) have never formally consented to the power that their governments 
possess, nor the obligations that they are under as a consequence. This was a criticism made 
as early as the eighteenth century by David Hume: ‘my intention’ said Hume, ‘is not to exclude 
the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. 
It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend, that it has very seldom had place 
in any degree, and never almost in its full extent’.22 It is for this reason that Michael Huemer 
admonishes traditional consent theory as having ‘an impudent disregard for reality’.23 He goes 
on to say that:  
‘No one has ever been presented with a contract describing how the government 
operates and asked for a signature. Few have ever been in a situation in which a verbal 
or a written statement of agreement to have a government would have been 
                                                          
21 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: pp. 26 & 33 
22 Hume, D. (1965) [1748] Of the Original Contract’; cited in: Hyams, K. (2008) ‘Political Authority and 
Obligation’: p.12 
23 Huemer, M. (2013) The Problem of Political Authority: p.21 
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appropriate, let alone have actually made such a statement. When do the social 
contract theorists think this event happened?’24 
 
As mentioned, although the authors above are referring to the traditional theory of consent 
as a legitimator of domestic law, the same problem applies to the notion that individuals have 
given their consent for their states to act as their representative proxies when acceding to 
international law. Of course, many consent theorists have tried to argue that individuals have 
given such consent – even if only consenting tacitly through their actions. The most famous 
exponent of this position was perhaps John Locke.25 I do not, however, find these theories 
convincing, and it would be well beyond the scope this this thesis to delineate their merits or 
otherwise. 
 If it is the case that only the consent of individuals can authorise a state to act as their 
proxy, and if – as I believe is clear – individuals have not so consented, then we are left with 
the difficult conclusion that most – if not all – international law is illegitimate. Fortunately, I 
do not believe the first premise to be true. In other words, it is not obvious that the only 
means through which a state can become a proxy is the consent of its citizens. In fact, a far 
more popular proposition is that a state can acquire a right of proxy if it is sufficiently 
democratic. 
 
5.1.2 Authorisation of State Consent through Democracy 
Before I discuss democratic decision-making as a means by which states could be authorised 
to consent on behalf of their citizens, it is important to address the following question which 
is likely, at this point, being begged: How can consent claim to legitimate international legal 
obligations but not domestic legal obligations? Surely, if the theory is sound, it will legitimate 
the imposition of all obligations – whether domestic or international? There are two related 
reasons why I do not believe it is a contradiction to say that the theory of consent might 
legitimate international law, but not domestic. 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Locke, J. (1924) [1690] Two Treatise of Government; see also: Plamenatz, J.P. (1968) Consent, Freedom and 
Political Obligation for another notable proposal of how citizens might be thought of as consenting to their 
states tacitly. 
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First, different models of legitimacy may be better suited to different institutions. For 
example – and as explained above – one of the main issues with consent as the model of 
legitimacy for domestic law is that it hasn’t been given. This is not the case for most 
international law as – very often – state consent is given (whether morally efficacious or not). 
Thus, there is at least one good reason to believe that consent may be an appropriate method 
of legitimacy for international law, but not domestic law. 
Second, and perhaps most important, is the distinction that needs to be made 
between the ‘act’ of consent, and the ‘values’ that the act represents. It should be understood 
that consent’s (purported) legitimating force is not the overt display of consent in itself, but 
the intrinsic values that this consent is meant to protect – e.g. autonomy and formal equality. 
What is ultimately important is the preservation of these values. Thus, if a different 
mechanism – such as democratic decision-making – could also preserve these values, then 
having one does not preclude the moral efficacy of the other; they are just two different ways 
of achieving the same desired outcome. In this way, consent is sufficient for the legitimacy of 
law, but not necessary. What this does tell us, however, it is that – to be consistent – the form 
of democratic decision-making used to authorise state consent must, in fact, preserve those 
same values.  
It may be argued, however, that, even if a state is sufficiently democratic, collective 
decision-making will inevitably result in some individuals having laws imposed on them 
against their will. Having a democratic state, therefore, will not ensure that the formal 
autonomy and equality of ‘every’ citizen is protected. To think about the problem in this way, 
however, is mistaken. When consenting to international law, the state is not acting as a ‘pure’ 
delegate for its citizens in the sense that it is merely relaying their direct will at the 
international level. Instead, the state is a representative. Through domestic democratic 
procedures, citizens are authorising their states, not to implement their exact will at the 
international level, but to judge and make those international decisions on their behalf. What 
we should be looking for, then, is sufficient ‘authorisation’ to act, not necessarily direct 
instruction as to how to act. It is perfectly conceivable that a citizen could authorise their state 
to act, even if that state acts in a way that is deviant from the way that citizen would’ve acted 
themselves (had they been pulling the levers of the state). The process of authorisation also 
need not be direct (as direct individual consent might be). Instead, the authorisation could be 
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a moral consequence of the process by which state representatives come to hold their 
positions (e.g. by free and fair election). 
 It could also be argued that democratic decision-making, although not providing each 
individual with the level of autonomy otherwise achieved through a consent-based system, 
nevertheless maximises autonomy; which is the best we can hope for.26 In other words, if we 
are to achieve collective decision-making at all (something unanimous individual consent is 
unlikely to do), then arriving at those decisions democratically is the best way of ensuring that 
each individual preserves as much autonomy as possible; even if not the ideal amount. This is 
essentially the principle that one should not make the perfect the enemy of the good. 
 It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider whether democratic decision-
making can, in theory, have the desired moral effect of authorising a state to consent on 
behalf of its citizens. Instead, I am happy to go along with the vast majority of popular opinion 
and assume that it can.27 As Christiano observes, for example, there is good reason to think 
that non-democratic states ‘will be much less responsive to their populations than are 
democratic states’, and thus their claim to be a proxy for the consent of their citizens is less 
convincing.28 This position, I suggest, is uncontroversial – and in any case is not one that I will 
defend here. The more interesting question for the purpose of this thesis is what features a 
democracy would need to possess to properly authorise state consent, and how many states 
actually meet this democratic threshold. 
 
5.1.3 Criteria for Democratic Authorisation  
In his essay ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’, Christiano posits three 
democratic criteria a state would need to satisfy to be sufficiently authorised to consent on 
behalf of its citizens.  
                                                          
26 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.219 
27 I say this fully conscious of the ‘argumentum ad populum’ logical fallacy. I do not, however, invoke 
consensus to prove the correctness of the proposition; I believe it to be correct for independent reasons. 
Instead, I invoke consensus only to demonstrate the argument’s relative uncontroversiality and thereby justify 
my decision not to defend it here.   
28 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125; see also: Przeworski. A., et 
al. (2000) Democracy and Development. 
 
   
134 
 
The first requirement is that a state be democratic in the traditional sense by seeking 
to represent its majority population; rather than dictating the will of a minority in an 
authoritarian fashion.29 Christiano explains simply why such authoritarianism is a problem 
when he says that: ‘when states that are not democratic negotiate with states that are 
democratic with an eye towards creating international law that impinges on the domestic 
legal systems of the society, it seems that we may describe this as a kind of imposition of 
international law on the populations that are not participating in their political societies.’30 
This argument (that the consent of non-democratic states cannot legitimate international 
law) has been repeated by most key theorists writing on this issue.31  
The second requirement is that – as well as being led broadly by the majority – a state 
needs to represent the interests of all its citizens, not just those from whom it receives votes. 
In practice, this translates to sufficient and equal human rights protections being afforded to 
all citizens. This requirement acknowledges that, although democratic states may represent 
their majorities, they ‘do not always represent their minorities very well, in particular 
indigenous peoples and insular minorities’.32 This criterion of democratic authorisation is also 
advocated by Lefkowitz who state that: ‘The existence of persistent minorities challenges any 
state’s claim to the standing to acquire obligations on behalf of all its subjects.’ 33  
The final requirement posited by Christiano is that a state’s ‘executive’ branch – and 
not just its ‘legislative’ branch – needs to be democratically accountable. Christiano explains 
the need for this requirement by noting that ‘traditionally, the branch of government most 
responsible for relations with other states has been the executive branch. And the exercise of 
its foreign-policy functions has been relatively non-democratic. Such functions often occur in 
secret and it is often the case that citizens in democratic societies have paid less attention to 
foreign affairs than to domestic affairs’.34 Christiano’s overall point is that, for state consent 
to legitimate international law, ‘the foreign policies of states must become more 
                                                          
29 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.124; see also: Buchanan, A. 
(2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.91 
30 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.91 
31 For example, see: Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’; Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is 
Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’; Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The 
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’; and Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global 
Governance’ 
32 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125 
33 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.108 
34 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125 
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democratic’.35 (It is unclear, exactly, whether Christiano is advocating the democratisation of 
the executive branch of government, or arguing that foreign-policy decisions ought to be 
made by the legislative branch, which is (usually) more democratic. This may be a distinction 
without a difference from a moral point of view, but will obviously be significant in practice).  
In sum, Christiano argues that, for state consent to act as an adequate proxy for the 
consent of individual citizens (and thus before state consent is sufficient to legitimate 
international law) a state should: 
1.) Have liberal democratic institutions for majority decision-making;  
2.) Adequately represent minorities; and  
3.) Ensure its foreign-policy establishments are, in some sense, democratic.36  
 
Although written in general terms – and therefore open to a broader range of interpretation 
– I think Christiano’s requirements push in the right direction. However, although perhaps 
necessary, I would hesitate to conclude that these requirements are sufficient. 
As explained above, the primary concern of consent theory is protecting the autonomy 
and equality of moral agents (understood as negative public autonomy and formal equality). 
Thus, if it is posited that democratic decision-making is sufficient to authorise state consent, 
then – to be consistent with the theory of consent – we need to ensure that this democratic 
decision-making maintains the autonomy and equality of individuals. It is not clear to me that 
Christiano’s requirements fulfil this fundamental demand – or, at least, they are not 
formulated explicitly with this consideration in mind. Christiano’s requirements are thus in 
need of expansion or – more charitably – clarification. 
My main concern is that, in setting out his requirements, Christiano seems to be taking 
‘social choice’ approach to democracy. The social choice approach worries about how the 
state should aggregate individual preferences or interests.37 In this way, the state treats its 
citizens equally in a superficial sense by giving ‘all their preferences equal weight in the 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.82 
37 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.219 
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process of aggregation to form a collective decision’.38 It also takes a shallow view of 
autonomy whereby autonomy is equated roughly with individuals getting what they want or 
having their preferences satisfied.  
 My own preferred approach is to view democracy, not merely as a ‘means of turning 
preferences into policies’, but as a ‘means of transforming preferences themselves’.39 In other 
words, I believe the autonomy and formal equality of individuals is more thoroughly served 
by taking a ‘deliberative’ approach to democracy. As explained by Swift, ‘through a process 
of democratic debate, argument, reflection, hearing other people’s point of view and 
responding to objections, democracy can, and should, be a way of changing – and improving 
– people’s views, not just registering and combining them.’ 40 
 More emphasis, then, should be added to Christiano’s requirements, about the ability 
of individuals to influence the interests of others, and not merely for the state to recognise 
the interests of individuals. In practice, this would take the form of, for example: less intrusive 
laws relating to free speech; an independent press; unbiased legal and political structures 
that don’t use the state apparatus to promote any one partisan view; and transparent state 
institutions that provide individuals with the accurate information necessary for a meaningful 
debate about the operation of those institutions. These additional requirements would go 
some way to ensuring the autonomy of individuals by enabling them to have a greater 
capacity to shape the laws under which they live; rather than merely registering their 
approval/disapproval for those laws. They would also help to improve formal equality by 
ensuring that it is harder for some individuals to gain an unfair advantage over others in 
having their interests heard or represented. 
 Again, I do not claim that any of these additional requirements are ones that 
Christiano would not himself endorse, only that they should be asserted more forthrightly in 
his discussion. I also do not claim that these additional requirements would create the ideal 
scenario whereby the autonomy and equality of all citizens is accounted for. I do claim, 
however, that they would increase the chances that such values were realised which, as I have 
argued, is the best we can do. 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Swift, A. (2014) Political Philosophy: p.219 
40 Ibid. 
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It would be useful, at this point, to take stock of where our discussion has led us. If we are to 
recognise that state consent to international law often imposes obligations on individuals as 
well as states, and even those obligations incurred by states are only morally relevant to the 
extent that they affect individuals within the state, then state consent – on its own and ceteris 
paribus – cannot be sufficient to legitimate international law. To be (potentially) sufficient, 
the consenting state should be authorised to do so by its citizens. The most likely mechanism 
by which to achieve this authorisation is for the state to be democratic (in a deliberative 
sense).  
 When we look to the states of the world, however, we notice that very few achieve 
the level of democracy necessary to ensure that their consent to international law – on behalf 
of their citizens – is legitimate. The uncomfortable consequence of this, of course, is that most 
international law should not be considered legitimate (at least in relation to those states). As 
Buchanan and Keohane argue, ‘given that many states are non-democratic and systematically 
violate the human rights of their citizens… state consent cannot transfer legitimacy for the 
simple reason that there is no legitimacy to transfer’.41 It should also be noticed that, as a 
rule, there is nothing in the existing practice of international law which stipulates that only 
democratic states can enter into international legal agreements.42 This means that – under 
this theory – the international legal system, as an institution, does not demand the conditions 
for its own legitimacy. 
 
5.1.4 The Problem of Undemocratic States  
Having said all this – and without detracting from it – there are still a number of reasons why 
one might still want to recognise the consent of undemocratic states. The first is that, if we 
adopt the position that undemocratic states cannot participate in, or be subject to, 
international law, then we run the risk of derogating the autonomy of the citizens within those 
states even further.43 Excluding those citizens could effectively be to deny them the option of 
                                                          
41 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.413 
42 This is different from saying, however, that it is a pre-condition of joining a specific agreement that a state is 
democratic – as is the case with the European Union. See: Treaty on European Union: Articles 2 & 49. 
43 Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: p.71; see also: 
Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.385 
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alternative authorities; ones that could counter or temper that of their own, undemocratic 
governments. 
Relatedly, allowing undemocratic states to consent to international law could actually 
increase their own legitimacy. This was a point made by Buchanan in his essay ‘Reciprocal 
Legitimation: Reframing the Problem of International Legitimacy’.44 Buchanan argues that, 
under the right conditions, cooperation between international institutions and states could 
result in a type of reciprocal legitimation. By submitting themselves to certain international 
legal obligations, states could render themselves more legitimate in relation to their own 
citizens. Think, for example, of states acceding to human rights treaties. It would be an odd 
position to argue that some undemocratic states could not consent to such treaties because 
they had previously violated the human rights of their citizens. If anything, this would be all 
the more reason to recognise their consent. More subtly, if it were the case that, by allowing 
an undemocratic state to participate in a trade deal the lives of their citizens would improve, 
then one should take seriously the position of accepting their consent even though that 
consent in no way derives from – or is authorised by – the citizens themselves.45 
Recognising the consent of undemocratic states, however, would need to be done on 
a case-by-case basis, and not become the norm (as is current international practice). There 
are, for example, real moral concerns about allowing illegitimate states to participate in 
international agreements as if they were legitimate. Sanctifying illegitimate rule in this way 
could have detrimental consequences for a state’s own domestic population. Someone like 
Leif Wenar, for example, might argue that we should distance ourselves from grossly 
illegitimate states (at least in terms of importing their resources) so as to incentivise an 
internal legitimation process.46  
  The reader, at this stage, will be forgiven for believing that I am committing a 
contradiction. On the one hand, I am arguing that the consent of undemocratic states cannot 
                                                          
44 Buchanan, A. (2011) ‘Reciprocal Legitimation’. 
45 This is basically the position that ‘paternalism’ is justified when the ‘would-be consenter’ is unable to 
consent. A classic example of this would be that of family members paternalistically making decisions for a 
coma patient. However, this type of paternalism would only be justifiable under consent theory if the person 
making decisions for the ‘would-be consenter’ does so on the basis of what the ‘would-be consenter’ mostly 
likely would’ve done (had they been able to consent), and not what the decision-maker would necessarily do 
themselves. 
46 See, for example: Wenar, L. (2011) ‘Clean Trade in Natural Resources’. 
 
   
139 
 
legitimate international law, but on the other, that we should nevertheless (at least in some 
circumstances) recognise the consent of undemocratic states. This apparent contradiction 
can be resolved by clarifying ‘who’ the relevant actors are in each scenario, and by reminding 
ourselves of my definition of legitimacy.  
 First, when I argue that ‘the consent of undemocratic states cannot legitimate 
international law’, what I am really saying is that the consent of an undemocratic state puts 
the citizens of that state under no (political) obligation to obey any relevant international law. 
To be clear, this does not mean that those citizens ought not to obey international law if they 
so choose. It also does not preclude the possibility that some other factor – other than state 
consent – is creating an obligation to obey international law for those citizens. Rather, the 
problem of authorisation simply states that the very fact of the undemocratic state’s consent 
– on its own – does not create any obligations for those citizens. 
 Second, when I argue that ‘we should – at least in some circumstances – recognise the 
consent of undemocratic states anyway’, I am not making a claim about the ‘legitimacy’ of 
international law in relation to the citizens of undemocratic states. It is no contradiction to 
believe that there are good moral or prudential reasons to act ‘as if’ the consent of an 
undemocratic were valid, and also that that consent has no normative significance for the 
citizens of the undemocratic state. There is no necessary reason to presume that the 
imposition of international law on non-consenting citizens is any worse than the imposition 
of domestic law; especially if it is a choice between the two. If the choice is between a 
domestic government that does not recognise the interests of its own citizens, and 
international law that does, then extending the influence of the international community over 
those citizens seems the morally preferable option. Again, however, this says nothing about 
the political obligations that those citizens may or may not be under in relation to 
international law or the international community. 
 
5.1.5 Summary 
In conclusion, the problem of authorisation presents a serious problem for any 
straightforward theory of state consent; especially for states that are – in whole or in part – 
monist in relation to international law. This is simply because our primary concern ought to 
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be the autonomy and equality of individuals; not of states. States are only instrumental in 
ensuring the autonomy and equality of the individuals within them, and can only be effective 
in this instrumental capacity if they are sufficiently authorised by those individuals to consent 
on their behalf.  
 As a consequence, I have argued that the problem of authorisation shows that only 
the consent of deliberatively democratic states could be sufficient to legitimate international 
law. This fact should not automatically entail that undemocratic states are denied 
participation in the international legal system altogether. This is because participation could 
increase the legitimacy of such states and be a benefit to their citizens.  
Ultimately, the problem of authorisation for state consent demonstrates that the 
traditional theory of state consent is insufficient to legitimate international law. To be 
plausibly sufficient, we could amend the traditional theory with the proviso that consenting 
states ought to be democratic. In other words, a ‘theory of democratic state consent’ stands 
a better chance of being sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. However, as 
mentioned, this thesis aims to assess the theory of state consent as it is; not as it might be. 
  
 
5.2 The Problem of Immoral State Consent 
The above sections analysing the sufficiency of state consent (sections 4.1, 4.2, and 5.1) have 
primarily discussed concerns as to whether requirements of valid and morally efficacious 
consent (i.e., consent that is free, informed, and authorised) could be satisfied in the context 
of a state consenting to international law. These requirements were designed to preserve the 
autonomy of the consenter (or of those on whose behalf the consenter was consenting). It is 
important to note that these previous arguments were all consistent with the idea that if state 
consent could satisfy the requirements of valid consent, then it would be sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law. Their main concern was only that valid consent is not being, 
or could not be, achieved at the international level. It is equally important to remember that 
state consent attempts to legitimate international law in an entirely procedural way. This is 
to say that it indicates no ‘substantive’ requirements for the ‘content’ of legitimate law. As 
long as a law has received valid consent, it is legitimate, irrespective of its content. 
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 This section, however, considers the claim that, to be legitimate, international law 
must satisfy some substantive requirements. It is not enough, on this view, to look at the 
procedure by which a law was made; one must also analyse the content of that law to 
evaluate its legitimacy. State consent – being only procedural – is therefore insufficient for 
the legitimacy of international law. The main concern here is that, within consent theory, 
there is nothing preventing an agent from consenting to immoral agreements; and an 
immoral agreement, say some, cannot be legitimate. (It needs to be stressed that ‘immoral’, 
in this context, is referring to ‘something for which we have a moral duty not to do’. In this 
sense, it is a matter of justice, and can be used synonymously with the term ‘unjust’. I use the 
word ‘immoral’ only to be consistent with the existing literature). The logic behind the 
‘immoral state consent’ objection is simple: an international law cannot be legitimate if we 
have a moral duty not to obey it. This would remain true whether or not that law had received 
state consent. To argue against this would be contradictory as it would imply that we can have 
a moral duty to obey an international law, and also a duty not to obey that same law.  
Horton holds to the immoral consent argument when he explains that, ‘there are some 
actions which a person does not have the right to do, even if that person promises, contracts 
or consents to do them. Consent cannot normally create an obligation to do that which is 
seriously morally wrong.’47 Horton is not alone. Indeed, such a view is commonplace. 
Christiano asserts straightforwardly that consent must not be given to ‘obviously and 
seriously immoral commands’.48 Held & Maffettone agree when they say that to conceive of 
consent as sufficient for legitimacy ‘may be deeply counter-intuitive if what is consented to is 
grossly immoral.’49 For example, if an institution receives widespread support from its 
members, but at the same time violates basic human rights, we would be hesitant to bite the 
bullet and accept that the mere fact of consent is sufficient for the legitimacy of that 
institution. This problem, affirm Held & Maffettone, ‘tells us that a completely procedural 
view of the legitimacy of an institution based on consent intuitively runs counter to our 
considered convictions about… sufficient… conditions for legitimacy.’ 50   
                                                          
47 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: p.43 
48 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.383  
49 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.119; see also: Estlund, D. M. (2009) 
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework.  
50 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.120 
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 There are two interpretations of the problem of immoral state consent: 1.) immoral 
state consent as ‘harm to others’, and 2.) immoral state consent as ‘self-harm and unfairness’. 
I will begin by considering the former. 
 
5.2.1 Immoral Consent as Harm to Others 
It is clearly the case that consent transactions have the capacity to cause significant harm to 
other agents. Horton, for example, points to the idea of a ‘contract to kill’ a third-party.51 
Merely consenting to such an agreement does not seem to make it legitimate. Another – fairly 
intuitive – example is when an obligation is imposed on an agent not party to the consent 
transaction. Having external obligations imposed on another is the very antithesis of 
autonomy and is precisely what consent is meant to protect against. Thus, being subject to 
obligations against one’s will is a harm in the sense that one’s negative public autonomy has 
been violated. International legal practice already recognises the forcible imposition of 
obligations as a harm significant enough to invalidate international law. Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that ‘a treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third state without its consent’.52 This general rule is known by the 
maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent prosunt.53  
 As mentioned, the wrongness of imposing obligations on a third-party without their 
consent is fairly intuitive, and the prohibition against it is to be expected as it is consistent 
with the principle of state sovereignty. Other examples, however, are less clear, and the 
problem of ‘harm caused’ to third-party states is more nuanced in practice. Voyiakis, for 
example, notes that ‘an economic alliance between states A and B may not create obligations 
for state C, but it may limit the market for that state’s exports’ [emphasis added].54  To borrow 
                                                          
51 Horton, J. (1990) Political Obligation: p.43 
52 It should be noted that the VCLT refers only to harms caused to other ‘states’, however, I see no reason why 
this should not extend to other agents, including individuals. It should also be noted – as explained by 
Kaczorowska-Ireland – that whether there are ‘any exceptions to the general rules that treaties are only binding 
on contracting parties exist is a matter of controversy’. See: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International 
Law: p.104. Views differ, for example, as to whether Article 2(6) of the UN Charter imposes obligations on states 
who are not members of the UN. Article 2(6) provides: ‘The Organization shall ensure that states which are not 
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’.  
53 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.104. For a more in-depth discussion see: 
Fitzmaurice, M. (2002) ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’. 
54 Voyiakis, E. (2010) ‘International Treaties’: p.113 
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a term from economics, this problem – highlighted by Voyiakis – could be labelled a problem 
of ‘negative externalities’.  
In economics, ‘externalities occur in an economy when the production or consumption 
of a specific good impacts a third party that is not directly related to the production or 
consumption.’55 Externalities can be either positive or negative, although negative 
externalities, by definition, are the ones that are cause for moral concern. An example of a 
common negative externality would be ‘pollution emitted by a factory that spoils the 
surrounding environment and affects the health of nearby residents.’56  
Negative externalities are readily acknowledged in the domestic sphere, and domestic 
law often makes provision to mitigate against them. One such example in UK law are the 
planning obligations set out in section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. These 
planning obligations (commonly known as s106 agreements) are a mechanism that help to 
mitigate the negative externalities of new property development. As Smith explains: 
‘Concerns about new infrastructure are sometimes met by the local council imposing 
planning obligations on developers. New developments in a particular area may bring 
with them wider impacts on the local area… New facilities may therefore need to be 
built or upgraded to cope with this extra demand and this needs to be paid for. Section 
106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) allows developers to 
enter into “planning obligations” with a local authority in order to secure planning 
permission for a development… [These] obligations may be either in cash or kind, to 
undertake works, provide affordable housing, or provide additional funding for 
services.’57 
 
In relation to international law, we can say that a negative externality occurs when the 
realisation of an international legal agreement (negatively) impacts a third party.58 Negative 
                                                          
55 Investopedia (2017) ‘Externality’ [Online] 
56 Ibid. 
57 Smith, L. (2016) ‘Planning for onshore wind’. 
58 As noted by Kaczorowska-Ireland, Article 2(1)(h) VCLT defines a third-party State as a State not party to a 
treaty. Accordingly, a State may participate in the negotiation of a treaty, have some important connection 
with the intended contracting States but not become a contracting party unless it ratifies the treaty. See: 
Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.104 
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externalities arise from state consent simply because states do not interact with one another 
in isolation.59 Due to the processes of globalisation, states have become increasingly 
intertwined as people, goods, services, money, and information flows between them at 
greater speeds, in greater volumes, and with fewer restrictions. Keohane and Nye have 
labelled this situation as being one of ‘complex interdependence’ between states.60 The 
problem of complex interdependence raises a number of normative concerns for traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty and state independence. For example, Hurd observes that, ‘since 
changes in one state’s monetary policy such as the interest rate can have large and immediate 
effects on the economic conditions in other states, it is not self-evident how to draw the line 
between the rights of one state to set its own interest rates and the rights of others to be 
independent from outside influence.’61  
The same problem can occur when states consent to international law. For example, 
when the countries of the EU (then the EEC) committed to establish the EU Customs Union in 
1957, all parties bound by that common external tariff gave their valid consent (to the Treaty 
of Rome).62 From the viewpoint of the international lawyer, therefore, the international law 
establishing the Customs Union was (and is) legitimate. However, the formation of this 
Customs Union arguably produced negative externalities for third-party states (states not 
signatory to that agreement).63  
Most straightforwardly, all other export markets (exporting into the EU) were put at 
an immediate competitive disadvantage. Given the tariffs they were having to pay to gain 
access to the Customs Union, the goods made by non-EU producers were relatively more 
expensive within the EU compared with like-for-like EU producers. As one can imagine, this 
particularly affects the economic growth of less-competitive developing economies who are 
net-exporters, and who thus rely heavily on the revenue generated from their exports for 
economic growth (e.g. Vietnam, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of the Congo).64 But the 
                                                          
59 See: Bodansky, D.M. (1999) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law’; and Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: 
p.90 
60 Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. (2001) [1977] Power and Interdependence. 
61 Hurd, I. (2011) International Organizations: p.8 
62 The Treaty of Rome (1957). See, esp.: Art. 3(b). 
63 Juma, C. (2015) ‘How the EU starves Africa into submission’. See also: Juma, C. (2015) The New Harvest: 
Agricultural Innovation in Africa. 
64 World Bank Data (2018) ‘Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)’. 
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impact of these external tariffs, argues Calestous Juma, ‘goes well beyond lost export 
opportunities. They [also] suppress technological innovation and industrial development 
among [in Juma’s example] African countries’.65 Juma gives the following example. The tariff 
charged on unprocessed roasted coffee exported into the EU is 7.5%. The tariff charged on 
processed cocoa products like chocolate bars or cocoa powder is 30%. These higher charges 
for processed goods ‘denies the continent [Africa] the ability to acquire, adopt and diffuse 
technologies used in food processing.’ 66 The extended effects of this are perhaps even worse. 
Juma explains that ‘usually, the know-how accumulated from processing exports such as 
coffee could be adopted for use on other crops and in other sectors. This in turn would help 
to stimulate industrial development and generate employment’. 67 Thus, the pressure on 
these African countries to export raw materials rather than processed goods ‘undermines 
technological innovation in the wider economy, not just in agriculture’.68 
 This example, then, shows that (even seemingly benign) international consent 
transactions have the capacity to cause negative externalities. The real question, however, is 
whether these externalities are harmful enough to delegitimate the international law that 
created them. This will ultimately depend on how we think about our pre-existing moral 
obligations since – as noted earlier – a law cannot be both legitimate and unjust. If we are 
under pre-existing moral obligations not to cause certain types of harm, then we are not at 
moral liberty to consent to international law that inflicts that harm. The case of the EU 
Customs Union seems to be a moral grey area in this regard. We may agree that inadvertently 
stunting the economic development of African countries is undesirable or bad, but is it a 
matter of (in)justice? Are we duty bound to refrain from any activities that may cause this to 
happen? Does it make a difference if this harm is an unintended consequence, rather than 
the primary purpose, of that action? I don’t intend to adjudicate on this particular example, 
as it would require a far more in-depth and careful analysis. However, it isn’t difficult to 
imagine far more clear-cut examples whereby the harm inflicted upon third-parties is so 
severe as to render it morally impermissible. 
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66 Ibid. 
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All this seems to point to the conclusion that state consent is not sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law. This is because the content of the law, to be legitimate, must 
be such that it does not constitute an injustice for a third-party. As the theory of state consent 
is purely procedural, and makes no requirement for the content of international law, it cannot 
be sufficient (in all instances) for its legitimacy.  
This argument, however, does not quite follow. It is perfectly true to argue that the 
injustice of an international law would preclude that law’s legitimacy. However, it does not 
follow that state consent is therefore insufficient to legitimate international law. The 
confusion arises, I think, in the ambiguous statement that state consent is a purely 
‘procedural’ theory of legitimacy. It is wrong to assume that consent theorists are 
unconcerned with the substance of a proposed law. After all, if they were unconcerned, how 
could they make a determination as to whether that law required consent for its legitimacy? 
Consent theory is only procedural in the sense that once consent has been given, then that 
consent is sufficient for the legitimacy of that law. 
The problem of immoral state consent – or at least this first version of it – therefore 
represents a flaw in the operation of the current international legal system, and not in the 
theory of state consent per se. This is because the grievance that state consent can cause 
severe negative externalities for third-party states is not an argument against state consent 
as such, but a complaint that state consent is not being obtained from all relevant parties. If 
state consent were to be received from all those states incurring sufficiently harmful 
externalities, then any resulting international law would be legitimate. So, on this view, if 
African countries (and anyone else) sufficiently harmed by the EU Customs Union also 
consented to its establishment, then, as a piece of international law, it would be legitimate 
irrespective of the ‘harm’ caused to those countries. In fact, from the consent theorist’s 
perspective, the very fact of consent would entail that the ‘negative’ externalities would no 
longer constitute a harm. After all, as the consent theorist would say, ‘the willing person is 
not wronged’. 
The proposition that consent ought to be obtained from third-parties states – because 
they are ‘harmed’ by international agreements – is a radical departure from domestic contract 
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law (at least in the UK).69 This departure, however, may be justifiable. In the UK, a court will 
not find a contract to be illegitimate (void) simply because a third-party is sufficiently harmed. 
In other words, there exists no requirement that contracts do not harm third-parties. 
Crucially, however, there is a requirement that domestic contracts be legal. In other words, 
the terms of a contract cannot violate pre-existing UK primary or secondary legislation. Thus, 
to the extent that UK primary and secondary legislation protects individuals from harm, valid 
domestic contracts are unable to harm third-parties. However, little comparable primary or 
secondary legislation exists at the international level, and thus there is very little protection 
available against harm for third-party states.70 Given this, requiring the consent of those 
sufficiently harmed by international law, and not merely those party to the international legal 
agreement, may be a reasonable means by which to compensate for the lack of primary and 
secondary legislation. In keeping with consent theory’s maxim that ‘the willing person is not 
wronged’, those adopting this position would be ensuring that all those ‘wronged’ are willing. 
 
5.2.2 Immoral Consent as Self-Harm and Unfairness 
Some, however, would dispute even this, i.e., that international law is unharmful (and 
therefore legitimate) just because all relevant parties have given their valid consent. In other 
words, they would want to claim that ‘the willing person may be wronged’. This brings us to 
the second strand of the problem of immoral state consent. Whereas the first argued that 
some consent transactions were immoral because they failed to obtain the consent of all 
those harmed (a position consistent with state consent theory), the second strand argues that 
some consent transactions are immoral irrespective of any consent that has been given (a 
position inconsistent with state consent theory). Christiano, for example, argues that even 
exchanges entered into voluntarily and knowingly might still be morally quite defective.71 The 
‘most serious problem’ with the state consent theory of legitimacy, he says, is that it allows 
                                                          
69 For a discussion of the key differences between international agreements and domestic contracts, see: 
Christiano, T. (2011) ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy Possible for International Institutions’: pp.86-90 
70 Arguable exceptions to this might include those ‘general principles’ or ‘jus cogens’ norms that act as 
constitutional-type laws in the international sphere. See section 6.2 for an in-depth discussion. 
71 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.385; see also: Christiano, T. (2010) 
‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.126 
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for severe ‘bargaining asymmetries’ or ‘hard bargaining’, which can create ‘a great deal of 
unfairness’.72  
The problem of asymmetric bargaining was considered previously in section 4.1 as a 
potential threat to the voluntariness (and therefore validity) of state consent. In that section, 
however, I argued that bargaining asymmetries should not be thought of as a problem of 
voluntariness, but should instead be used to point out that consent theory has very little 
concern for standards of fairness. To remind ourselves: bargaining asymmetries occur when 
two negotiating parties have vastly unequal bargaining positions. The stronger party is at a 
distinct advantage because they are ‘credibly able to threaten withdrawal from the 
arrangement while the other is not’.73 This may result in ‘treaties which are ‘unequal’ either 
because of their substance (e.g. because they impose on one party only obligations and grant 
to others only rights, or they impose extreme restrictions on the sovereignty of one party 
only), or because of the unequal procedure (e.g. they are concluded under political, or 
economic coercion)’. 74 Thus, says Kumm, ‘it is doubtful that much legitimating value can be 
placed on a state’s consent to a treaty when the state is confronted with a take it or leave it 
option and the costs of not participating are prohibitively high’.75  
Christiano claims that ‘asymmetrical bargaining has been by far the most serious 
objection to the claim of international institutions to legitimacy. Complaints about the [UN] 
Security Council, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) are all instances of this phenomenon.’76 The IMF, in particular, is a 
frequent target of this criticism. One of the primary functions of the IMF is to act as a ‘lender 
of last resort’. As Hurd explains, IMF loans are made in response to an unsustainable situation 
in a member state’s balance-of-payments or foreign exchange positions.77 The paradigmatic 
instance of this is when foreign investors lose confidence in the stability of a local currency 
causing a ‘run’ on that currency. ‘The IMF’s lending program is intended to greatly increase a 
government’s access to foreign currency, with which it can buy the local currency being sold 
                                                          
72 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125 
73 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.125 
74 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.101 
75 Kumm, M. (2004) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.914 
76 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.126; see also: Pauwelyn, J. 
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p.335; and Hathaway, O. and Hongju Koh, H. (eds.) (2005) Foundations of International Law and Politics: p.283. 
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by fleeing investors.78 This is what happened, for example, during the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. The IMF, however, will make the loan conditional on the borrowing government 
implementing certain economic policies which, in theory, are aimed at rectifying the 
underlining problems that led to the balance-of-payments crisis. These conditions attached 
by the IMF often include ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, such as privatisation of 
industries and deregulation. They may also include changes to the country’s tax policies, 
monetary policy, and banking regulations.79  
Given the function of the IMF, then, one could argue that the legal arrangement 
negotiated between the borrowing country and the IMF is necessarily characterised by 
bargaining asymmetries. The borrowing country is in crisis, and, as such, must effectively 
accept the terms of the IMF’s offer on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis.80 As a result, many countries 
are ‘forced’ to consent to deals they believe to be unfair, and, in many cases, deals that have 
turned-out to be harmful. For example, in 2001, Argentina was forced by the IMF (it is argued) 
into a policy of fiscal restraint which ‘led to a decline in investment in public services which 
arguably damaged the economy’.81 
From a strict consent theorist point-of-view, there is nothing problematic about the 
legitimacy of the agreements made between the IMF and borrowing countries. Both parties 
give explicit consent to the terms of the agreement, and thus each retain their autonomy and 
formal equality. However, it is precisely because the consent theorist finds nothing 
problematic that people like Christiano question whether state consent is sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law. Intuitively, we feel as though there is something morally 
problematic about such agreements; and state consent theory fails to address this concern. 
Christiano believes that, to meet requirements of fairness, agencies such as the IMF, 
must ensure that desperate borrower countries have an ‘adequate voice in the process of 
structuring the loans.’82 In general, he thinks unfair asymmetric bargaining can be held in 
check by diminishing economic inequalities among the negotiating parties, and by 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.: pp.74-5 
80 It should be noted that, technically, the IMF does not make an ‘offer’ as, to initiate the negotiations, the 
borrower must approach the IMF. 
81 Pettinger, T. (2012) ‘Criticism of IMF’. 
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‘establishing independent standards of fairness in the process of forming agreements, which 
are then implemented in international agreements.’83  
 The doctrine of unequal treaties has also been written about by Soviet and Chinese 
writers and has received considerable support from post-colonial states.84 These authors 
point primarily to the allegedly unequal bilateral treaties ‘concluded in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century between Western countries, 
the US and some Latin American countries, on the one hand, and Asian States and African 
States, on the other.’ 85 One notable legal example from this period was the Case Concerning 
The Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad). In this case, ‘Libya argued that a 
treaty negotiated in 1955 between itself and France, although valid, should be interpreted 
favourably towards Libya because, at the time of negotiation, Libya lacked experience in the 
negotiation of international agreements especially compared to the experience of the French 
negotiators’.86 As it happened, the ICJ rejected Libya’s reasoning, and the doctrine of unequal 
treaties appeared to have lost some relevance.87 
Although we might agree with Christiano and others that international agreements 
are often plagued by unfairness, the real question we need to answer is whether this 
unfairness constitutes an injustice such that the resulting international law is illegitimate. It is 
important to remember that we are not looking to evaluate international law in terms of 
justice, but in terms of legitimacy. The fact that some international law may not achieve some 
‘thicker’ understanding of international justice – as proposed by, for example, by Thomas 
Pogge88 – does not necessarily entail that it is illegitimate. Indeed, as explained in chapter 
two, the concept of legitimacy is useful for us precisely when we disagree about what 
constitutes justice, or when full justice is unattainable. Standards of legitimacy, therefore, 
must necessarily be ‘weaker’ than those of justice. The contention set-out at the beginning of 
this section was not that law failing to meet standards of justice cannot be legitimate, but 
                                                          
83 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.128 
84 See, for example: Tunkin, I. (1986) International Law: A Textbook: pp.48-9; Fung, E.S.K. (1987) The Chinese 
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that laws that are unjust cannot be legitimate. There seems to be some significant moral 
distance between international laws that are ‘not perfectly just’, and those that are ‘unjust’.  
With this in mind, we shouldn’t rule out the possibility that international law can be 
both legitimate and – to some degree – morally defective. Thus, just because we observe 
unfairness in an international agreement does not mean we should jump straight to the 
conclusion that each party to that agreement does not have a moral obligation to obey the 
resulting international law. Although setting high moral standards for the legitimacy of 
international law may seem like an attractive idea, it will also have its unintended 
consequences. Christiano himself points out what these might be. If, for example, ‘symmetric’ 
bargaining was made a pre-condition for legitimate international law, then wealthier states 
may simply refrain from negotiating agreements with poorer states entirely.89 If, as Christiano 
accepts, agreements with more equitable distributions of the goods exchanged are spurned 
in favour of other agreements, ‘then we will have equity but greater poverty.’90 
 One may agree with the notion that morally defective agreements may still be 
legitimate, but nevertheless point-out that strictly adhering to the ‘sufficiency of state 
consent’ position would lead to moral absurdities. For example, would an agreement 
whereby a state consented to be the recipient of war or genocide really be legitimate, just 
because that state gave valid consent? This, after all, seems to be the logical conclusion of the 
state-consent theorist’s position. The jus cogens norms of international law already prohibit 
such acts of self-harm. However, since international law is supposed to be premised on the 
state consent model, are such prohibitions not contradictory? There are two brief points that 
could be made in response to this apparent argumentum ad absurdum. 
 First, the jus cogens prohibitions on state’s consenting to severe self-harm might be 
explained with reference to, what Kleinig calls, ‘practical policy reasons’.91 In other words, the 
ostensible irrationality of such an act would give ‘reason to doubt the genuineness of consent 
to self-harm, and it may be difficult to sort out those cases in which the consent is both 
genuine from those in which it is not.’92 Put simply, consent to self-harm might lead one to 
be suspicious that the ordinary requirements of valid consent – such as ‘voluntariness’ and 
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‘knowledge’ – are not being satisfied. This, however, would be to make a different argument 
about the ‘validity’ and not about the ‘immorality’ of consent. 
There is also the argument that a state consenting to ‘self-harm’ should not be thought 
of as ‘self’-harm at all. The confusion arises with the mistaken belief of states as ‘autonomous’ 
or ‘artificial persons’ (as discussed previously under the ‘problem of authorisation’ in section 
5.1) and the poor analogy that is often made between states and individuals. States, unlike 
individuals, are not unitary agents; they are a collection of individuals. Thus, when an 
individual consents to be harmed, they are only harming themselves (which, under consent 
theory, is justifiable). When a state consents to be harmed, however, it is unlikely to be an 
actual instance of ‘self-harm’. What is usually taking place is that state representatives are 
consenting to arrangements that harm other citizens within the state. This, then, is not 
necessarily a problem about the substance or ‘immorality’ of state consent, but actually refers 
back to the problem of authorisation (section 5.1) and the ‘validity’ of state consent.  
Thus, although this second strand of the problem of immoral state consent highlights 
the fact that ‘legitimacy’ is not synonymous with ‘morally just’ or ‘desirable’, it does not 
demonstrate – on its own – that state consent is insufficient for the legitimacy of international 
law. 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
In sum, the problem of immoral state consent is essentially an argument against the idea that 
a purely procedural view of the legitimacy of international law – such as state consent – can 
be sufficient. To be sufficient, goes the argument, the content or ‘substance’ of international 
law must also meet morally acceptable standards. 
What I have shown in this section, however, is that the ‘problem of immoral state 
consent’ can actually be separated into two different arguments. First, there is the argument 
that ‘international-law-creating’ state consent transactions are ‘often’ immoral because not 
all relevant states have given their consent. This argument is directed, not towards the theory 
of state consent, but the application of that theory in the international legal system. As such, 
it is actually not an argument against the sufficiency of state consent. Instead, it implicitly 
argues that state consent could be sufficient if applied properly; the problem is simply its 
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misapplication. Needing to obtain the consent of parties harmed by – but not party to – an 
agreement is not common in domestic law, but such a requirement could possibly be justified 
in international law as the latter does not have an underlying framework of laws protecting 
against such harms. A strong case could therefore be made about the need to establish some 
type of ‘harm principle’ in international law. This principle would help determine when states 
are at moral liberty to create international law, or when the consent of third parties is 
required. (This proposed ‘harm principle’ will be expanded upon in the conclusion to this 
thesis). This does not alter the fact, however, that this first version of the problem of immoral 
consent is, in practice, not a problem of the ‘immorality’ of the consent at all, but a defect in 
the procedure through which the consent was given.  
The second strand of the immoral state consent argument is that international law 
can be immoral even when the theory of state consent has been applied correctly. This latter 
argument is an argument against the sufficiency of state consent to legitimate international 
law. My instinct was to caution against this position. When one looks closely at the reasons 
why states ought not to consent to ‘self-harm’, the defect tends to lie in that consent being 
invalid rather than immoral. In other words, there is something wrong with the procedure of 
that consent rather than the content of the international law per se. I also argued that we 
should be careful not to confuse standards of legitimacy with standards of justice; we should 
not conclude that international law is illegitimate just because it doesn’t conform to a 
conception of justice. We should, instead, be more lenient with our evaluations of what 
constitutes legitimate law, especially as we are unlikely to achieve international justice in an 
environment in which obedience to international law is infrequent. 
My conclusion is, therefore, that the problem of immoral state consent – in either 
version – does not demonstrate that state consent is insufficient for the legitimacy of 
international law. What is does do, however, is draw our attention to the fact that, in many 
cases, it is questionable whether state consent theory is being applied ‘ideally’ in practice.  
 
5.3  Summary: The Sufficiency of State Consent  
We have now arrived at the end of our discussion on the sufficiency of state consent in 
legitimating international law. This discussion, spanning both chapters four and five, has 
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considered four potential objections: the problem of non-voluntary state consent; the 
problem of uninformed state consent; the problem of authorisation; and the problem of 
immoral state consent.  
 As was made clear, it is the third of these problems – that of authorisation – that I find 
to be the most damaging to the proposition that state consent is sufficient for the legitimacy 
of international law. This is because our primary concern ought to be the autonomy and 
equality of individuals; not of states. This is not something the standard theory of state 
consent takes into consideration. States are only instrumental in ensuring the autonomy and 
equality of the individuals within them, and can only be effective in this instrumental capacity 
if they are sufficiently authorised by those individuals to consent on their behalf. However, 
there is nothing in the theory of state consent, or indeed in most international legal practice, 
which suggests that such authorisation is prerequisite for state consent to have its intended 
effect of legitimating international law. The problem of authorisation, therefore, leads to the 
general conclusion that state consent is not sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. 
This is because there exists the further necessary requirement that states should be 
authorised to give consent by their citizens. In my view, this authorisation could be acquired 
by states instituting a system of sufficiently deliberative democracy.  
This conclusion, however, is in need of at least two important caveats. The first is that 
the problem of authorisation does not seem to apply to states that are constitutionally 
‘dualist’ in relation to international law. As explained in chapter one, a dualist country is one 
in which international law must be transposed into domestic legislation for it to have legal 
effect in that country. Thus, once transposed, international law will look no different to other 
examples of domestic law in that country’s statute book. Accordingly, this becomes an issue 
about the legitimacy of domestic law rather than international law – and not the subject of 
this thesis. The second caveat is that undemocratic states (i.e., states unauthorised to consent 
on behalf of their citizens) should not necessarily be prohibited from participating in the 
international legal system. This is because participation could encourage or incentivise the 
democratisation of such states, or be of material benefit to their citizens. 
Ultimately, however, the problem of authorisation shows that the traditional theory 
of state consent is insufficient to legitimate international law. To be plausibly sufficient, we 
could amend the traditional theory with the proviso that consenting states ought to be 
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democratic. In other words, a ‘theory of democratic state consent’ stands a better chance of 
being sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. Suggestions as to how this might be 
realised in practice are set out further in the conclusion to this thesis. 
 I found the other three arguments against the sufficiency of state consent less 
convincing. To start, the problems of non-voluntary and uninformed consent – as seen in 
chapter four – were less arguments against the sufficiency of state consent in ‘theory’, and 
more about the consent of states in practice. Even then, I found that – in practice – these 
issues pose less of a problem than is often portrayed by others. This is not because others in 
any way misrepresent the facts of how the international system operates, but merely because 
they place a greater moral importance on some of these descriptive facts than I do. 
 Similarly, and although I recognise its strong intuitive appeal, I concluded that the 
problem of immoral consent does not – on its own – undermine the notion that state consent 
is sufficient as a means of legitimating international law. This is because, when we look 
closely, the problem of immoral consent is invariably not one relating to the content of the 
law, but the procedure by which it came to apply to a state or its people. I also argued that 
we should be careful not to confuse standards of legitimacy with standards of justice. In other 
words, we should not conclude that international law is illegitimate just because it doesn’t 
conform to a conception of justice. We should be more lenient with our evaluations of what 
constitutes legitimate law, especially as we are unlikely to achieve international justice in an 
environment in which obedience to international law is infrequent. 
 The next (and final) chapter considers two arguments against the proposition that 
state consent is ‘necessary’ for the legitimacy of international law: the problem of ‘immoral 
state non-consent’, and the problem of ‘non-consensual’ international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
THE NECESSITY OF STATE CONSENT 
 
The previous two chapters dealt with the issue of whether state consent is sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law (i.e., whether state consent can legitimate international law 
on its own). As we saw, there are valid reasons to suggest that state consent is not sufficient 
for the legitimacy of international law. This does not entail, however, that state consent is not 
necessary. To say that state consent is necessary, but insufficient, is to say that international 
law cannot be legitimate unless state consent has been given, although other necessary 
conditions must also be met. Alternatively, if state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy 
of international law, then international law can be legitimate without receiving state consent 
at all. This section critically engages with two arguments for why state consent should not be 
thought of as necessary for the legitimacy of international law: the problem of ‘immoral state 
non-consent’, and the problem of ‘non-consensual international law’. 
 
6.1 The Problem of Immoral State Non-Consent 
The problem of immoral state non-consent, like the problem of ‘immoral state consent’ 
(discussed above in section 5.2), says that consent must be constrained by considerations of 
justice. However, this problem considers the flip-side of the previous argument. The problem 
of immoral consent said that, to what we have a moral duty not to do, we cannot give our 
consent. The problem of immoral non-consent, however, says that, to what we have a moral 
duty to do, we cannot withhold consent. Although both problems argue that consent must be 
bound by considerations of justice, the distinction between the two is important. The immoral 
consent problem argued that consent was insufficient, meaning that it may be necessary for 
legitimacy, but that other considerations concerning justice must also necessarily be satisfied. 
Immoral non-consent, however, argues that, when obeying international law is a moral duty, 
then one’s consent to that law is unnecessary; it is the fact that the international law is a 
matter of justice, and not the giving state consent, which makes it legitimate. The underlying 
logic here is that a law cannot both be a matter of justice and illegitimate.  
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6.1.1 ‘Global Public Bads’ and Moral Duties 
Lefkowitz presents the problem of immoral non-consent clearly as follows: In relation to 
consent to international law, ‘if all individuals necessarily owe certain moral duties to non-
compatriots [or all states owe moral duties to other states], and if they can discharge those 
duties only by treating international law as authoritative, then it follows that they have a 
moral duty to do so irrespective of whether they have consented to comply with those 
international laws.’1 Framed differently, this problem could be thought of as a problem of 
creating negative externalities through non-consent (as opposed to creating negative 
externalities through giving consent – see section 5.2).2 Thus, argue Held & Maffettone, ‘the 
state consent theory of legitimacy becomes increasingly less tenable to the extent that 
withholding consent may have severe externalities.’3  
The negative externalities created by non-consent are largely caused for the same 
reasons as those caused by giving consent (again, as seen in section 5.2). In the modern world, 
with its processes of globalisation and the advancement of production and technology, there 
have arisen multiple problems that do not confine themselves the borders of states. These 
problems – also referred to as ‘global public bads’ – include: climate change, pandemics, 
financial instability, difficulties in international trade, and nuclear proliferation.4 ‘In our 
increasingly interconnected world’, explains Held, ‘these global problems cannot be solved by 
any one nation-state acting alone. They call for collective and collaborative action.’5 The same 
point is made by Guzman who argues that: ‘we… live in a world with nuclear weapons, a 
warming climate, vanishing fisheries, grinding poverty, and countless other problems whose 
solutions require a high level of cooperation among states. Unless we change how we view 
the role of consent, it will be almost impossible to address these problems.’6 The severity of 
these global public bads, argues Christiano, means that general cooperation that aims to 
prevent or alleviate these bads is ‘morally mandatory’.7 The state consent view of legitimacy, 
however, would seem to give ‘unlimited opting-out powers’ to states and, yet, given the 
global collective action problems we currently face, withholding consent from even 
                                                          
1 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.110 
2 Kleinig, J. (2010) ‘The Nature of Consent’: p.9 
3 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.123 
4 Ibid.; see also: Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.388 
5 Held, D. (2004) Global Covenant: pp.11-12 
6 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.6 
7 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.388 
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reasonable attempts at their solution may imply imposing severe costs on others.’8 This 
problem has been noted by many others.9 
The basic argument here, then, against the necessity of state consent as a means to 
legitimate international law, is this: if proposed international law is necessary to address 
‘global public bads’, and if addressing global public bads is a moral duty, then that proposed 
international law is legitimate whether or not states have given their consent. Again, this is 
based on the assumption that international law cannot be both a requirement of justice (i.e. 
morally mandatory) and illegitimate. 
To add a practical dimension to our discussion, we can focus on two of the ‘global 
public bads’ mentioned by Held & Maffettone above (nuclear proliferation and climate 
change), and look at two recent real-world examples of when states have seemingly refused 
to cooperate in addressing these issues. 
On 7 July 2017, a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was drafted and 
adopted at a United Nations Conference. As noted by Mills and Culpin, it was ‘the first 
multilateral, legally-binding, instrument for nuclear disarmament to have been negotiated in 
20 years.’10 In overview, the treaty prohibits signatories from ‘developing, testing, producing, 
manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, transferring or receiving control over 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It also prohibits them from using, or 
threatening to use such weapons.’11 122 out of 124 countries participating at the UN 
Conference voted in favour of the treaty (with The Netherlands voting against and Singapore 
abstaining).12 Many saw this Treaty as crucial in achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament 
with the representative for Brazil declaring that the treaty could be ‘the missing piece in the 
puzzle’ of nuclear disarmament.13  
However, many countries did not participate in the drafting or adoption of the Treaty, 
including – crucially – the nine states that actually possess (or are thought to possess) nuclear 
                                                          
8 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.123  
9 See, for example: Helfer, L.R. (2008) ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’: p.74; and Jackson, J.H. (2003) 
‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’: pp.782 & 795  
10 Mills, C. & Culpin, L. (2017) ‘A Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons’: p.4 
11 Ibid. 
12 United Nations General Assembly (2017) ‘Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’; See also: 
Mills, C. & Culpin, L. (2017) ‘A Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons’: p.4 
13 Cited in: Mills, C. & Culpin, L. (2017) ‘A Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons’: UK: p.3  
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weapons. Many of these states, including the United Kingdom, have stated that they have no 
intention of consenting to this Treaty. As such – under the existing state consent model of 
international law – they will be under no legal obligation to obey the Treaty or any of its 
provisions.  
Moving to our second example, in December 2015 at a conference in Paris, 
representatives of 196 countries reached a historic agreement to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. The resulting Paris Climate Agreement commits parties to hold ‘the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.’14 The 
Agreement requires all parties to ‘put forward their best efforts through nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This 
includes requirements that all Parties report regularly on their emissions and on their 
implementation efforts.’15 This agreement marked the first time that both developed and 
developing countries have committed to tackling greenhouse gas emissions.16  
The United States signed the Agreement on 22 April 2016 and ‘accepted’ on 3 
September 2016. The Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. However, on 1 
June 2017, President Trump announced that the United States would be pulling out of the 
Paris Climate Agreement, stating: ‘as of today, the United States will cease all implementation 
of the non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the 
agreement imposes on our country’.17 This included, he went on to say, ending both the 
implementation of the nationally determined contribution and US contributions to the Green 
Climate Fund.18 
 
 
                                                          
14 Paris Climate Agreement (2015): Article 2 
15 Ibid.: Article 4. (It should be stressed that the specific climate goals are voluntary and thus politically 
encouraged rather than legally bound. Only the processes governing the reporting and review of these goals 
are mandated under international law). 
16 Ares, E. & Hirst, D. (2015) ‘Paris Climate Change Conference’: p.3 
17 Trump, D. (2017) ‘Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord’. 
18 As per Article 28 of the Paris Agreement, the US is only legally allowed to withdraw from the Agreement 
three years from the date on which the Agreement entered into force. This will be just before the end of 
President Trump’s first term in office. 
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6.1.2 Problems of Disagreement 
Those endorsing the problem of immoral state non-consent, then, may very well argue that, 
in the examples above, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Paris 
Climate Agreement (given that they express an attempt to achieve morally mandatory 
outcomes) create legitimate legal obligations for all states, whether or not they choose to 
give their consent.  
 There are, however, a number of points that advocates of state consent might want 
to make in response to the above, and reasons for why we should be hesitant to dismiss the 
idea that state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of international law. As mentioned, the 
argument behind the problem of immoral non-consent is that: to what we have a moral duty 
to do, we cannot withhold consent. The first response by the consent theorist, therefore, 
might be to contest the notion that we actually know what we have a moral duty to do. 
Indeed, the usefulness of the concept of legitimacy – as discussed chapter two – stems 
precisely from the fact that it gives us moral obligations to obey the law even when we 
disagree as to whether that law is a matter of justice. 
Whilst acknowledging the difficulty in agreeing upon requirements of justice in 
general, however, Held & Maffettone nevertheless argue that:  
‘At least for a central class of cases that are at the heart of global governance [and 
international law], such as climate change, prudential financial regulations and nuclear 
proliferation, the types of externalities involved would, in the absence of cooperation, 
have important implications for the basic interests of humankind. Accordingly, they 
would be part of any plausible account of the kind of externalities we are not allowed 
to impose on others.’19  
 
In other words, although we may not have a complete picture of the requirements of justice, 
there exist some potential harms so great that a failure to attempt to prevent them would 
clearly constitute an injustice. 
 Christiano, although agreeing with Held & Maffettone that a certain class of negative 
                                                          
19 Held, D. & Maffettone, P. (2016b) ‘Legitimacy and Global Governance’: p.123 
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externalities put states and individuals under a moral obligation to cooperate, does not agree 
that this necessarily renders state consent unnecessary. He explains that, although ‘we are 
morally required to cooperate in solving these fundamental moral problems, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty as to how these problems can be solved’ [emphasis added].20 ‘This type of 
uncertainty’, he continues, ‘provides a reason for supporting a system of state consent with 
freedom to enter and exit arrangements because it supports a system which allows for a 
significant amount of experimentation in how to solve the problems.’21 In other words, 
although we can agree that a failure to act in certain instances may cause an injustice, we 
may reasonably disagree as to how we should act to resolve or prevent that injustice. This 
reasonable disagreement, argues Christiano, leaves room for state consent. This being the 
case, we should be hesitant to force states to obey international law because we cannot be 
certain that any proposed international law will be the best means by which to solve a 
problem. Indeed, the proposed international law may produce unintended and counter-
productive consequences. Thus, failing to recognise the consent of states, and effectively 
forcibly imposing obligations on them, would potentially be an unproductive means by which 
to achieve morally mandatory aims. 
 Indeed, in the two practical examples we looked at above, we find that, as Christiano 
pre-empted, the states in question refuse to give their consent, not because they (openly) 
disagree with what the laws are trying to achieve, but because they disagree with how those 
laws propose to achieve it.  The British Government made a statement explaining that it was 
not going to sign the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because it: ‘cannot 
and will not work’. Britain’s Ambassador to the UN went on to state that: 
‘The British government firmly believes that the best way to achieve the goal of global 
nuclear disarmament is through gradual multilateral disarmament, negotiated using a 
step-by-step approach and within existing international frameworks [specifically the 
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. A step-by-step approach to global nuclear 
disarmament is what we need to build trust and confidence. It will provide for tangible 
steps towards a safer and a more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons 
feel able to relinquish them. Finally… a ban on nuclear weapons will not in itself 
improve the international security environment, or increase trust and transparency 
                                                          
20 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: pp.388-9 
21 Ibid.: p.389 
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between nuclear weapon possessor states and it will also not address the technical 
and procedural challenges of nuclear disarmament verification.’22 
 
Again, in the speech announcing the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, 
President Trump did not refer to the general aims of the agreement as a reason for 
withdrawal (even though many suspect this might’ve been the case).23 Indeed, in the speech 
he professes that he is ‘someone who cares deeply about the environment’ and actually 
admonishes the Paris Agreement for failing ‘to live up to our environmental ideals’.24 Instead, 
he argues that the Treaty is unfairly and disproportionately burdensome for the United States 
because of its ‘onerous energy restrictions’ and the consequences it may bring for economic 
growth and jobs.25   
At this point, it is important to point out that Christiano’s defence of the necessity of 
state consent is heavily qualified by the consenting state being able to provide an ‘adequate 
explanation’ as to why the proposed international law would not contribute to solving the 
problem, and why some alternative might be superior. By ‘adequate explanation’ Christiano 
means one that ‘is not irrational, unscrupulous or morally self-defeating and that displays a 
good-faith effort to solve the problem at hand.’26 Briefly, an ‘irrational’ explanation goes 
against vast majority of scientific opinion. An ‘unscrupulous’ one is one that is selfish in the 
sense of merely free riding on the efforts of others. A ‘morally self-defeating’ one insists on a 
different method of coordination, defeating a coordination solution that, in the 
circumstances, advances everyone’s interests.27 If a state fails to provide such an adequate 
explanation, says Christiano, then the international law would be legitimate without the 
consent of that state, and that state may be legitimately forced to cooperate.28 
 Although Christiano’s ‘adequate explanation’ qualification sounds intuitively 
                                                          
22 Rycroft, M. (2017) ‘A step-by-step approach to global nuclear disarmament is what we need to build trust 
and confidence’. (A similar justification for non-consent was given by other states. For example, Switzerland 
stated that: ‘Switzerland is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, but also sees risks that 
this treaty may weaken existing norms and agreements and create parallel processes and structures which 
may further contribute to polarization rather than reduce it’. See: Sanders-Zakre, A. (2017) ‘States hesitant to 
Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty’.) 
23 Gustin, G. (2018) ‘Climate Denial Pervades the Trump White House, But It’s Hitting Some Limits’. 
24 Trump, D. (2017) ‘Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord’. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.389 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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appealing, it doesn’t solve our primary problem of ‘disagreement’. There is no reason to 
believe that states who disagree as to how a problem should be solved are any more likely to 
agree on whether the explanations they offer for this are ‘adequate’. At some point, someone 
would need to make a decision as to whether the proposed international law is legitimate – 
but it’s not clear who that someone should be. This is my central concern with ‘the problem 
of immoral non-consent’ – or indeed any theory which determines the legitimacy of 
international law with reference to its ‘content’ rather than ‘procedure’: it doesn’t solve the 
problem of disagreement. This is crucial because – as I argued in chapter two – legitimacy, as 
a concept, is useful precisely because it (largely) avoids the problem disagreement by 
referring to the procedure by which a law was made to determine its normative status, and 
not the content of the law itself.  
 Given this, I would conclude that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
and the Paris Climate Agreement are not examples of legitimate international laws – at least 
in relation to those states that are unwilling to give their consent. This is not to say, however, 
that these proposed laws – or any action taken to enforce them – would not be morally 
justified. This may sound like a contradiction to the reader. However, the contradiction only 
arises if one assumes that I am using the terms ‘legitimate’ and ‘morally justified’ 
synonymously; which I am not. This ultimately comes down to how I have chosen to define 
‘legitimacy’ in chapter two. A law is legitimate if and only if it derives its moral permissibility 
from the procedure by which it was made (i.e. is justified with reference to content-
independent features of the law). This does not mean that the contents of laws are not 
morally significant; they are. All I am claiming is that the content of a law does not bare upon 
the ‘legitimacy’ of that law. 
This point about legitimacy being a content-independent – rather than content-
dependent – moral justification has created a fair amount of confusion in the literature. In 
fact, we see examples of theorists who – like me – have conceived of legitimacy as content-
independent, but have still promoted content-dependent criteria for the legitimacy of 
international law. For example, Buchanan & Keohane argue that legitimacy entails ‘that those 
to whom institutional rules are addressed have content-independent reasons to comply with 
them’, and that ‘one has content-independent reason to comply with a rule if and only if one 
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has a reason to comply regardless of any positive assessment of the content of that rule’.29 
However, in the very same essay, they write that institutions ‘are legitimate only if they do 
not persist in violations of the least controversial human rights.’30 This does not follow 
logically. First, Buchanan and Keohane define legitimacy as a content-independent 
justification for the right to rule, but then stipulate a content-dependent requirement (i.e. 
upholding human rights) that ought to be satisfied by an institution before it can claim 
legitimacy. 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
This section started by presenting the ‘problem of immoral state non-consent’. In essence, 
this says that the non-consent of states can – in some instances – create negative externalities 
severe enough that they create ‘global public bads’ (such as climate change and nuclear 
proliferation) and thereby constitute an injustice. Given this – went the argument – proposed 
international law attempting to rectify those ‘bads’ are legitimate; with or without the 
consent of states. If correct, this argument would demonstrate that state consent is not 
necessary for the legitimacy of international law. 
There was an epistemological flaw with this position, however, which was the 
difficulty of determining what does, and does not, constitute an injustice. Indeed, legitimacy 
is useful as a concept precisely because we can’t often agree on the requirements of justice. 
Held & Maffetonne responded to this objection by noting that there are certain public bads 
that clearly fall foul of the requirements of justice. As such, the problem of disagreement is – 
to a greater or lesser extent – negated. Christiano, however, hits the ball back over the net by 
pointing out that, although there may be wide-spread agreement in certain instances as to 
‘what’ constitutes a public bad, there is still likely to be disagreement as to how public bads 
should be resolved. This was demonstrated using the practical examples of Britain’s objection 
to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and President Trump’s objection to the 
Paris Climate Agreement. 
Having said this, Christiano also stated the need for non-consenting states to provide 
an ‘adequate explanation’ for their non-cooperation. This ‘adequate explanation’ 
                                                          
29 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.411 
30 Ibid.: p.420 
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requirement, however, simply pushed the problem of disagreement back another stage; but 
did not overcome it. This is because all non-consenting states are likely to believe that their 
reasons for doing so are adequate. For me, this line of argument demonstrated the problem 
with theories that attempt to determine the legitimacy of international law with reference to 
the ‘content’ of the law rather than the ‘procedure’ by which it is created. Indeed, this was 
why – as set-out in chapter two – I defined legitimacy as a content-independent quality of a 
law: providing a content-independent explanation as to why one has a moral obligation to 
obey the law solves – to a large extent – the problem of disagreement and, as a consequence, 
of wide-spread coordination. 
In general, the problem of immoral non-consent has shown us that, in such an 
interconnected global sphere, the refusal of states to cooperate to resolve transnational 
problems could constitute an injustice. However, the conclusion regarding legitimacy that one 
draws from this fact varies depending on how one has chosen to conceptualise ‘legitimacy’.  
If one assumes that ‘legitimacy’ is broadly synonymous with ‘morally justifiable’, then 
one is, in principle, lead to the conclusion that state consent would not be necessary for the 
legitimacy of international law. This is because, as Held & Maffettone convincingly argued, in 
certain exceptional circumstances, failing to consent could result in severe harms being 
inflicted on other states & individuals. It would thus be odd – in this scenario – to conclude 
that reasonable proposed international laws aimed at preventing this harm were illegitimate.   
Having said this, I think this argument, even on its own terms, should be treated with 
caution. This is because, organising the international legal system based on the principle that 
state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy of international law seems to leave weaker 
states defenceless in the face of the imposition of harms and obligations by stronger states. 
This is the argument that state consent is a necessary tool to prevent against ‘predation’ in 
the international realm.31 Thus – even if we were to accept this argument – it should only be 
in rare and specific circumstances that state consent is considered unnecessary. In this way, I 
think Buchanan’s approach is sensible when he says that (democratic) state consent should 
be a presumptive necessary condition for the legitimacy of international law.32 In other words, 
the onus is on those states wanting to impose international law to demonstrate why non-
                                                          
31 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.192 
32 Buchanan, A. & Keohane, R.O. (2006) ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’: p.415 
 
   
166 
 
consent to such law would constitute an injustice. The point of principle still remains, 
however, that if legitimacy is defined with reference to the content of a law, then proposed 
international laws that seek to prevent or rectify an injustice must be – in some basic sense – 
legitimate.  
However, if one chooses (as I have) to define legitimacy as creating a content-
‘independent’ obligation to obey the law, then the simple fact of state non-consent creating 
an injustice does not lead to the conclusion that any international law aimed at rectifying that 
injustice is ‘legitimate’. This is not to say that any action or proposed law would not be 
‘morally justifiable’ in this regard. However – given that legitimacy is determined solely with 
reference to content-independent features of a law – such proposed laws would have no 
bearing on ‘legitimacy’ per se. 
Thus, under my conception of legitimacy, the ‘problem of immoral state non-consent’ 
does not show that state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy of international law. What 
it can claim to do, however, is demonstrate the limitations of the concept of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy does not offer us a complete picture of when it is or is not morally permissible to 
impose obligations on others. Instead, it only tells us when content-independent obligations 
exist. In this way, legitimacy is sufficient for the imposition of an obligation, but not necessary, 
for the simple reason that obligations may also be imposed for content-dependent reasons.  
 
 
6.2 The Problem of Non-Consensual International Law  
The final argument that I will consider is the problem of non-consensual international law. 
This is essentially an argumentum ad consequentiam (argument to the consequences). An 
argumentum ad consequentiam is an argument that concludes a hypothesis to be either true 
or false based on whether the premise leads to desirable or undesirable consequences. Thus, 
this final argument against the necessity of state consent is one that points to the 
implications, in practice, of believing that state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of 
international law.  
It is simply a matter of fact, argue people like Buchanan and Christiano, that – despite 
state consent being the dominant model of international legal legitimacy – much of what we 
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consider to be international law today is not the product of state consent.33 Here, Buchanan 
and Christiano are thinking primarily of ‘jus cogens’ international law, and customary 
international law; but these are not the only examples that have been put forward. Similarly, 
Henriksen argues that it is a ‘fallacy to assume that states cannot be bound by an obligation 
to which they have not consented’. 34 Thus, if state consent were necessary for the legitimacy 
of international law, then we would be forced to the (potentially) undesirable conclusion that 
much of what we currently think of as international law is actually illegitimate.35 Below, I will 
set-out three sources of international law that are often thought not to be the product of 
state consent: ‘customary international law’; ‘general principles’; and ‘jus cogens’.36 
 
6.2.1 Customary International Law 
The first source of international law that – it is claimed – often creates legitimate law without 
the consent of states is ‘customary international law’ (CIL). Put simply, CIL is law that is borne 
out of, and reflects, the behaviour (or ‘general practice’) of states.37 In theory, CIL, although 
not receiving the explicit consent of states, does receive their tacit consent; as demonstrated 
through the customs (or actions) of states. As Klabbers explains, ‘the standard position is this: 
if a state notices that a new rule of CIL is in the process of being created [through the practice 
of states generally], and it feels unable to accept it, it should make its opposition known. By 
objecting persistently, the state can ensure that it does not become bound’.38 This is the 
‘persistent objector’ doctrine.39 
                                                          
33 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.188; and Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.387. See also: Tomuschat, C. (1993) Obligations Arising for States 
Without or Against Their Will: p.241  
34 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.22 
35 Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.92 
36 This list of non-consensual sources of international law is not exhaustive. Some authors add additional 
sources, and some label and frame the categories differently. For example, Janis proposes the following three 
categories: ‘General Principles of Law’, ‘Natural Law’, and ‘Jus Cogens’ (see: Janis, M.W. (2003) An Introduction 
to International Law). Guzman, on the other hand, includes the categories of: CIL, Jus Cogens, and UNSC 
Resolutions (see: Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’). 
37 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.26-9. (In addition, for a more in-depth discussion relating to the 
issues surrounding ‘general practice’, see: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp.31-4 
38 Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: p.30. See case study of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v Norway) 
[1951], ICJ Rep 116. 
39 Stein, T.L. (1985) ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in 
International Law: p.458 
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We can observe a practical example of this in the case of the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (discussed previously in this chapter). Following the support that this 
Treaty had received from most world states, France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States issued a joint statement making known their opposition to this new international law:  
‘France, the United Kingdom and the United States have not taken part in the 
negotiation of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We do not intend to 
sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal 
obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. For example, we would 
not accept any claim that this treaty reflects or in any way contributes to the 
development of customary international law [emphasis added]’. 40 
 
The reason these three countries felt compelled to issue this statement was because silence 
could’ve been interpreted as tacit consent to developing norms as set out in the Treaty.  
Some, however – including Buchanan and Christiano – argue that CIL is very often not 
based on the consent of states; even their tacit consent. For one thing, notes Buchanan, ‘many 
principles of customary international law were developed before many states currently in the 
world had come into existence.’41 This particularly applies to the proliferation of former post-
colonial states in the post-WWII period. Thus, although new states are bound by the principles 
of CIL, they were in no way involved in their development, and were unable to persistently 
object at the time.42 As Guzman argues, supposed ‘consent’ to CIL ‘turns out to be a necessary 
and unavoidable part of becoming a state. This is consent in the same sense that humans 
consent at birth to breathe in oxygen and breathe out carbon dioxide.’ 43 
This imposition of pre-existing CIL on new states is usually justified, explains 
Kaczorowska-Ireland, on the grounds that ‘new States, by entering in relations without 
reservations with other States, show their acceptance of all international law, including its 
customary rules. Further, to grant them the right to dissent would be highly disruptive to the 
                                                          
40 United States Mission to the United Nations. ‘Joint Press Statement’ [Online, 7 July 2017]. See also: Mills, C. & 
Culpin, L. (2017) ‘A Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons’: p.6  
41 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.188; also: Buchanan, A. (2010) ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Law’: p.92 
42 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.33 
43 Ibid.: p.34 
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conduct of international relations.’44 The first justification – that new states, by entering into 
international relations with other states thereby tacitly consent to the entire corpus of CIL – 
is a weak one. This is because tacit consent to CIL is meant to be demonstrated through the 
‘general practice’ of a state and, given that newly-formed states are by definition ‘new’, it is 
a stretch to suppose that they could’ve already exhibited any sort of ‘general practice’ that 
would signify their consent. The second justification – that allowing new states to dissent 
would be ‘disruptive’ – may be true, but it has no bearing on the question of the legitimacy 
of that international law in relation to state consent. It may also be noticed that the second 
justification undermines the first. On the one hand, it is said that new states have the ability 
to consent/non-consent to CIL, and on the other, that we can’t allow new states to non-
consent because of the disruption it might cause.45 
Another argument is that, because CIL is based on the general practice of states – and 
not their explicit consent – it is not always clear whether or not states have intended their 
actions to be recognised as consent. Article 38 ICJ Statute recognises the significance of 
intentionality when it says that, to count as tacit consent to international law, the general 
practice of states must be accompanied by ‘opinio juris’; a sense of legal obligation.46 In other 
words, states must intend their general practice to contribute to the establishment of legal 
norms. Needless to say, interpreting the intention of states and their representatives can be 
a messy business, and only increases the possibility that states may become bound by CIL 
without having tacitly consented. Simply relying on the persistent objector doctrine to 
determine intention (i.e. a sense of legal obligation) is problematic. This is because, as 
explained by Guzman, ‘a state might fail to object for any number of reasons having nothing 
to do with consent. It may prefer to avoid objecting for political reasons; it may not feel that 
the norm is changing into custom (making objection unnecessary); or it may simply not be 
sufficiently affected by the rule to bother objecting.47 Guzman makes the related but 
additional point that, even when a state’s general practice ‘is’ accompanied opinion juris, 
                                                          
44 Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: p.38. See also: Sinha, S. P. (1965) ‘Perspective of 
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International Law: p.86 
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46 See: Klabbers, J. (2013) International Law: pp.26-9, for a discussion of these two requirements.  
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simply ‘perceiving a legal requirement is not at all the same as consenting to that 
requirement.’48 He says that: ‘for a state, a sense of legal obligation might reflect (among 
other things) an understanding of the norms of the international community, even if the state 
does not and would not consent to such norms’.49   
Finally – and straightforwardly – Christiano points out that, unlike most treaty law, 
‘there appears to be no way unilaterally to exit customary international law.’50 ‘To be sure’, 
continues Christiano, ‘the law can be modified particularly through the making of treaties. 
But this cannot be done unilaterally.’51  To this extent, it is difficult to see how CIL is the 
product of ongoing voluntary (and thus valid) state consent.  
There is little doubt that CIL plays an important part in the production of international 
law. If it did not exist, many disputes (in the absence of a treaty) would not easily be resolvable 
through legal means, and states would be at greater liberty to act capriciously and 
hypocritically without legal restraint. However, the arguments presented above (in addition 
to clear practical examples of this taking place) seem to force one to the same conclusion as 
Michael Akehurst that – at least in some cases – ‘a State can be bound by a rule of customary 
international law even if it has never consented to that rule’.52 It should be stressed that this 
is not the same as saying that CIL is never the product of state consent – in fact, I think it often 
is. Consider the example presented above of France, the UK and the US making their 
opposition to a developing norm explicit. The very fact that they felt the need to do this 
demonstrates that silence on their part – when given every opportunity to object – could 
reasonably be interpreted as tacit consent. What this section has demonstrated, however, is 
that the connection between much CIL and state consent is not obvious – if it exists at all. 
 
6.2.2 General Principles of Law 
The next type of purported ‘non-consensual’ international law is ‘general principles’. Of all 
the traditional sources of international law, general principles arguably have the strongest 
claim not to derive from the consent of states. As explained in chapter one, general principles 
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came to be recognised as a source of international law because treaties and custom were 
occasionally insufficient to provide all the legal answers needed to resolve a dispute. In this 
way, general principles can be viewed as ‘gap fillers’ that only need to be consulted ‘when a 
dispute could not be resolved on the basis of a treaty or customary international law.’53 Given 
that this is the purpose for which they have been recognised, it follows that general principles 
– almost by definition – cannot stem from the consent of states. As noted by Kaczorowska-
Ireland, the recognition of general principles as a source of law ‘can be seen as a rejection of 
the positivist doctrine, according to which international law consists solely of rules to which 
States have given their consent, and as affirming the naturalist doctrine whereby if there 
appeared to be a gap in the rules of international law, recourse could be had to general 
principles of law, i.e. to natural law.’54 
However, it is important to note that general principles of international law can be 
divided into two distinct categories. First, there are general principles that are ‘inherent in 
legal systems and linked to the structure or operation of the system’. 55 These principles are 
necessary insofar as they are integral for the functioning of a particular legal system or legal 
systems in general. Second, there are general principles of law that are simply found 
commonly in all (or most) legal systems, even if they are not integral to the system. My 
contention is that this latter type of general principle could conceivably be interpreted as 
deriving from state consent, whereas the former could not. 
We will start with a consideration of those general principles deriving from the 
inherent nature of legal systems. ‘The basic notion’, explains Janis, ‘is that a general principle 
of international law is some proposition of law so fundamental that it will be found in virtually 
every legal system’.56 Examples of such principles – as noted by Klabbers – may include: the 
notion of good faith; the idea that no one shall be judge in their own cause; the principle that 
people shall not be sentenced twice for the same act; and the principle that there shall be no 
crime without a law.57 The basic point about these general principles is that it is hard to 
imagine any legal system – worthy of the name – that did not apply these principles. A system 
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in which contracts were not made in good faith, or where someone could be punished for a 
crime for which there was no law, sounds more like an anarchical system in which those with 
power determine the rules inconsistently and in their own favour. Because of their inherent 
nature, these general principles have been referred to as ‘structural general principles’. An 
example of such a structural general principle being invoked by an international court was the 
principle of ‘self-determination’ in the case The Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion).58 Again, 
this was because the Court determined that such a principle was fundamental to the 
operation of the international legal system. Because these general principles are ‘inherent or 
necessary to a legal system’, they ‘may be overridden neither by agreement nor by the 
formation of new rules of custom. Such principles must’, concludes O’Connell, ‘be explained 
by using natural law theory, not positivism’. 59 
 The second type of general principle are those that are common to most legal systems. 
As Janis explains, the search for this second type of general principle is primarily ‘an exercise 
in comparative law’.60 In other words, courts, such as the ICJ, will ‘survey judicial decisions 
from other states’ to discover common principles that are applicable to their own case.61  As  
such, I will refer to general principles identified in this way as ‘comparative general principles’. 
An example of the ICJ invoking such a comparative general principle was in the Corfu Channel 
Case62, in which the ICJ ‘recognised the principle of the admissibility of circumstantial 
evidence as being a well-established and generally accepted principle of law’.63 The ICJ 
remarked that ‘this indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognised 
by international decisions’.64 
Unlike structural general principles, one could argue that comparative general 
principles are based on a type of tacit consent. Because states apply these general principles 
in their domestic legal systems, they are demonstrating that they recognise them to be 
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principles of law in general, and would thus consent to their application in all legal 
jurisdictions; not just their own.65 Although this is plausible, it would only be a credible 
argument if the state to whom the general principle was being applied (say, by the ICJ) also 
applied that exact same principle in their own domestic law. In other words, the fact that the 
general principle was common to many other jurisdictions would have no moral force (from 
the view point of consent) to a state that didn’t choose to apply that principle domestically 
themselves. 
The proposition, then, that general principles – either structural or comparative – are 
derived from state consent does not appear to be strong. There is one final argument to the 
contrary, however, offered by Janis, which is that ‘the authority to apply general principles of 
law’ derives ‘from the provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice’ to which 
‘states have explicitly agreed.’ 66 In other words, although states have not consented to each 
specific general principle, they have explicitly consented to give the ICJ the power to identify 
and apply general principles. Janis ends up rejecting this argument himself, however, as there 
are too many examples of other courts drawing upon general principles who haven’t been 
given such explicit authorisation. My own view is that this argument works better in relation 
to comparative general principles than structural. This is because, given their very nature, 
most structural general principles would need to be drawn upon by a court even if they did 
not have the explicit authority to do so. 
The final point to stress as a caveat to all of the above is that general principles have 
very rarely been invoked to modify or reverse existing international law.67 Instead, they only 
tend to be applied by courts when no other applicable law exists (either in the form of custom 
or treaty). As such, in practice, there have been very few difficulties with states accepting 
general principles.68 
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6.2.3 Jus Cogens  
The final type of (arguably) non-consensual international law (that I will discuss) is ‘jus 
cogens’.69 As explained in chapter one, jus cogens norms of international law are 
distinguished by the fact that they are ‘peremptory’ (i.e. they trump all competing or 
contradictory law).70 For many, jus cogens norms are non-consensual by definition. Buchanan, 
for example, defines jus cogens laws as ‘peremptory norms of international law [that] apply 
to all states regardless of their consent to the treaties or conventions or practices that 
contributed to their creation’ [emphasis added].71 Similarly, Alexander Orakhelashvili argues 
that these ‘[p]remptory norms prevail not because the States involved have so decided but 
because they are intrinsically superior and cannot be dispensed with through standard inter-
State transactions’.72  
The existence of jus cogens norms seems (although not without controversy) to 
support a ‘natural law’ approach to international law, rather than the ‘positivist’ approach 
ingrained in the state consent model.73 In other words, this type of international law is 
legitimate, not because of how the law was made, but because the content of the law 
conforms to a sense of natural justice. Such norms are often thought to include the general 
prohibition of: aggressive war; genocide; torture; piracy; slavery; and other crimes against 
humanity.74 
 As O’Connell correctly observes, jus cogens are very often determined through judicial 
decisions.75 However, it is important to stress that, although jus cogens norms are invariably 
‘identified’ in judicial decisions, this is not to say that they are ‘created’ by judicial decisions. 
                                                          
69 For more in-depth discussions on jus cogens see, for example: Orakhelashvili, A. (2006) Peremptory Norms in 
International Law; and Christenson, G.A. (1988) Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International 
Society: p.585 
70 It is worth pointing out (as explained by O’Connell) that, although jus cogens norms are ‘superior to all other 
norms, they are also limited in nature. They form a barrier to government action, but they do not compel 
affirmative action. Jus cogens norms void treaties and other rules. However, to the extent that jus cogens 
norms are similar to rights, they act as negative rights, such as the freedom to be free from torture’ (see: 
O’Connell, M.E. (2012) ‘Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms’: p.80). 
71 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.190 
72 O’Connell, M.E. (2012) ‘Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms’: p.86; Orakhelashvili, A. (2006) 
Peremptory Norms in International Law: p.8 
73 Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.388 
74 Voyiakis, E. (2010) ‘International Treaties’: p.104; see also: Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The Legitimacy of 
International Institutions’: p.387 
75 O’Connell, M.E. (2012) ‘Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms’: p.98 
 
   
175 
 
The actual source of jus cogens norms is a matter of intense debate, not least because – as 
mentioned – it appears to introduce an element of natural law into an otherwise consent-
based international legal system. Needless to say, those positivists who rely exclusively on 
state consent for the making of international law want to demonstrate that – if they do exist 
– jus cogens norms are still the product of state consent.76 They invariably attempt this by 
claiming that jus cogens is just another form of CIL: If one looks at the definition of jus cogens 
in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, one will notice it is similar, but 
crucially different, from the definition given by Buchanan above. Article 53 states that: a jus 
cogens norm is one ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.’77 As Ragazzi notes, 
this definition focuses on external tests of identification of jus cogens rules (i.e. they must be 
‘accepted and recognised’ by the international community), rather than on the substantive 
values protected by the norm.78 In other words, the phrase ‘accepted and recognised’ 
suggests that states do indeed consent to jus cogens – even if only tacitly. In this way, jus 
cogens look something more akin to CIL. The only obvious difference from other CIL – and 
presumably the reason that it is frequently discussed in its own right – is that jus cogens norms 
are ‘peremptory’.79  This simply means that they would trump any other international law if 
and when they conflicted.80  
This understanding of jus cogens as a branch of CIL is supported by the fact that the 
ICJ has previously suggested that ‘in order to identify a rule of jus cogens, procedures similar 
to those relating to the identification of any rule of customary international law should be 
carried out. There must be a widespread practice of States and opinion juris.’ 81 This also helps 
to explain the ICJ’s decision in the case Belgium v Senegal, in which the Court found the that 
‘the prohibition of torture, although a rule of jus cogens, did not impose on Senegal the 
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obligation to prosecute the alleged perpetrator of acts of torture which had occurred before 
the entry into force of the 1984 Convention on the Prohibition of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane Treatment or Punishment for Senegal.’ 82  It should be stressed, however, that – as 
mentioned in the section on CIL above – the fact that jus cogens may be just another example 
of CIL does not necessarily entail that it has obtained the consent of states – tacit or 
otherwise. 
Some, however, strongly disagree with the notion that jus cogens can be reduced to a 
type of CIL. Janis, for example, argues that ‘although jus cogens is sometimes viewed as a form 
of customary international law, it is really of a different character. Customary international 
law is, by its very nature, not an apt instrument for the establishment of non-derogable rules; 
norms with a potency superior even to treaty rules.’ 83 The argument Janis is making here is 
essentially one of logical inference.  He starts by noting that treaty law is normally superior to 
CIL ‘as it derives from explicit consent, and not some uncertain notion of tacit consent derived 
from opinion juris and general practice’84. His second premise is that jus cogens norms – being, 
as they are, peremptory – are superior to treaty in all instances. He thus points out that to 
assume jus cogens is a form of CIL is to assert that ‘some aspect of CIL – i.e. jus cogens – is 
superior to treaty in all instances.’85 ‘It makes better sense’, he concludes, ‘to view jus cogens 
as a modern form of natural law.’86 O’Connell arrives at the same conclusion when she states 
that ‘jus cogens norms are apart from and above the rules and principles derived from the 
primary, positivist sources of international law, including customary international law.’87 She 
adds that they ‘are not developed in the same way as positive-law rules. Jus cogens norms 
may not be changed by treaty, which is not the case for any other treaty rule or customary 
law rule. They are not explained in positive law theory. That leaves natural law theory.’88 
The proposition that jus cogens is better understood as natural law (and thus non-
consensual law) appears to be supported by the judgment of a number of international 
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courts. For example, scholars now generally agree that the organisers of the 1945 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and the drafters of its Charter, ‘relied on natural 
law concepts and jus cogens for the proposition that otherwise valid national law could not 
be raised as a defence at the tribunal if the national law conflicted with higher norms of 
international law.’89 Another example would be the Aloeboetoe Case.90 ‘In this case’, explains 
Kaczorowska-Ireland, ‘the Court held that a treaty concluded between the Netherlands and 
the Saramaka tribe in September 1762 (under which the Saramakas were to sell the Dutch 
any captured slaves and other prisoners, as slaves)… could not be invoked before any 
international human rights court as they conflict with jus cogens rules… Accordingly, the 
IACtHR disregarded the 1762 Treaty.’91 Notwithstanding the moral shortcomings of the 1762 
Treaty, this case provides a clear example of jus cogens overriding the explicit consent of 
states. As per the point made by Janis above, it would thus be extremely difficult to claim that 
the jus cogens norm applied in this case was somehow still the product of state consent.92 
It is worth pointing out that, among those who agree that jus cogens norms derive 
from natural law, some have different reasons for believing this to be the case than others. 
On the one hand, you have those who believe it is because jus cogens are necessary 
foundational rules of the international legal system. In this way, jus cogens norms are 
substantially the same as ‘structural general principles’.93 On the other hand, you have those 
who believe it is because jus cogens norms are fundamental ethical principles. Whilst this 
difference of position doesn’t change the fact that all those who subscribe to a natural law 
theory of jus cogens believe it to be fundamentally non-consensual, it is important it terms of 
identifying which norms count as jus cogens, and which do not. 
Those who believe jus cogens norms to be essentially equivalent to ‘structural general 
principles’ believe that such norms are necessary to maintain ‘international ordre public’. 94 
Read in this way, explains Kaczorowska-Ireland, the introduction of jus cogens into 
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international law ‘was inspired by analogy to some national laws which firmly established the 
hierarchy of legal rules.’95 She goes on to note that ‘the transposition of this idea into 
international law entails that some rules of international law are fundamental, or of a higher 
order, as being rules of international public order.’96 Thus, as with structural general 
principles, jus cogens are those ‘constitutional’ rules that constitute ‘a basis for the 
community’s legal system.’97 They are therefore non-consensual in the sense that the system 
could not operate properly without them. Although we looked at some example of these rules 
in the section on general principles above, other examples might include ‘Articles 1 and 2 of 
the United Nations Charter, which guarantee the sovereignty of states’98 or the principle of 
pacta sunt servanta (that contracts between states are binding).99 
There are some, however, who believe that jus cogens have a unique feature that 
places them in a category distinct from that of structural general principles. As O’Connell 
explains, although structural general principles [like jus cogens] derive from natural law and 
cannot be overridden, they lack the ‘quality of moral superiority that is true of jus cogens 
norms’.100 In other words, jus cogens are not merely those norms that underpin the 
functioning of the international legal system, they are more ‘substantive’ ethical norms by 
which actors within the system must abide. The norm forbidding the use of torture is a good 
example of a jus cogens norm as an ethical imperative rather than a structural general 
principle. This is because the practice of torture – although perhaps morally deviant or the 
cause of an injustice – possesses no real threat to the ongoing ability of the international legal 
system to operate successfully. 
 O’Connell’s advocacy for this ethical-based approach to jus cogens seems to derive 
more from an observation of ‘how’ jus cogens has developed in practice rather than on any 
normative argument that this ‘ought’ to be the case. She notes, for example, that ‘in judicial 
decisions since World War II, examples of jus cogens involve ethical or moral norms almost 
exclusively.’ 101 She also observes that ‘little, if anything, is said about how these scholars and 
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judges know that a norm is a peremptory norm… Currently, it appears that judges and scholars 
simply consult their own consciences when identifying jus cogens norms.’ 102 The same point 
was made in a 1966 discussion organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
in which it was said that ‘jus cogens [is] not formulated in precise rules… it [is therefore] left 
to the judge to extract jus cogens limitations from the legal system as a whole by transforming 
primordial social values directly into legal imperatives.’ 103 For these reasons, O’Connell 
concludes that ‘the more persuasive view is to include only ethical or moral norms among jus 
cogens norms.‘104 
Before we move on, I should note that it is not for me to come down on any particular 
side of this debate – both arguments have some merit. The reason for highlighting this 
distinction between jus cogens as ‘structural general principles’ or as ‘ethical norms’ is simply 
to improve the clarity and nuance of the discussion that follows. 
 
In summary of the above, then, there is a strong case to be made that some international law 
is only loosely derived from the consent of states – if at all. This is particularly the case, I would 
argue, for ‘structural general principles’ and jus cogens norms – in both its forms. To a lesser 
extent, instances of customary international law could also be included in the category of 
non-consensual international law; particularly when imposed on newly-formed states. As 
Janis notes, ‘whatever the theoretical stumbling blocks’, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, 
in practice, ‘non-consensual sources play an important role in international law.’ 105 
However, the impression should not be formed that ‘most’ international law is non-
consensual. In fact, the vast majority of international laws derive from treaties which are – 
with only very few arguable exceptions – clearly derived from explicit state consent. Indeed, 
Lord McNair – in his day the world’s leading authority on the law of treaties – once described 
treaties as ‘the only, and sadly overworked workhorses of the international legal order.’106 
There are also many instances of CIL for which it would be extremely tenuous to argue that 
states had not given their tacit consent. This is perhaps why it is a rarity for states to challenge 
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the application of CIL by international courts. I therefore also agree with Guzman that the 
non-consensual sources of international law discussed above ‘are best viewed as exceptions 
to the general requirement of consent’.107 He goes on to argue that ‘even when taken as a 
group… they represent no more than a small dent in the consent requirement. Each of the 
non-consensual approaches is heavily constrained in its ability to influence state behavior, 
and fall far short of a direct assault on the consensus requirement’.108 
 
6.2.4 Resolving the argumentum ad consequentiam 
It should, at this point, be remembered that an argumentum ad consequentiam is not an 
argument against the position that state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of 
international law per se; it only forces us to contend with the consequences of thinking that 
it is. In this case, it seemingly forces us to choose between two options: 1.) to bite the bullet 
and say that, contrary to what we thought, some international law is actually illegitimate 
because it lacks the consent of states, or 2.) concede that state consent is not actually 
necessary for the legitimacy of international law. 
As I will argue below, however, there is a third option; one that says both statements 
may be partially true. In other words, some international law may indeed be illegitimate as it 
lacks sufficient state consent, however, other types of international law do not depend on 
state consent for their legitimacy. Our conclusion would therefore be that state consent is 
(potentially) necessary for the legitimacy of some types of international law; but not all.  
To explain how I arrive at this seemingly contradictory conclusion, it is important to 
make a distinction between those international laws that are integral to the structure of the 
state-based international legal system as we know it, and those variable laws that exist 
‘within’ the system and can be altered without upsetting the overarching ‘rules of the game’.  
This distinction broadly mirrors that which was first highlighted in chapter one, i.e., 
the difference between the international law of ‘co-existence’, and that of ‘cooperation’. As 
the name suggests, international laws of coexistence are simply those rules that enable states 
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to coexist and interrelate peacefully and orderly with one another.109 As was stated 
previously, those international laws relating to coexistence often include: ‘issues related to 
the delimitation of – and title to – territory, the criteria for statehood and the recognition of 
new states and governments, jurisdiction and immunity, the use of force, the conduct of 
armed hostilities and neutrality in times of armed conflict. Also included are the international 
principles of treaty law and the secondary legal principles on state responsibility.’ 110 These 
laws are very similar to – if not the same as – those required for the maintenance of 
international public order (as mentioned above).  
 On the other hand, the international law of cooperation are those rules governing 
cooperative activity between states that go beyond mere coexistence. States are naturally 
interdependent in many ways, and international law can help facilitate the cooperation that 
this interdependence sometimes demands.111 Cooperation exists when two or more states 
agree to turn an issue – that would otherwise have been dealt with by national law – into one 
of an international character.112 Examples and areas in which states cooperate include: 
international human rights law, the majority of international environmental law and 
international economic law, eradicating disease by means of common rules as to vaccination, 
and in combating international terrorism.113  
In is my contention, therefore, that consent is arguably only necessary for those 
international laws relating to ‘cooperation’, but not those relating to ‘coexistence’. In other 
words, states are ‘inherently bound by the international law of coexistence’, but in all matters 
pertaining only to cooperation, their consent may be necessary.114 
This conclusion, however, does not diminish the theory of state consent in the way 
that it may first appear. In fact, it is the only way in which a system of state consent could 
operate. In other words, a system of state consent – in which sovereign states are not bound 
by international legal obligations to which they have not consented – can only function 
properly if a number of ‘constitutional’ rules are place. These constitutional rules specify the 
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International Law: pp.10-11 
114 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.11 
 
   
182 
 
rules of the ‘state-consent game’, and therefore cannot themselves be the product of state 
consent.  
It should also be noticed that it is in ‘structural general principles’ and jus cogens that 
we often find these constitutional-type rules. This, then, would explain why these types of 
law are not often the product of state consent. Christiano arrives at a similar conclusion when 
he argues that jus cogens and general principles should be thought of as forming a type of 
unwritten constitution that facilitates voluntary association amongst states based on the 
model of state consent.115 In his own words: ‘from a moral standpoint, we can think of the 
state-consent account of legitimacy as a morally bounded system of voluntary association 
among peoples. The boundaries of that system reflect the commitment to the fundamental 
interests of persons that no system of voluntary association may violate.’116 
It will be useful here to look at a couple of these so-called unwritten constitutional 
principles. One example would be the general principle of ‘good faith’. Broadly, the principle 
of good faith stipulates that contracting parties should treat each other honestly and fairly. In 
addition, those acting in good faith will be concerned with achieving mutual advantage in the 
creation of a legal agreement, and not attempt to enter a legal agreement for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the other party. The ICJ has previously referred to good faith as ‘one of the 
basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their 
source.’117 Good faith can be considered a principle of constitutional significance because, in 
the words of Ziegler and Baumgartner, ‘without good faith, social relations would be doomed 
to fail.’118 Indeed, they go on to say that good faith has a ‘primordial social ordering function’ 
which is crucial ‘for a peaceful coexistence of individuals and nations’.119 In other words, 
without good faith, it would almost impossible for states to enter into legal relations with one 
another, and therefore also to consent to those relations. It is for this reason that the principle 
of good faith would not require state consent to be legally binding upon states.  
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117 See: Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253: para.46 
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Another interesting general principle that, by definition, cannot derive (in the first 
instance) from state consent, is that of pacta sunt servanda (that pacts must be performed).120 
This is simply the principle that, when consenting to an agreement, states are bound by their 
own consent. This principle, of course, cannot be the product of state consent as its 
application must be assumed for consent to be binding in the first place.  
Thus, for a voluntary association of states to function properly – where state consent 
is the method by which states incur international legal obligations – there must exist some 
‘background’ or ‘framework’ rules that establish how that voluntary association is to function. 
These background rules cannot themselves be the product of state consent. If a state chooses 
to reject these background rules, they would effectively be rejecting the system of voluntary 
association altogether. But then, by what standard would they defend their own sovereignty 
and consequent right to consent? As such, this recognition of sovereignty must be reciprocal. 
As Henriksen explains, ‘the mere fact that international society is composed of a multitude of 
sovereign states with different interests’ necessitates a minimum set of rules that allow that 
system to exist at all.121 
 For a state-consent theorist to cling to the idea that state consent is necessary to 
legitimate all international law (including laws of coexistence) would be self-defeating. Any 
state consent theorist would need to ask themselves what is the primary object of their 
concern: the mere fact of state consent, or the underlying values (i.e. autonomy and equality) 
that state consent is meant to protect? The answer, of course, must be the latter. Thus, if 
certain principles and laws are necessary to ensure the protection of those values, then it is, 
at best, superfluous to argue that state consent is necessary to bring those principles and laws 
into existence. Indeed, in such a scenario, refusing to ‘consent’ (or rather, refusing to 
acknowledge that they are bound by those particular laws) could undermine the autonomy 
and equality of states.  
 However, the analysis in the above sections also demonstrated that their exist some 
types of (arguably) non-consensual international law that don’t seem to be necessary for the 
maintenance of the state-based system of voluntary association. These would include some 
                                                          
120 See, for example: O’Connell, M.E. (2012) ‘Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical Norms’: p.83; and 
Janis, M.W. (2003) An Introduction to International Law: p.65 
121 Henriksen, A. (2017) International Law: p.10 
 
   
184 
 
types of CIL, jus cogens norms that are purely ethical, and those ‘comparative general 
principles’ that cannot properly be traced back to implicit state consent. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, it is difficult to see how the ethical jus cogens norm that prohibits torture 
is integral to the continued existence of an ordered international legal system based on state 
consent. Under the state-consent theory of legitimacy, therefore, laws like this would be 
illegitimate as they are neither (in all instances) derived from state consent nor necessary for 
the operation of the system of state consent. This is not to say, however, that (using our 
previous example) preventing torture is not morally justifiable for content-‘dependent’ 
reasons; only that, minus consent, a law prohibiting torture is not legitimate. It is also not to 
say that an international law ‘mandating’ torture is legitimate even if it received state 
consent. This is because, as I have argued in other chapters, mere state consent is also not 
sufficient for the legitimacy of international law, and that the procedural features for valid 
state consent are unlikely to be met by a law mandating torture. The same argument could 
apply to a non-consensual norm prohibiting slavery, for example.  
Of course, with some laws, not only is it difficult to judge whether they have received 
state consent, it is also hard to ascertain whether they are of ‘constitutional’ significance, and 
whether or not they are in need of state consent. Take, for example, the general principle 
that there should be no crime without a law. On the one hand – as mentioned earlier – it is 
hard to imagine a legal system operating without this principle as it would likely descend into 
a state of anarchy in which the powerful ruled at their own discretion. However, if we look at 
the Nuremburg trials, it was judged that there could indeed be a crime – namely genocide – 
without (at that point) a law. Thus, breaking this general principle could (and to an extent in 
this case was) justified on the grounds that, for the sake of continued international public 
order, a crime needed to be assumed without a law.  
It is not for me, however – at least in this thesis – to argue which specific international 
laws fall into which category (and consequently which international laws require state 
consent). What is important for our purposes is simply to appreciate that these categories 
exist. 
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6.2.5 Summary 
Although not an argument against the necessity of state consent per se, the problem of non-
consensual international law has demonstrated that, if we follow the logic of the position that 
state is necessary for the legitimacy of international law through to its fullest implications, 
then we are left with the unwelcome conclusion many international laws we had assumed to 
be legitimate (e.g. types of customary international law, jus cogens, and general principles) 
are, in fact, illegitimate. This problem therefore forces us to make a decision: between 
accepting this uncomfortable conclusion, or giving up our original argument that state 
consent is necessary for the legitimacy of international law. 
 What I have argued toward the end of this section, however, is that the conclusion 
that state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy of international law is only half correct. 
This is because ‘international law’ is not one homogenous entity. As such, state consent is 
necessary for the legitimacy of ‘some’ types of international law, but not for others. In 
particular, I have argued that state consent is not necessary for those international laws 
necessary to maintain the functioning of the state-based international legal system (i.e., laws 
of coexistence), but is necessary for all other international laws that are created and exist 
within that system (i.e., laws of cooperation). To argue that state consent is also necessary 
for the former set of rules would be self-defeating as a system in which state consent was 
necessary could not exist without them.   
 In sum, the problem of non-consensual international law does not, in itself, show that 
state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy of international laws of cooperation, but does 
help to demonstrate how state consent is not necessary for the ‘constitutional-type’ laws of 
coexistence. It should be re-emphasised at this point, however, that concluding state consent 
to be necessary for the legitimacy of most international law – especially the laws relating to 
‘cooperation’ – is not to say that it is sufficient. Indeed, for the reasons set out in previous 
chapters – particularly the section on ‘authorisation’ in chapter five – I do not believe that it 
is. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The post-WWII era of globalisation has seen a proliferation of international laws and 
institutions that have – to greater or lesser extents – displaced many traditional domestic laws 
and institutions. This shift and transfer of authority has raised a number of normative 
questions – particularly regarding the issue of from where these new international authorities 
derive their legitimacy. This question is not merely abstract. Populations around the world, 
particularly in Europe and North America, increasingly feel as though their lives are being 
influenced by rules and authorities outside of their direct and domestic control. This began, 
most overtly, with criticism of the preeminent international financial institutions (such as the 
IMF, WTO, and World Bank) in the 1990s and early 2000s, and has, most recently, culminated 
in the decision of the United Kingdom – as determined in the June 2016 referendum – to sever 
its 44-year membership of the European Union. The theoretical problem of international 
political legitimacy, therefore, is beginning to spill-over into practice.  
The need to confront this issue within the academic sphere, therefore, is growing, 
especially as it has hitherto ‘not received the attention that it deserves within mainstream 
[academic] debates.’1 Although limited in its scope, this thesis has sought to contribute to this 
much needed debate. My contribution, however, has not attempted to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the question of international legal legitimacy (i.e. I have not 
attempted to formulate novel or comprehensive criteria for the legitimacy of international 
law). Instead, I have taken the more conservative – but equally important – approach of 
assessing the current situation. By that, I mean I have taken the current dominant theory of 
international legal legitimacy (i.e. the theory of state consent) and subjected it to an 
‘intellectual stress-test’. Specifically, I have analysed what I consider to be the six most-
challenging objections to the proposition that state consent can legitimate international law. 
These were:  
1. The Problem of Non-voluntary State Consent 
2. The Problem of Uninformed State Consent 
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3. The Problem of Authorisation  
4. The Problem of Immoral State Consent      
5. The Problem of Immoral State Non-Consent     
6. The Problem of Non-Consensual International Law  
 
By focusing solely on the theory of state consent, I have tried to achieve a level of nuance that 
has sometimes been lacking in writings on the same topic. My approach was never either to 
simply accept or reject the theory of state consent, but to separate those elements that are 
morally attractive from those that are more problematic. This dissection of the theory has a 
secondary benefit in that it allows others – even if they disagree with my conclusions – to 
better navigate this terrain, and better formulate their own arguments. 
What I have shown is that, when asking (in general) the extent to which state consent 
provides for the legitimacy of international law, one is confronted with four logically possible 
answers: 
1. State consent is both necessary and sufficient. Those advocating this position 
would be arguing that a.) without state consent international law cannot be 
legitimate, and b.) nothing more than state consent is required for the legitimacy 
of international law; 
2. State consent is sufficient, but not necessary. Those advocating this position 
would be arguing that a.) nothing more than state consent is required for the 
legitimacy of international law, but b.) other sufficient conditions for the 
legitimacy of international law also exist; 
3. State consent is necessary, but not sufficient. Those advocating this position 
would be arguing that a.) without state consent international law cannot be 
legitimate, but b.) other necessary conditions must also be satisfied before 
international law can be legitimate; and, 
4. State consent is neither necessary nor sufficient. Those advocating this position 
would be arguing that a.) international law can be legitimate without state 
consent, and b.) state consent would not provide for the legitimacy of 
international law even when it existed.  
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A central conclusion of this thesis has been that this question cannot be answered 
straightforwardly. This is because the question assumes that ‘international law’ is a singular 
or uniform institution (in the way that domestic law might be). As I demonstrated in both 
chapters one and six, however, this is not true. A useful – if perhaps over-simplistic – way to 
conceive of international law is to separate it into two categories: first, those ‘structural’ laws 
that are necessary for a system of voluntary association between sovereign states. I have 
referred to these as the international laws of ‘coexistence’. The second category are those 
‘cooperative’ laws that have replaced pre-existing domestic laws.  
As such, it is ambiguous to ask the singular question of whether state consent is 
necessary and/or sufficient to legitimate ‘international law’. Instead, we need to ask two 
questions:  
1. Is state consent necessary and/or sufficient to legitimate the international law of 
coexistence? 
2. Is state consent necessary and/or sufficient to legitimate the international law of 
cooperation? 
 
My answer to the first question is that state consent is neither necessary nor sufficient. My 
answer to the second is that it is probably necessary, but not sufficient. Below I briefly 
recapitulate how I reached these conclusions.  
 
Conclusion 1: state consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for the legitimacy of the 
international law of coexistence 
State consent theory is unnecessary and insufficient for the legitimacy of the international 
law of coexistence for a very simply reason: it is a theory that presupposes a number of pre-
existing imperatives for its operation. For example, it presupposes (among other things): the 
concept of the sovereign state; the concept of the state as an ‘artificial person’ capable of 
entering legal relationships; a normative framework that indicates what type of action 
necessitates the giving of consent; the concept of a legal system with basic attributes allowing 
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for impartial application and adjudication; and the normative significance of the act of state 
consent itself.  
These presuppositions necessitate the existence of various ‘structural’ international 
laws of coexistence that find their legitimacy, not by being the ‘product’ of state consent, but 
by being a pre-condition for it. These laws might include (among many others): the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda; the principle of ‘good faith’; those laws relating to non-aggression; 
laws demarcating state boundaries and jurisdiction; the principles of ‘equity’; laws relating to 
the negotiation and application of treaties; the principle that there cannot be a crime without 
a law, or a punishment without a ‘crime’; and the legal principles of state responsibility.  
I have called these laws the international laws of ‘coexistence’. This is because they 
are necessary for the sustainable coexistence of sovereign states whose interrelations are 
based on voluntary association. If any of these international laws were ignored, then the 
process of legal legitimation through state consent would lose – to greater or lesser extents 
– its normative significance. These laws should be thought of as ‘framework’ or 
‘constitutional’ laws of the current international legal system. They provide the context in 
which sovereign states can develop international laws relating to cooperation (discussed 
below). 
These ‘constitutional’ laws usually find their source in non-consensual (or, at least, not 
explicitly consensual) sources of international law such as customary international law, 
general principles, and jus cogens. Given that the theory of state consent presupposes the 
existence of these constitutional rules, it is unsurprising that they have developed from those 
sources of international law not directly underpinned by state consent. Even when these 
constitutional-type laws can be located in treaty law (and therefore based on explicit state 
consent) we usually find that the relevant treaty is an attempt merely to codify pre-exiting 
customary law or general principles. A good example of this is the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969 (or, at least, many of the provisions within it).  
Of course – as I pointed out in chapter six – it is not always clear which international 
laws should be considered as having ‘constitutional significance’.  Besides offering a broad 
definition of these rules (as ‘those rules necessary for the sustainable operation of an 
international legal system based on a voluntary association model of state consent’) this 
thesis has not attempted to formulate any comprehensive list. Of course, theorists will likely 
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disagree as to the contents of this list – but that is a debate for others to have at another time. 
What is important for the purposes of this thesis is simply an appreciation that such 
international laws must necessarily exist. 
A final important caveat is that many of these constitutional-type rules are only 
necessarily legitimate in the context of an international legal system based on state consent. 
Thus, if one wholesale rejects the theory of state consent, then some of these constitutional 
rules will no longer be ‘constitutional’; and therefore also no longer be necessarily legitimate. 
For example, international laws prohibiting violations of state sovereignty will clearly not be 
necessary if one envisages an international (or ‘global’) legal system that is not characterised 
by the voluntary association of sovereign states. Some theories of global democracy, for 
example, would not need to presuppose constitutional rules preserving state sovereignty (as 
states wouldn’t exist).2 
In sum, to argue that state consent is necessary for the legitimacy of international laws 
of coexistence would be self-defeating as a system in which state consent was necessary could 
not exist without them. I turn now to summarise how and why I arrived at the conclusion that 
state consent is not sufficient – although is perhaps necessary – for the legitimacy of 
international laws of ‘cooperation’. 
 
Conclusion 2: state consent is not sufficient, but is perhaps necessary, for the legitimacy of 
the international law of cooperation 
International laws of cooperation are those that go beyond mere peaceful coexistence. 
Cooperation exists when two or more states agree to turn an issue – that would otherwise 
have been dealt with by national law – into one of an international character.3 Examples and 
areas in which states cooperate include: international human rights law, the majority of 
international environmental law and international economic law, and in eradicating disease 
by means of common rules as to vaccination.4 EU law is a particularly good example of a legal 
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regime solidly situated in the international law of cooperation.5 Under EU Treaties, ‘member 
States have transferred important powers to EU institutions. In some areas, e.g. the Common 
Commercial Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU has exclusive powers, i.e. the 
EU alone is entitled to act at both the internal and international level with regard to these 
areas.  
It is this category of ‘cooperative law’ that has proliferated so starkly in the post-WII 
era of globalisation. It is also this type of international law that has raised the strongest 
normative concerns, and contributed most directly to the crisis of international legal 
legitimacy that we see today. It is not difficult to see why this is the case. International laws 
of cooperation – unlike those relating to coexistence – are not necessary for the functioning 
of the international legal system as a whole. Instead, they supplement and/or replace 
domestic laws. As Henriksen notes, these laws of cooperation that proliferated after WWII 
were ‘involved in the promotion of a variety of ‘societal’ goals’.6 It was the first time that 
international law really ‘began to be concerned with the manner in which sovereign authority 
was exercised within individual states’.7 By doing this, these new international laws upset and 
deviated from theories of domestic legal legitimacy that had already established themselves. 
From the perspective of an ordinary citizen, new laws were (and are) being introduced that 
hadn’t followed the domestic processes of legitimation that they had come to recognise. 
These new laws were often seen as being imposed by a foreign power, or (given that the 
executive branch typically has competence over foreign policy and international agreements), 
pushed through by their own governments at the expense of legislative approval or scrutiny. 
Given their centrality in igniting the debate about international legal legitimacy, it is 
these international laws of cooperation that have been the implicit focus of this thesis. My 
conclusion in relation to this category of international law is that state consent is insufficient 
for its legitimacy, but arguably necessary – for reasons I will now briefly delineate.  
Of all the arguments considered in this thesis, it was the ‘problem of authorisation’ 
(section 5.1) that most convincingly argued against the sufficiency of state consent as a means 
of international legal legitimation. The problem of authorisation highlights a fundamental 
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flaw with state consent theory: it assumes that states, as with individuals in the domestic 
sphere, have the intrinsic right to give consent. In other words, it assumes that states are 
moral agents in their own right with autonomy and formal equality worth protecting for its 
own sake. This view, however, is misplaced. Instead, states should only be seen as morally 
relevant to the extent that they are instrumental in protecting the autonomy of our actual 
units of moral concern: individuals.  
When this realisation is taken in conjunction with the fact that international law often 
imposes obligations and restrictions on individuals (as well as states), we are led to the 
conclusion that, for state consent to have any normative significance, it needs to be 
sufficiently authorised by the individuals within the consenting state. How this authorisation 
takes place is an open question. I personally argued that it could occur through an internal 
process of deliberative democracy. Whatever the mechanism, however, we can’t escape the 
moral imperative that such authorisation is necessary.  
In its standard form, the theory of state consent does not demand that state consent 
be authorised. As such, the standard theory is insufficient to legitimate international law. To 
be plausibly sufficient, we could amend the traditional theory with the proviso that 
consenting states ought to be sufficiently democratic. In other words, a ‘theory of democratic 
state consent’ stands a better chance of being sufficient for the legitimacy of international 
law. This, however, would be to posit an additional necessary condition for the legitimacy of 
international law.  
Three further arguments against the sufficiency of state consent were also considered 
in this thesis – namely, the problems of ‘non-voluntary’ and ‘uninformed’ state consent 
(section 4.1 & 4.2 respectively) and the problem of immoral state consent (section 5.2). I 
found these latter arguments, however, to be less convincing than the problem of 
authorisation. To begin, the problems of non-voluntary and uninformed consent were less 
arguments against the sufficiency of state consent in theory, and more about the consent of 
states in practice. In other words, they implicitly argued that if valid state consent were given, 
then ceteris paribus it would be sufficient for the legitimacy of international law. The main 
problem these arguments pointed to was simply that – very often in international legal 
practice – valid consent is not given (even if putative consent is). Thus, the objection was 
against the practice and not the theory.  
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Nevertheless, these arguments could still carry weight if followed by the claim that 
the international legal system is ill-suited to the conditions required for the giving of valid 
consent. For example, the international system is characterised by stark bargaining 
asymmetries and power imbalances that render many instances of state consent either non-
voluntary or uninformed (or both).  For reasons delineated in chapter four, however, I 
disagreed with those who extended this line of thinking. My disagreement did not stem from 
a belief that other theorists had inaccurately characterised the international system, but 
simply from the fact they placed a greater moral importance on many of the descriptive facts 
than I did. 
I also found the problem of immoral state consent (section 5.2) to be unconvincing. 
This was the argument that state consent should not be considered sufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law as there exists another necessary condition, namely: that 
legitimate international law must not be unjust or immoral in its substance. As the theory of 
state consent is ‘indifferent’ to the content of international law, it cannot – went the 
argument – be sufficient on its own.  
When discussing this problem, I noted that the issue of immoral state consent can 
actually be interpreted in two different ways. First, state consent can be immoral because – 
in some instances – it may create international law that is harmful to third parties (i.e. states 
not directly involved in the consent transaction). I showed, however, that this was an 
argument directed, not towards the theory of state consent, but its application in practice. 
This is because the consent of those states sufficiently harmed by the newly-created 
international law should also be obtained. If it were obtained, then the law would be 
legitimate, irrespective of its content. As such, it is not an argument against the insufficiency 
of state consent. Instead, it implicitly argues that state consent ‘could’ be sufficient if properly 
applied; the issue is simply its misapplication.  
The second interpretation of the immoral state consent argument is that international 
law can be immoral even when the theory of state consent has been applied correctly. In 
other words, state consent can be immoral because – in some instances – it may create 
international law that is harmful to the consenting states themselves. This latter argument ‘is’ 
an argument against the sufficiency of state consent to legitimate international law because 
it posits that states should not be able to consent to ‘self-harm’ – something the theory of 
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state consent does not prohibit. In response, I argued that, when one looks closely at the 
reasons why states ought not to consent to ‘self-harm’, the defect tends to lie in that consent 
being ‘invalid’ rather than ‘immoral’. In other words, there is something wrong with the 
procedure of that consent rather than the content of the international law per se. I also 
argued that we should be careful not to confuse standards of legitimacy with standards of 
justice. We should not conclude that international law is illegitimate just because it doesn’t 
conform to a conception of justice. We should be more lenient with our evaluations of what 
constitutes legitimate law, especially as we are unlikely to achieve international justice in an 
environment in which obedience to international law is infrequent. 
 In summary, then – and notwithstanding my rejection of the problems of ‘non-
voluntary’, ‘uninformed’ and ‘immoral’ state consent – I concluded that state consent is 
insufficient for the legitimacy of international law owing to the problem of ‘authorisation’. As 
stated, however, I did not dismiss the possibility that state consent may be ‘necessary’ for the 
legitimacy of international law. This was, primarily, because I did not find compelling the 
arguments against the necessity of state consent discussed in this thesis. 
 The first such argument was the problem of ‘immoral state non-consent’ (section 6.1). 
This was the argument that state consent is unnecessary because some international laws are 
morally mandatory. As such, they would be legitimate irrespective of whether consent had 
been given. My disagreement with this argument was largely a conceptual one, i.e., although 
I completely agreed that some laws are morally mandatory, this does not make them 
legitimate per se. This is only because the ‘mandatoriness’ of the law does not derive from 
the legitimacy of the legal institution, but from the fact that the content of the international 
law happens to align with a natural moral obligation. This may appear to be a trivial semantic 
difference, especially as – in some instances – I agree that international law should be obeyed, 
even if illegitimate. However, this apparent triviality is important in preserving the concept of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy does not just generate moral obligations; it generates moral 
obligations for a particular reason, i.e., that the procedure through which that obligation was 
generated is morally compelling. As such, legitimacy is a quality of institutions; not laws 
themselves. This is important because the function of legitimacy – as explained in chapter two 
– is to create moral obligations even when one disagrees with the content of that obligation. 
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Read in this way, although state consent is not necessary for incurring international moral 
obligations, it is – arguably – necessary for the legitimacy of international laws. 
The second argument against the necessity of state consent was the ‘problem of non-
consensual international law’ (section 6.2). This argument argued against the necessity of 
state consent by pointing to the hard-to-accept consequences of believing that it ‘was’ 
necessary. Specifically, the necessity of state consent would entail that many of the 
international laws we had assumed to be legitimate (e.g. types of customary international 
law, jus cogens, and general principles) are, in fact, illegitimate. This is because – in many 
instances – they are quite clearly non-consensual (hence the ‘problem of non-consensual 
international law’). This problem thus tried to force us into making a decision: between 
accepting this uncomfortable conclusion, or giving up our original argument that state 
consent is necessary for the legitimacy of international law. 
 My response was to argue that we can actually have our cake and eat it too. In other 
words, we can accept both that some international laws are non-consensual but nevertheless 
legitimate, and also that state consent is still necessary for the legitimacy of (some types of) 
international law. This is achieved by returning to our distinction between the international 
law of ‘coexistence’ and ‘cooperation’; the former is non-consensual but legitimate (as it is 
pre-requisite to a theory of state consent), but the latter (arguably) necessitates state consent 
for its legitimacy. 
 Having said all this, keen logicians will note that rejecting arguments against the 
necessity of state consent is not quite the same as a positive affirmation that state consent is 
necessary for the legitimacy of international law. This is true, and is the reason I have been 
careful to caveat that state consent is ‘perhaps’ or ‘arguably’ necessary; rather than simply 
asserting that it is. However, I also believe that ‘positive’ arguments for the necessity of state 
consent do exist. For example, organising the international legal system based on the 
principle that state consent is unnecessary for the legitimacy of international law seems to 
leave weaker states defenceless in the face of the imposition of harms and obligations by 
stronger states. In this way, state consent can be viewed as a necessary tool to prevent against 
‘predation’ in the international realm.8  
                                                          
8 Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.192 
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Additionally, state consent theory – despite our heavy focus on its shortcomings – has 
many morally attractive features that would arguably be lost if we were to consider it 
unnecessary. To start, consent theory (in general) has a strong intuitive normative appeal. 
This is because it has the ability to directly ‘reconcile a conception of agents as morally free 
and equal with their submission to authority. If an agent chooses to place himself under a 
duty to another then those duties are the product of the agent’s control over his life, not 
requirements imposed upon him or a facet of his subjugation to the will of another agent.’9 
As Edmundson eloquently puts it, ‘accepting political obligation out of fear of anarchy, or dire 
necessity, for merely strategic reasons – even as mandates of fairness – seems less inspiring 
than the idea that our political bonds are self-made and self-imposed, that they are 
expressions of noble rather than servile traits of personality. To consent is to exercise a 
personal authority that ennobles even as it limits.’10 Consent also makes it more likely that 
the well-being of the consenter will be maximised as ‘the costs are borne only by those willing 
to pay them and are therefore presumably worth it to those individuals.’11 Of course, we are 
dealing here with states rather than individuals. However, to the extent that state consent is 
authorised by individuals, the same logic would apply. 
Consent – in general – also makes for a relatively uncontroversial form of legitimation; 
both in terms of why – from a moral point of view – one accrues an obligation, and also in 
terms of the content of the obligation. As Edmundson explains, ‘the everyday experiences of 
asking and doing favours, coordinating plans, asking and keeping promises, and forming and 
performing contracts make vivid to us what it is to submit ourselves to legitimate expectations 
– moral requirements – that we would otherwise be free of.’ 12 Simmons agrees, stating that, 
‘voluntary undertakings such as promises and contracts are more readily acknowledged as 
grounding clear obligations than virtually anything else.’13 The content of one’s obligations 
are also usually less controversial if legitimated through consent. This is so because – at least 
in most cases of express consent – one agrees to specific terms rather than, as it may be with 
democratic legitimation, some general and unspecific sense of obligation to obey authority. 
                                                          
9 Lefkowitz, D. (2016) ‘The Legitimacy of International Law’: p.107; see also: Christiano, T. (2012) ‘The 
Legitimacy of International Institutions’: p.383 
10 Edmundson, W.A. (2011) ‘Consent and Its Cousins’: p.338 
11 Dworkin, G. (1988) The Theory and Practice of Autonomy: p.90 
12 Edmundson, W.A. (2011) ‘Consent and Its Cousins’: p.337 
13 Simmons, A. J. (2010) ‘Political Obligation and Consent’: p.306 
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This is even more apparent when state consent is given to international treaties. An additional 
beneficial corollary of this relative uncontroversiality is that moral responsibility 
concomitantly becomes easier to identify. In the eventuality of a dispute as to the nature of 
one’s rights or obligations, the original consented-to text or treaty can be referred to in order 
to resolve the disagreement.  
A final advantage of state consent – that I will mention – is that it (explicitly) recognises 
states as the most significant actors in the international sphere. This may not sound like an 
advantage in an ‘ideal’ world, but in the world as it is actually constructed, it probably is. This 
is for the simple reason – as noted by Christiano – that ‘if states do not have a say and they 
do not want to do something, the rules of the international system simply won’t be observed 
except by accident since the international system relies on their cooperation’.14 This seems 
to be a similar argument to the one made by Guzman, who observes that:  
‘The signature feature of international law is the lack of coercive enforcement. This 
reality makes compliance with international law a matter of constant concern. 
Imposing rules on states without their consent creates the risk that the rules will be 
ignored. The consent requirement promises to reduce the frequency of non-
compliance by limiting international law rules to those that states have agreed to 
accept. Unanimity ensures, at a minimum, that every affected state prefers the new 
arrangement to the available alternatives.’ 15 
 
This is not merely a pragmatic argument, however. Christiano continues to note that ‘the 
state and, more particularly, the modern democratic state is an extremely sophisticated 
system for the identification and advancement of the interests of a very broad proportion of 
its population.’16 Acknowledging states’ central role in the legitimation of international law is 
therefore justified in moral terms as it is the vehicle through which the interests of persons 
are most likely to be advanced. This moral justification is, of course, premised on states 
being/becoming representative of (or rather ‘authorised’ by) their citizens.  
                                                          
14 Christiano, T. (2010) Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: pp.123-4 
15 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.8. For a similar argument see: Helfer, L.R. 
(2008) ‘Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’: p.73 
16 Christiano, T. (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’: p.124 
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Even taking into account these strong reasons not to dismiss state consent, however, 
I still think asserting its absolute necessity would be an inadvisably bold statement to make. 
This is simply because there may well exist other sufficient theories of international legal 
legitimacy. For example, another (academically) popular theory for the legitimacy of 
international law is ‘democratic rule’.17 If democratic rule were successfully argued to be 
sufficient for the legitimacy of international law, then – needless to say – state consent would 
not be necessary (unless, of course, it were a version of democratic rule that incorporated an 
element of state consent). 
 
Where does this leave us? 
In summary, for the reasons detailed above, state consent is insufficient for the legitimacy of 
international law, but perhaps necessary for the international law of cooperation; especially 
given the present structure of the international system. For international law to be legitimate 
it requires not just state consent – but state consent that has been properly authorised 
through a process of internal deliberative democracy within the consenting state. But were 
does this conclusion leave us? Where does this leave the normative status of international 
law, and how should we respond to the – arguably – illegitimate demands made by much 
international law? It is quite clear that many – if not most states – are undemocratic. Thus, it 
would appear that large swathes of cooperative international laws are actually illegitimate. 
Does this mean we should tear up those laws, or else conclude that many states are not 
actually under the obligations we previously thought they were? Not quite.  
To say that a law is illegitimate is not necessarily to say that one should disobey it, or 
even that one does not have a moral obligation to obey it. To start, people (in this case 
‘states’) may choose to obey a law even if not under a moral obligation. The opposite of having 
a moral obligation to obey is not having a different obligation to ‘disobey’; it is simply having 
no obligation at all. One could, for example, obey a law for prudential reasons, or out of mere 
self-interest.18  
                                                          
17 See, for example: Kuyper, J. (2016) ‘Global Democracy’. 
18 See, for example: Buchanan, A. (2003) Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: p.149 
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Second, just because a moral obligation is not generated from the ‘legitimacy’ of a law 
does not mean that a moral obligation does not exist. As explained previously, the legitimacy 
of an institution generates a content-independent ‘political’ obligation to obey that institution 
(because it is legitimate). This political obligation exists in addition to the natural obligations 
we owe to all other moral agents by virtue of their moral status. Thus, if an institution were 
illegitimate, we would still be left with all our other natural obligations. It may also be the 
case that fulfilling those natural obligations requires obeying the institution. Crucially, 
however, those natural obligations would not be owed ‘to’ the institution – they would be 
owed to other moral agents. The institution would simply be a ‘vehicle’ through which we can 
best fulfil those obligations (say, perhaps, because the institution has the knowledge, 
resources, and ability to coordinate action that we do not possess individually). In practice, 
then, we would have an ‘instrumental’ obligation to follow the rules of the institution, even 
though it is illegitimate.  
We should also be careful not to make the best the enemy of the good. State consent 
may not be sufficient to legitimate international law, but it may be the method most likely to 
produce legitimate law currently available to us, or the one most likely to result in successful 
collective political coordination. It would therefore probably not be wise to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater. Instead, a more prudential approach may be to improve and build 
upon the application of consent theory in in those areas I’ve highlighted as morally deficient. 
Following the conclusions of this thesis, there are at least two practical steps that could be 
made that would go a long way to increasing the legitimacy of international law.  
First, a stronger connection needs to be established between international law and 
the individual; whereby individuals, rather than states, are recognised as the true originators 
of international law. It should be acknowledged the extent to which international law affects 
the lives of individuals and, as a result, individuals should be more central to the authorisation 
and creation of the international laws to which their state consents. The state should be 
understood simply as a vehicle through which individuals project their collective political will 
internationally.  
Practically, this can be achieved in two stages. First, within each state, there needs to 
exist a mechanism through which individuals can influence and authorise state action. My 
own preference, as stated and argued for in section 5.1, would be a system of deliberative 
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democracy with a representative legislative body (i.e., ‘Parliament’). Without such a 
mechanism it is – epistemologically – very difficult to determine whether state action on the 
international level has been authorised by the citizens of that state. A system of deliberative 
democracy would also preserve – to a large extent – the autonomy and formal equality of 
individual citizens; thereby reconciling the imposition of international legal obligations with 
our intuitions about individual and collective self-determination. Less democratic states 
should thus be incentivised to democratise. Of what precisely these incentives consist is not 
something I plan to delve into here, although it is not unreasonable to imagine things like 
trade deals, international loans, or defence contracts being made conditional on democratic 
reforms. (Such proposals have already been advanced by, among others, Leif Wenar).19 
The second stage – which is an extension of the first – would be to increase the role 
of the democratically-elected legislative body within a state in the creation of international 
law. This is a step that ought to be taken even by many of those states we consider to be 
‘advanced’ democracies. Indeed, as I write this, the role of the legislature in international law-
making (compared to that of the executive) is being intensely debated in the UK in relation to 
the treaty that will establish the UK’s future relationship with the EU. To be clear, I am not 
proposing that legislatures take over the role of international negotiation (as negotiations 
require the type of flexibility that large and inharmonious legislatures are unlikely to be able 
to provide). However, many of the problems surrounding the problem of ‘authorisation’ could 
be solved if legislatures – rather than executives – were the bodies to implement international 
law. In this way, I prefer the model of implementation for international law adopted by 
‘dualist’ rather than ‘monist’ states. In practice, this would mean that, for international law 
to be applicable within a state, it would first need to be incorporated into domestic law by 
the democratically elected and accountable legislature, rather than directly incorporated by 
the less accountable executive. 
The second step that could be taken to increase the legitimacy of international law 
(given the finding of this thesis) is for there to be an acknowledgment that international legal 
agreements are not created in a vacuum. Instead, they are made within a complex and 
interconnected world. This interconnected world means that actions and their consequences 
cannot easily be isolated; third parties – to greater or lesser extents – are always prone to 
                                                          
19 Wenar, L. (2013) ‘Fighting the Resource Curse’: p.303 
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experiencing ‘negative externalities’. This acknowledgment is important because the 
international legal system – compared to most domestic legal systems – has a far weaker 
framework of rules and protections that prevent against this type of indirect harm. Crucially, 
however, this acknowledgment needs to be institutionalised so that it can be the future basis 
on which legitimate international law is created. In other words, before international law is 
created, an ‘impact assessment’ should be conducted to ensure that no third party will be 
severely harmed. Where it is found that a third-party would be seriously harmed, then their 
consent to that harm should be obtained. This step will ensure that states creating new 
international law are at moral liberty to do so (i.e., the creation of that new international law 
is consistent with their pre-existing moral obligations not to cause serious harm to non-
consenting states). At present (as highlighted in section 5.2), international legal practice 
assumes that states are at moral liberty to create international law; largely irrespective of 
potential harm caused to third parties. This, I argued, is not consistent with the assumptions 
underpinning the theory of state consent and is, therefore, a misapplication (or rather 
‘incomplete’ application) of the theory. 
 Since I am not – nor claim to be – an international lawyer, I hesitate to speculate on 
how this proposal might be achieved in practice. However, from my limited knowledge, I can 
extend two suggestions that may serve as the basis for future discussion. First, such a ‘harm 
principle’ could be codified by states into treaty-form. An appropriate place to adopt such a 
provision would probably be as an amendment to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT). As discussed earlier in the thesis, the VCLT is a treaty that specifies rules on 
the negotiation, ratification, and application of treaties between states. The only provision in 
the Treaty currently relating to third parties is Article 34, which states ‘a treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’. In addition, the only provision 
concerning the potential invalidity of a treaty because of its effect is Article 53, which states 
that: ‘a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law’. (By ‘peremptory norm’ it is meant a jus cogens norm). It seems to 
me that either or both of these provisions could be extended to include the harm principle to 
which I’ve referred. So, for example, a new provision might read: ‘a treaty is void if, at the 
time of its conclusion, its provisions, either directly or indirectly, causes serious injury to a 
third State without its consent’. 
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A second option would be for an international court – such as the ICJ – to recognise 
this harm principle as a ‘general principle’ of international law. In this case, an international 
court would need to wait for a state to bring such a case before it, and then rule in its favour 
citing this principle. By way of justification, the court should make clear in their judgement 
that a system of state consent presupposes sovereign states with certain basic natural rights 
(such as to be free from serious injury) that cannot ceteris paribus be violated. This includes 
violations that are intentional and direct, as well as those that are unintentional and indirect.  
The advantage of the treaty option is that the principle would be more clearly and 
visibly established in international law. Having received the explicit consent of states, the 
principle would also more likely be respected and upheld. The down-side with the treaty 
option, however, is that the principle would only apply to those states that signed-up to it. 
The pros and cons of the ‘judicial decision’ option are essentially the reverse. As a general 
principle of international law, the harm principle would ostensibly have universal application. 
However, given that it would not have received the explicit consent of states, it is less likely 
to be obeyed. The court developing (or ‘identifying’) such a harm principle would also be 
opening itself up to accusations of judicial activism.  
With either option, however, I fully acknowledge how fraught with complications 
constructing such a principle would be in practice. How, for example, would we define what 
constitutes a ‘serious harm’ or ‘injury’? How would one prove the causal link between the 
international law and the indirect harm inflicted on the third party? And how – if all this could 
be established – would we quantify the harm caused so as to achieve legal redress – 
presumably through financial settlement? I do not claim to know the answers to these 
questions, nor will I explore them here. The short – perhaps lazy – answer would be to leave 
it to the discretion of the courts. However, even if we wanted to hand courts such immense 
judicial discretion and responsibility, we would still – at a minimum – need to give the court 
some guidelines as a point of reference for making a decision. In principle, however, I do not 
believe these problems to be impenetrable – especially as these same complexities frequently 
arise, and are dealt with, at the domestic level. 
 In sum, although this thesis has concluded that state consent is insufficient for the 
legitimacy of international law, it does not propose tearing-up all existing international laws. 
We have natural moral obligations outside of our political obligations, and it may well be that 
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following existing international laws (although illegitimate) is the best way of fulfilling those 
obligations. For example, we arguably have an independent moral obligation to preserve 
international peace and stability, and to maximise predictability for the maintenance of order. 
If respecting existing international law is likely to achieve this, then we should be cautious 
about undermining such laws. We should also be mindful not to make the ‘ideal’ the enemy 
of the ‘good and achievable’. Our current system of state consent may be the best we can 
presently hope for given the construction of the international system. Thus, for example, 
although we might believe that – in theory – a global democratically elected and 
representative legislature would consistently produce legitimate international laws, such an 
institution is not in the offing, and an attempt to forcibly construct it may lead to more harm 
than good.  
This does not mean, however, that we should not work to reform the international 
legal system so as to increase its claim to legitimacy. I have offered two proposals for how this 
might be achieved. The first was to work towards the democratisation of states, and the 
second to institutionalise a ‘harm principle’ as a treaty provision or general principle of 
international law. If these two reforms could be realised, I believe that state consent would 
have a much stronger claim to be sufficient for the legitimacy of international law.  
 
Andrew Guzman wrote in 2011 that ‘the normative implications of our consent-centric 
approach to international law have not been adequately addressed and, in my view, are not 
well understood.’20 This thesis has tried to render this claim a little less true. In offering the 
first ‘book-length’ moral analysis of state consent as the basis of international legal legitimacy, 
I have tried to introduce nuance to a debate where little existed before. I have also tried to 
bridge the divide – referred to in my introduction – between the way this issue is approached 
by, on the one hand, political philosophers, and on the other, international lawyers. I hope 
that, in reading this thesis, philosophers will come away with an improved understanding of 
the structures and complexities of international law, and that international lawyers will apply 
a more critical eye to the method of legitimation that is (often) taken for granted.  
                                                          
20 Guzman, A. (2011) ‘The Consent Problem in International Law’: p.5 
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The value of this thesis should not be read – or not ‘only’ be read – with reference to 
the ability of its conclusions to achieve consensus or agreement. In undertaking this thesis, I 
have tried to accomplish something far more useful: to map the terrain of this debate; to 
deconstruct it into more comprehensible components – so that future contributors may more 
easily navigate the points of contention and construct their own arguments. The legitimacy 
of international law is an issue that will only grow more pressing as political, social and 
economic activity increasingly takes place ‘between’ rather than ‘within’ states. We need to 
find a way to reconcile our conceptions of political legitimacy with legal structures and 
authorities that are becoming increasingly distant from the individual. If this thesis has in any 
way contributed to understanding and resolving this challenge – or helped others to do so – 
then I consider it a success.  
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